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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103Q").

issues on Cross-Appeal
Did the trial court err in reopening the evidence in this case after both sides
had rested their case, presented written closing arguments, and the evidence
was obviously insufficient to grant judgment in the Bank's favor? Reopening
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion after considering the totality of the
circumstances. Lewis v. Porter. 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976)

Determinative Legal Provisions
None.

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff/Appellant Franklin Credit ["the Bank"] is the successor-in-interest to
a trust deed issued in favor of Bank One. The Bank sought to judicially foreclose
the trust deed. Blaine Hanney ["Blaine"] resisted, claiming that his then wife,
Shirley Hanney ["Shirley"] had falsely signed his name to the trust deed. The trial
court agreed with Blaine and found the trust deed void.
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Course of Proceedings Below
The parties filed a complaint and counterclaim. After denying cross
motions for summary judgment, the matter proceeded to trial. In preparation for
trial, the court executed a lengthy pretrial order. R. at 994-1035, App. A. Trial
was held on 20, 22, and 23 April 2009 before the Honorable Rodney Page. At
the court's request, the parties presented written closing arguments. R. at 1058
(the Bank's Post Trial Brief) and 1095 (Defendant's Closing Argument).
Defendant's closing argument pointed out that Plaintiff had failed to present
evidence of the amount owing under the trust deed and was therefore not entitled
to a judgment of foreclosure. Realizing the defective nature of its evidence, the
Bank filed a motion to reopen the evidence to cure the evidentiary deficiency.
After oral argument, the trial court entered an order allowing the evidence to be
reopened, subject to Blaine's right to object. R. at 1270-73. Because the proffered
evidence was inadmissible hearsay, Defendant objected to it. R. at 1268-69.
Judge Page issued a memorandum decision on 28 January 2010 in
Defendants' favor. R. at 1277-87, App. B. Subsequently, Judge David M.
Connors issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment in
Favor of Blaine J. Hanney and Hanney Family Trust on 25 February 2010. R. at
1288-1304 (Findings) and 1305-07 (Judgment). Notices of appeal and crossappeal were timely filed.
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Disposition at Trial Court
The trial court declared the trust deed void. R. at 1277-87. Judgment
entered in favor of Defendant Blaine J. Hanney and Hanney Family Trust. R. at
1305-07.

Facts
I.

Introduction and Blaine's Home
Blaine and Shirley were married in 1973. Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law ["Findings"], If 8, App. C. Between 1998 and 2003, Shirley
embezzled hundreds of thousands of dollars from her in-laws' family limited
partnership. R. at 1386, vol. II, 33. To conceal this, she obtained loans secured
by the marital home without Blaine's knowledge or consent. This case relates to
the Bank's effort to judicially foreclose one of the trust deeds securing one of
those loans. App. C, Findings, ^ 1.
The real property was deeded to Blaine alone on January 20, 1978. App.
C, Findings, Tf 3. Trial Exhibit 1, attached as App. D. Blaine's parents deeded this
real property to Blaine at the same time that other lots his parents had developed
were deeded to his siblings. App. C, Findings, f 5. Blaine and Shirley then
proceeded to build a home which was completed lien-free. App. C, Findings, fflf
6-7.
During the marriage, Blaine and Shirley were always debt-free. App. C,
Findings, If 7 (marital home was constructed and finished debt-free); R. at 1386,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vol. II, 39-40. Over the years they put their money in a joint account out of which
family expenses were paid. App. C, Findings, fl 11. Shirley was primarily
responsible for keeping track of the family finances, paying the bills, seeing the
taxes were taken care of and for the financial management for the family. She
signed checks in Blaine's name and tax returns when he was out of town. App. C
Findings, H 12.
In 1991 Blaine's construction job begin to take him out of town most of the
time and he would only come home once or twice a month. Shirley took on even
more responsibility for family finances and he became less and less involved,
relying on Shirley's representation as to how things were going. He trusted her
completely. App. C, Findings, If 13.

II.

Hanney Development and Hanney & Hanney Construction
For several years Blaine's family had been involved in the development

and sale of the land owned by his parents. App. C, Findings, fl 14. In April 1993,
the family organized Hanney Development, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership. App.
C, Findings, fflj 15-16. Blaine, his mother, and his sister were designated as the
General Partners with his other five siblings as Limited Partners. App. C,
Findings, % 17. Shirley, though not a partner of the limited partnership, had full
control of the finances of the company. She had authority on bank accounts, did
the bookkeeping for the company, paid the bills, and deposited the funds. She
dealt directly with the accountant in preparing taxes and prepared financial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reports for the members of the partnership. The partners relied on her to take
care of the business's finances and on her reports as to the financial condition of
the Partnership. App. C, Findings, If 19.
Shirley started building speculative homes. To that end, Shirley formed
Hanney and Hanney Construction. Initially, Shirley associated with another
builder to build homes. She gradually began to build homes on her own. She also
expanded into commercial work. R. at 1386, vol. II, 36-38.
At the beginning, Shirley used only money that she and Blaine had agreed
to use from their savings and construction loans. However, at some point she
opened up a line of credit with First Security Bank which she paid off each year.
Blaine had no knowledge of it and was not an obligor. App. C, Findings, If 41.
Eventually, Shirley's business became overextended when she incurred a
$160,000 concrete bill she could not cover. She begin taking money from
Hanney Development accounts at Barnes Bank to meet her Hanney and Hanney
Construction obligations. Neither Blaine nor any of the partners of Hanney
Development had any knowledge of this. App. C, Findings, If 42. Shirley had no
legal right to take these funds.
Shirley manipulated the books and records of Hanney Development to
conceal the money she had taken money from Hanney Development. App. C,
Findings, ^f 43. Shirley controlled all of the records of both; she falsified the
records and tax returns and withheld all information from Blaine. App. C,
Findings, If 65. Shirley would create entirely new, and false, banking statements
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to present to Blaine and the Hanney Development partners. She also created
other false documents to conceal her betrayal. R. at 1386, vol. II, 28-31.

III.

Establishment of the Hanney Family Trust
i

In about 1995, Blaine and Shirley met with an attorney's representative to
discuss a trust. They decided to create the Hanney Family Revocable Trust. App.
C, Findings, jf 21. Blaine and Shirley executed a written trust agreement. Trial

<

Exhibit 6, attached as App. E.
Blaine and Shirley signed the Trust on February 22,1995. App. E, Trust
i

Agreement; App. C, Findings, fl 28. At the same time, Blaine, as grantor, signed a
special warranty deed conveying the home to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of
the Hanney Family Trust. App. C, Findings, Tf 29. Trial Exhibit 4, attached as App.

*

F. This deed was recorded on April 10, 1995. App. F, Special Warranty Deed.
App. C, Findings, If 31.

(

As part of establishing their trust, Blaine and Shirley also signed reciprocal
general durable powers of attorney. The general power of attorney were never
recorded. App. C, Findings, fl 32. It is this general durable power of attorney from

a

Blaine to Shirley, that the Bank relies upon in this case. Trial Exhibit 8, attached
as App. H. There is, however, no evidence that the Bank was even aware of this

<

power of attorney until after litigation commenced. Instead, the transactions with
the Bank were consummated by a special power of attorney Shirley forged, which
<

will be discussed later.
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Blaine and Shirley had some subjective-and erroneous-beliefs about the
trust and related documents. They believed that the trust would become effective
if something happened to either one of them, but would have no effect as long as
they were both still alive. App. C, Findings, U 23, R. at 1292. They testified that
they understood the trust would only take effect after one of them died. Moreover,
they believed that the general power of attorney could only be used in the event
one of them was disabled. App. C, Findings, ^ 33, R. at 1293.

IV.

Shirley Borrows from Bank One
In August 2000, Shirley refinanced prior loans she had fraudulently

obtained. App. C, Findings, fflf 44-57. Through its title agent, Inwest Title, Bank
One sedulously avoided doing business with the trust. Instead, the home was
conveyed, by deed from the trust to Blaine and Shirley individually, and then a
trust deed was granted to the Bank.
Inwest Title prepared, and Shirley executed the warranty deed conveying
the home out of the family trust to Blaine and Shirley individually. This deed
referenced no power of attorney; Shirley simply forged Blaine's name on it. Trial
Exhibit 21, attached as App. G. It was signed on August 22, 2000 and recorded
the on 29 August 2000 as entry No. 1610660. Blaine did not sign the document
nor was he aware of it. App. C, Findings, |f 59.
Before a trust deed could be executed, another impediment remained:
obtaining Blaine's signature on the trust deed. As a condition of obtaining a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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policy of title insurance protecting the lender's interest, the title company woudl
not accept the general power of attorney. Instead, through its title agent, Bank
One required Shirley to obtain a special power of attorney. R. at 1385, vol. I,
172-75. Shirley obtained the form special power of attorney from the title
i

company, took it home, signed Blaine's name and had a notary falsely notarized
the signature she forged, jd. Trial Exhibit 26, attached as App. I. It was recorded
at the request of Inwest Title on August 29, 2000 as document No. 1610661,

i

immediately following the warranty deed and immediately before the trust deed.
App. C, Findings, fl 61, R. at 1300. Blaine had no knowledge of the special
i

power of attorney.
The trust deed at the heart of this case was next. Shirley executed this trust
deed for herself and for Blaine by virtue of her deceitful special power of attorney.

(

The trust deed was recorded at the request of Inwest Title on August 29, 2000 as
document 1610662. Trial Exhibit 22, attached as App. J. Blaine had no
knowledge of it. App. C, Findings, fl 60, R. at 1299-1300. There is no dispute that
the general durable power of attorney was not used for this transaction.
I
To restore title to the Hanney Family Trust, Shirley then executed another
quit claim deed. Shirley executed the quit claim deed for herself and for Blaine
under the forged special power of attorney. This deed was recorded as entry no.

<

1610663. Trial Exhibit 23, attached as App. K. Blaine was not aware of this
document. App. C, Findings, fl 62. The proceeds from this loan were used to pay
i
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off the amounts owning to Key Bank and other obligations owing by Hanney
Construction. App. C, Findings, ]f 63.
None of the funds received by Shirley were used to improve the property or
to provide for any family expenses. App. C, Findings, If 66, R. at 1301. In addition
to the terms of the General Power of Attorney which did not provide Shirley with
authority to engage in the transactions in question, the limits of her authority were
further evidenced by the fact that the Bank's predecessor in interest would not
allow her to proceed using the General Power of Attorney, but required a Special
Power of Attorney as to specific property. App. C, Findings, % 67, R. at 1301.
Blaine had no knowledge of the loan by Bank One to Shirley and never signed
any of the documents or powers of attorney it was claimed he signed in
conjunction with the loan. App. C, Findings, fl 68, R. at 1301-02.

V.

Reopening the Evidence
Following the presentation of evidence, each side rested. R. at 1384, vol.

Ill, at 32. The trial court asked for written closing briefs in lieu of oral closing
arguments. The Bank filed its closing argument on 8 May 2010. R. at 1080; and
Defendants responded on 27 May 2010. R. at 1128. Defendants observed that
the Bank had failed to prove its case. The Bank presented no evidence of the
amount owing under the trust deed and therefore the Bank was not entitled to any
judicial foreclosure. R. at 1098-1102.
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Recognizing the flaw, the Bank responded by requesting that the trial court
reopen the evidence. R. at 1135-40. The issue was briefed and argued and the
trial court allowed the Bank to reopen the evidence, with a caveat. R. at 1270-73.
The Bank was to proffer its evidence and the Defendants had the opportunity to
object to the proffer. The Bank's proffer was of evidence from the Bank's
employee. Defendant timely objected on foundational and hearsay grounds. R. at
1268-69. The Bank never responded to nor cured the objection. More importantly,

i

the proffered evidence was never presented to the trial court by the Bank.1
Ultimately, the trial court signed an order permitting reopening the evidence
i

and purporting to find certain facts. However, the only basis for the conclusion
regarding the principal amount owing in the trial evidence was trial exhibit 59.
Exhibit 59 was a document prepared by Shirley. She noted the Bank One loan

(

ambiguously: "oweing [sic] $245,590.25 ?." Beyond this, not a scintilla of
evidence regarding the principal amount owing was presented by the Bank. No
evidence establishing an interest rate due or the date from which interest would
run was presented. Given that no evidence was actually presented by the Bank
{

1. The record does not disclose any basis to determine the principal amount
owing. The only reference to any amount owing was contained in Exhibit 59,
attached as App. L. Exhibit 59 is a document prepared by Shirley, in her
handwriting. With regard to the Bank One loan, Exhibit 59 contains the following
reference: "oweing [sic] $245,590.25 ?." There is no indication in the record what
this figure represents, other than some amount owing to Bank One. The record
does not disclose whether this is a principal amount, principal and interest, a payoff, or some other figure. Neither does the record disclose whether this figure is
current as of a date certain.
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on this point, the trial court's order was wrong. Putting that aside, however, no
evidence exists regarding interest.

Summary of the Argument
The Bank's attack on the Judgment and Findings amounts to two main
points: (1) the claim that Shirley had authority, actual, implied or apparent, to
execute the various deeds in question and (2) Shirley's actions were ratified. On
cross-appeal, Blaine challenges the trial court's decision to reopen the evidence
after Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prevail. The trial court erred in
granting that motion.
Shirley had no authority. The general durable power of attorney is
inadequate as a matter of law to be used to exercise reserved or granted trust
powers. It is also inadequate to allow a gratuitous transfer, as occurred here.
Because Shirley never had any personal interest in the home, she had nothing
individually which should could convey. The trust deed was ineffective to convey
any interest to the Bank.
Blaine did not ratify Shirley's actions. After he was informed of all the facts,
he repudiated the loan. Prior to that, Blaine never was fully appraised of all the
material facts. Moreover, there is no evidence that Blaine ever had any intent to
ratify. Ratification did not occur.
The trial court's findings and judgment should be affirmed. They are based
on substantial evidence and correct legal analysis. Alternatively, the trial court's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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grant of reopener should be reversed. Because no evidence sufficient to
establish a judicial foreclosure was presented, no foreclosure will lie at all. This
court may therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this alternate ground.

Argument
I.

Response to the Bank's Brief
A.

The Trial Court's Findings Are Presumed Correct Because the
Appellant Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence

The unacknowledged core of the Bank's appeal is a direct challenge to the
trial court's factual findings. Indeed, throughout the Bank's opening brief, it merely

'

reargues its view of the evidence. Revealingly, the Bank fails to cite a single
finding of fact in its Statement of Facts. App. Brief, 7-24. The Bank repeatedly
asserts that various factual findings are against the "clear" evidence. App. Brief,
42, 45-46. However, the Bank makes no effort, and no pretense of effort, to
<

satisfy its obligation to marshal the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court's findings
of fact are presumed correct.
To challenge findings of fact, an appellant has a duty to marshal the

\

evidence. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Marshaling obligates
an appellant to detail "'the evidence in support of the findings then demonstrate
i

that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence.'" Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, fl19,
100 P.3d 1177 (quoting In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)).
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<

This duty is not met by merely rearguing a losing position or by self-serving
citations to the record. Chen, ^ 78.
When the duty to marshal is unmet, the appellate court assumes that the
trial court's findings are supported by the evidence. Chen, If 80; In re Estate of
Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). Even where the appellant seeks to
challenge only a legal determination, if the correctness of the trial court's
application of a legal standard is fact-sensitive, the appellant still has a duty to
marshal the evidence. Chen, fflj 19-20.
In the present case, the Bank has made no effort to marshal any evidence.
Instead, the Bank relies on declarative sentences rather than marshaling. The
Bank's marshaling not simply inadequate, it is nonexistent. Instead, the Bank
merely recycles its argument from below; it does not actually challenge facts.
Accordingly, in this appeal, the correctness of the trial court's factual findings is
presumed. Because the factual findings support the trial court's legal
conclusions, the judgment should be affirmed.

B.

The Trust Deed is invalid Since Shirley Never Had Any
Transferrable Interest in the Home

From 1978 until 1995, the home was vested in Blaine alone. Following
1995, it was vested in the trust. As a spouse, Shirley had no interest in the home
which was transferrable or to which any creditor's claim could attach. Apart from
the forged power of attorney and deeds, the Bank also claims that Shirley's status
as a spouse allowed her to convey some or all of the home held in the family
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trust. The Bank's Brief, 48-50. Blaine concedes that, upon the commencement of
the divorce in 2005, the home was a marital asset. Nevertheless, there was never
any point in time when Shirley had any alienable interest in the home.
A decree vesting marital property in one spouse takes effect "when a
decree of divorce is rendered." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1). A spousal interest
in marital property, during a marriage and prior to the commencement of a
divorce action, is at most inchoate: unascertained, unallocated, undetermined,

i

unassignable, ungarnishable, and uninheritable. While no Utah case has
addressed this issue, sister states with marital distribution statutes similar to
i

Utah's have.
In Nielson v. Thompson. 982 P.2d 709 (Wyo. 1999), the plaintiffs obtained
a money judgment against Mr. Thompson, which was uncollectible for several

(

years. When Mr. Thompson filed for divorce, the Nielsons sought to intervene in
the divorce, asserting a judgment creditor's claim to Mr. Thompson's interest in
the marital estate. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that such intervention was
improper because the judgment creditor held no interest which could be the
subject of intervention in the divorce. The Wyoming Supreme Court explained:
We conclude that the effect of our [equitable] distribution in divorce cases
[statute] is quite similar to the effect ascribed to the Kansas statute in Cadv
v. Cadv, 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358 (1978). That court held that prior to
the filing of the divorce petition a spouse had oniy an inchoate interest in
property held in the name of the other spouse. When the divorce complaint
is filed, however, that inchoate interest vests subject to definition and
determination by the divorce court. At that juncture a species of common or
co-ownership is identified, but that property is not then divided until the
ultimate decree of the court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

,

<

Nielson, 982 P.2d at 712. This species of co-ownership:
. . . does not afford an ownership interest to the non-owning spouse;
instead it is a right to have the assets included in the marital estate which
the court will divide. Mr. Thompson had no possessory or marketable
interest in Mrs. Thompson's property, and he had nothing to which a lien
could attach. The limited purpose of the co-ownership right as identified in
[prior Wyoming cases] does not provide Mr. Thompson with an ownership
interest to which any rights of [a judgment creditor] could attach. It is clear
that the [judgment creditor] could not have levied execution on any property
involved in the marital estate until it was actually divided by the district
court.
id. (emphasis added). See also, In Re Marriage of Watson. 22 P.3d 1081, 1085
(Kan. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, the effect of this doctrine is that during marriage
property in one spouse's name is not exposed to the other spouse's creditors:
Marital property was not subject to a lien or execution based upon a
judgment obtained against one spouse or co-owner during the
pendency of the divorce action because of the vested interest of the
other spouse or co-owner. Smith made clear that the doctrine did
more than remove property division transfers from the reach of the
tax men. It also gave the previously uninvolved spouse property
rights that trumped those of creditors seeking to collect from the
involved spouse until the ownership of the property is finalized by the
decree.
Watson. 22 P.3d at 1085, citing In Re Marriage of Smith. 737 P.2d 469 (Kan.
1987).2

2. Many other courts have reached similar conclusions under equitable
distribution statutes similar to Utah's. In Re Questions Submitted bv United
States Dist. Court. 513 p.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974) ("[a]t the time a divorce action is
filed, the inchoate martial interest becomes vested: "This interest which has
vested is inchoate only in the sense that, prior to the division, the property to be
transferred to the wife has not yet been determined . . . [But] upon the filing of the
action, the court may protect this vested interest of the wife pending the division
order, even though the property to be transferred to her has not yet been
determined."); Sinha v. Sinha. 727 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (App. Div. 2001) (the
marital interest is "unenforceable and unallocated" prior to the divorce action and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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During the course of a marriage and before the pendency of any divorce,
property owned by each spouse in their own name is that spouse's separate
property. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-2 ("[contracts may be made by a
wife, and liabilities incurred and enforced by or against her, to the same extent
and in the same manner as if she were unmarried"); Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-5(2)
("[t]he wages, earnings, property, rents, or other income of one spouse may not
be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt, obligation, or

i

liability of the other spouse."). During the course of the Hanneys' marriage and
prior to the initiation of any divorce, the interest of Shirley in the property was
merely an expectancy.
Shirley had, at most, an expectancy that in the event of divorce, the parties'
home would be an asset of the marital estate subject to division. She had no

'

interest to which any claim could attach. The parties deliberately so arranged
their affairs that Shirley individually never had any interest in the home. At home,
Shirley had an inchoate, expectancy interest. As a matter of law, such an interest
is neither transferable nor attachable. Here, the Bank argues that it has a
I

"matured into a true ownership interest only upon the entry of the final divorce
decree); Leibowitz v. Leibowitz. 462 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (App. Div. 1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing such interests as "mere expectancies");
McDuffie v. Com.. 638 S.E.2d 130, 142 (Va. 2006) (marital interest is unvested,
inchoate interest; married woman's act, like Utah's, provides marriage does not
give spouse interest in other spouse's property); United States v. 9894 South
Titan Court. Unit 9. 75 G.3d 1470, 1478 (10th cir. 1996), partially overturned on
other grounds, United States v. Urserv, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (under Colorado law,
a spouse's inchoate interest "is neither a present nor a vested interest.").
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property right based only upon the notion that the home was marital property. The
trial court was correct to reject this claim. The Judgment should be affirmed.

C.

Shirley Has Never Had Authority-Actual, implied or Apparentto Convey the Home Out of Trust or to Herself Gratuitously

The Bank rests its entire case on its claim that the general durable power
of attorney blessed every action of Shirley. The Bank claims that the general
durable power of attorney granted Shirley authority act in Blaine's name both to
function as a trustee and to gratuitously transfer the property to herself. The Bank
has failed to analyze Utah law regarding general powers of attorney; Utah law
does not authorize such actions based upon a generic, general power of attorney.
The general power of attorney did not authorize what Shirley did, either for Blaine
personally or the trust. The special power of attorney was a forgery. Thus,
Shirley was without authority of any kind here. The trial court's decision was
legally and factually correct.
The general durable power of attorney provided:
I, Blaine J. Hanney . . . hereby make, constitute, and appoint Shirley
Ann Hanney . . . my true and lawful attorney in fact for me and in my
name, place and stead, giving unto said Shirley Ann Hanney full
power to do and perform all and every act that I may legally do
through an attorney, in relation to all of my property, real or personal,
wherever situate, to carry out the purposes for which this power is
granted, specifically including the power to make deposits, sign
checks, endorse items, and withdraw funds from checking, savings,
or other accounts.
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App. H. The General Durable Power make no reference to the parties' Trust, and
it does not empower any gifts. It has no other special powers, merely this general
language.
The universal view is that powers of attorney are to be strictly construed.
Kline v. Utah Dept. of Health. 776 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing
Huntsman v. Huntsman. 192 P. 368, 370 (Utah 1920). In this context, however,
"strict construction" has a particular meaning: construction with the agent's
fiduciary duties in view. In Re Trust of Franzen. 955 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1998). In
Franzen. the settlor of a trust provided that his surviving spouse could make
certain withdrawals from the trust, jd. at 1020. The settlor died and the surviving
spouse attempted to make these changes through her brother, who she had
appointed to be her attorney-in-fact. The Court noted that the common law rule
held that
Where a broadly worded power of attorney arguably authorizes acts that
may be inconsistent with the principal's interests or intent, the instrument
should not be interpreted as allowing the agent to undertake such acts in
the absence of specific authority.
jd- at 1021. In a similar vein, the Washington Supreme Court noted that the
general view was that "gift transfers or transfers without substantial consideration
inuring to the benefit of the principal violate the scope of authority conferred by a
general power of attorney to sell, exchange, transfer or convey property for the
benefit of the principal." Bryant v. Bryant. 882 P.2d 169,172 (Wash. 1994).
Utah law, with respect to powers of attorney, is similar.
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A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person,
as principal, authorizes another to act as agent. The scope of the
authority so conferred may, by the terms of the instrument itself, be
general or limited, but the instrument creating this agency
relationship is to be strictly construed.
Kline, 776 P.2d at 61-62 citing Huntsman 192 P. at 370.3 The Utah Supreme
Court held:
A power of attorney given to an agent to act in the name and on
behalf of the principal, though couched in general language, must, in
the absence of anything showing a contrary intent, be construed as
giving authority to act only in the separate, individual business of the
principal and for his benefit. It cannot be construed as permitting the
agent to engage in transactions foreign or repugnant to that
business, or to bind the principal by acts done, not for his benefit and
in his behalf, but for the private benefit of the agent himself, or for
other persons.
Huntsman. 192 P. at 370 (quotations omitted). The facts of Huntsman are
illustrative. A party was attempting to vindicate a deed issued by virtue of a power
of attorney, claiming that a general power of attorney included sufficient authority
to gift the property. The Utah Supreme Court held that a general power of
attorney that did not specifically include the power to make a gift was simply not
within the contemplation of the principal and that even a broad, general power of
attorney could not be relied upon to vindicate the transaction. Huntsman, 192 P.
at 370-71.4 Here, Shirley made a gratuitous transfer of the home from the trust to
3. In 2003, Utah codified the common law rule that authority to modify a trust
or to make a gift are powers that must be specifically stated a power of attorney.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-503(3).
4. In Eaqar v. Burrows. 2008 UT 42, 191 P.3d 9, an individual was granted
authority, pursuant to a power of attorney, which included a specific power to "gift
property, whether real or personal". The court noted that "whether an attorney in
fact has power to convey the principal's property for nominal consideration must
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herself and Blaine. Such a transfer is without the authority of the power of
attorney.
In this case, it is undisputed that Shirley transferred the home from the trust
to herself and Blaine without any consideration. She then granted a trust deed on
the home from herself and Blaine. To find that the general durable power of
attorney vindicated these faithless actions, the court would have to find either
specific authority or at least substantial benefit to the principal: the trust and

i

Blaine. Neither exists here.
Moreover, a power of attorney is insufficient, without more, to amend a
i

Trust. Kline, 776 P.2d at 61-62. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, citing
Kline, has noted that "[t]he authority appears uniform that 'in the absence of
express direction to the contrary, the power to revoke [a trust] is personal to the

{

settlor, when reserved to him, and does not pass to his successors in interest on
his death, nor is it transferable by him." In Re Guardianship of Lee, 982 P.2d
539, 541 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 1999). The Lee court continued:

(

be 'deducible from the language or manifest intent of the instrument.'" Eagar, ^
20, quoting Huntsman. 192 P. at 374. The Utah Supreme Court noted that
because the power of attorney in Huntsman granted "no specific authority to gift
the principal's real or personal property" no such power was conveyed. Eagar,
U 20 & n.11. The Eagar court noted that though the language of the power of
attorney in Huntsman was general, it lacked sufficient specificity to give the
property away or convey it for mere nominal consideration. Id. The power of
attorney in the present case is virtually the same as the one in Huntsman. It is a
general power of attorney that does not include the power to make a gift or to
convey Blaine's property away for nominal consideration. Moreover, it does not
convey any authority
with respect to the Trust.
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Thus a trust reserving solely under the settlor the power to revoke
becomes irrevocable upon the settlor's incapacity, notwithstanding
execution of an otherwise general, durable power of attorney, where
the trust and the power evince the settlor's intent at revocation that
the revocation power be personal to the settlor. Kline v. Utah Dept. of
Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

id.
Since a power of attorney is to "be strictly construed," Muller v. Bank of
America. 12 P.3d 899, 903 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000), an attorney in fact "does not
have the power to revoke a trust where the settlor personally reserved the right to
revoke." id. 5 "Unless the settlor expressly states otherwise in the trust document
or power of attorney, the power to revoke a trust is personal to the settlor and is
non-delegable." Muller at 904. Similar cases from Utah's sister states illustrate
these principles.

5. The Bank suggests that Utah law may be different: "While Franklin has
been unable to find a Utah case directly on point, two Utah cases suggest a
power of attorney may be used to act on behalf of a trustee." App. Brief 32. The
Bank then cites Eager v. Burrows, 2008 UT App 42,191 P.3d 9 and Davis v.
Young, 2008 UT App 246, 190 P.3d 23 to support this proposition. Neither case
provides any support for this proposition. The Davis court noted that reciprocal
powers of attorney had been executed in connection with the creation of a trust.
Far from holding that a power of attorney could be used to allow an agent to act
as a trustee, the court noted, as a matter of fact, that a husband, armed with a
general durable power of attorney, was not so acting when he signed a quit claim
deed in his own name alone. Put another way, the mere existence of a power of
attorney did not mean that the agent was acting under its power.
Eager is even less helpful for the Bank. A power of attorney explicitly
granted the agent the power to make a gift. The agent made a gift under the
power. Because the gifts comported with the specific powers granted in the
power of attorney, the gift was upheld. Eager contrasts favorably with the present
case: the power of attorney had no gifting authority and therefore, Shirley's acts
were beyond the terms of that power.
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In Amcore Bank v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 174 (III. App. Ct.
2001), a bank sued the defaulting borrower and guarantors on a loan. One of the
guarantees had been executed by an attorney-in-fact for his father, jd. at 177-78.
Like Franklin Credit, Amcore relied "solely on the broad grant of agency in the
power of attorney's opening paragraph . . .givfing] the authority to perform 'every
act of every kind and nature which may be deemed desirable or advisable to be
performed." jd. at 182. The Court held that "'all-embracing expressions are
discounted or discarded. Thus, phrases like 'as sufficiently in all respects as we
ourselves could do personally in the premises"... are disregarded as
i

meaningless verbiage.'" jd., quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency. § 34, cmt.
h, at 122 (1958). Even a broadly worded power of attorney is insufficient to grant
authority to execute a guarantee, jd. Even the broadest general power is not

{

sufficient to grant a guarantee if it is not specifically allows. Here, even the broad
power was insufficient to make a gift or alter the trust arrangements.
Even when a gift would provide a tax benefit to the principle, a power of
attorney cannot be used for a gift without express authority. In Re
Conservatorship of Anderson. 628 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Neb. 2001). In Anderson.
an agent purported to make gifts of the principal's assets-in order to reduce the
principal's taxable estate-to himself and others, jd- at 237-38. Like Huntsman, the

(

agents pointed to a general power of attorney to attempt to vindicate the gifts; like
Huntsman, the court rejected the self-serving claims:
<

A power of attorney authorizes another to act as one's agent. Generally, an
agent is required to act solely for the benefit of his or her principal in all
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

matters connected with the agency and adhere faithfully to the instructions
of the principal. An agent and principal are in a fiduciary relationship such
that the agent has an obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to the
principal. An agent is prohibited from profiting from the agency relationship
to the detriment of the principal.
*

*

*

This court has repeatedly held that no gift may be made by an attorney in
fact to himself or herself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly
granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear intent on the part
of the principal to make such a gift.
id. at 239. The benefit to the principal's estate of reducing estate taxes was
viewed as almost entirely self-serving to the agents, who were also heirs of the
estate. In a similar case, an agent purported to create a trust for the principal and
to transfer the principal's assets into the trust. In Re Trust of Jameison, 8 P.3d 83
(Mont. 2000). The Montana Supreme Court held that a broadly worded general
power of attorney was insufficient to grant an attorney in fact authority to create a
trust for the principal, id- at 87.6
Finally, in a carefully reasoned case, the Delaware Supreme Court
provided a thorough analysis of the effect of a self-interested agent making
transfers under a power of attorney. In Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217 (Del.
1999), an elderly woman granted a general power of attorney to her neighbor.
Using the power of attorney, the neighbor transferred substantial property from

6. Other courts have concluded that a general power of attorney is insufficient
to allow the attorney to make a gift of the principal's property to herself. In Re
Washington. 297 B.R. 662, 664 (S.D.Fia.Bnk. 2003)(a power of attorney not
sufficient to allow bankruptcy petition to be signed without noting the power on
the petition); In Re Trust of Franzen, 955 P.2d 1018,1021 (Colo. 1998); In Re
Conservatorship of Anderson. 628 N.W.2d 233, 239-40 (Neb. 2001); Cheloha v.
Cheloha. 582 N.W.2d 291, 297-98 (Neb. 1998).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

the woman to herself or family members-generally consistent with the woman's
orally expressed desires. ]d- at 220-21. These transfers were challenged by the
residuary beneficiary of the elderly woman's will. Jd. at 221-22. The Court first
addressed the fiduciary nature of an attorney-in-fact's relation to the principal:
The common law fiduciary relationship created by a durable power of
attorney is like the relationship created by a trust. The fiduciary duty
principles of trust law must, therefore, be applied to the relationship
between a principal and her attorney-in-fact. An attorney-in-fact, under the
duty of loyalty, always has the obligation to act in the best interest of the
principal unless the principal voluntarily consents to the attorney-in-fact
engaging in an interested transaction after full disclosure. At common law,
transactions which violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty were void. Under
current Delaware law, these transactions are voidable at the behest of the
beneficiary.

'

id. at 225.7 "If the transaction is challenged, the burden of persuasion to justify
upholding the transaction is on the fiduciary." ]d.
i

Thus, in the present case, at common law, Shirley's actions in using the
powers of attorney were void. Accordingly, the Bank's predecessor in interest
received nothing by her actions. However, even if only voidable, Blaine properly
and promptly challenged the transaction and prevailed before Judge Page.
<

7. By statute, Utah appears to have altered the common law rule, which made
self-interested transaction void. They are now voidable under Utah Code Ann. §
75-5-504. This statute was enacted in 2003 and provides:
Any loan, sale, or encumbrance on behalf of a principal with his
attorney-in-fact, or with the attorney-in-fact's spouse, agent, or attorney, or
any entity or trust in which the attorney-in-fact has a substantial beneficial
interest, or any transaction involving the attorney-in-fact which is affected
by a substantial conflict of interest, is voidable unless the transaction is
approved by the court after notice to interested persons and others as
directed by the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-504.
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Further, in Schock, the trial court applied a "bright line" rule that an attorney in
fact may not make gifts to himself or herself unless there is a clear, written
expression of that authority, id. at 228, quoting Kunewa v. Joshua. 924 P.2d 559,
565 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996). See also Eaqar. fl 20, quoting Huntsman. 192 P. at
374. While holding that the bright line rule might not be desirable in every case,
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the result of its use in Schock. id. at 228.8
The Bank argues strongly that the general durable power of attorney
granted Shirley power to either act as a trustee for Blaine or to unilaterally convey
property out of the Trust. The general durable power of attorney did not grant
authority to Shirley to convey Trust property under any circumstance. More
important, neither the Trust nor the general durable power of attorney authorized
Shirley to gift the property to herself or others. Huntsman. 192 P. at 370. Under
Huntsman. Shirley took assets belonging to Blaine and the Trust and converted

8. Moreover, the Schock and Kunewa courts noted that many jurisdictions
employed the "bright line" rule: Fender v. Fender. 329 S.E.2d 430 (S.C. 1985); in
Re Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1996); Whitford v. Gaskill. 480
S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 1997), as amended, 489 N.E.2d 177 (1997); F.M. Stigler. Inc. v.
H.N.C. Realty Co.. 595 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1980); Johnson v. Fraccacreta. 348 So.2d 570
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In Re Estate of DeBelardino. 352 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Estate of Casey v.
Commr of Internal Revenue. 948 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1991)("When one
considers the manifold opportunities and temptations for self-dealing that are
opened up for persons holding general powers of attorney-of which outright
transfers for less than value to the attorney-in-fact herself are the most
obvious-the justification for such a flat rule is apparent. And its justification is
made even more apparent when one considers the ease with which such a rule
can be accommodated by principals and their draftsmen.").
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them to her own use and purposes. The general durable power of attorney simply
did not extend so far as to allow Shirley to act in this fashion.
Here, Shirley's use of the general durable power of attorney was a breach
of fiduciary duty. She transferred trust property to herself and Blaine in violation of
her trust by gifting the home. She then further granted a trust deed on the
property for her own benefit in violation of her trust. The general durable power of
attorney contains no language authorizing such gratuitous transfers. Huntsman
stands for the unambiguous principle that no power to make a gift will not be
inferred. Huntsman, like most other states, voids the very power the Bank would
. i

rely on here. The trial court's ruling and judgment were correct.
Asserting implied authority does not help the Bank.
Implied authority, on the other hand, embraces authority to do those acts
which are incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish
or perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent. Implied
authority is actual authority based upon the premise that whenever the
performance of certain business is confided to an agent, such authority
carries with it by implication authority to do collateral acts which are the
natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized. This
authority may be implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the
facts and circumstances attending the transaction in question.

(

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Utah 1988).
To show implied authority, the Bank would need to point to some authority
granted to Shirley from which the right to act was implied. Here, there is only the

<

general durable power of attorney. However, there is no evidence that Bank One
had any awareness of the general power of attorney when the transaction was
<

consummate. Nor did Shirley have even a subjective belief that the power of
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attorney was usable. There was, therefore, nothing from which an implication
could arise. Moreover, even if the general power of attorney were considered, a
power expressly disallowed by law cannot arise in contravention of the law by
mere implication. The Title Company explicitly disallowed reliance on the general
durable power of attorney. R. at 1384, vol. Ill, 10-14. The Bank, through its agent
the Title Company, insisted that the loan be closed through the Special Power of
Attorney, id- It is undisputed that the Special Power of Attorney was forged. The
Bank's insistence and reliance upon the Special Power of Attorney is
demonstrated by the fact that the Special Power of Attorney was recorded as part
of the transaction.9
Shirley had no authority to forge Blaine's name to a warranty deed or the
special power of attorney. The general durable power of attorney did not grant
her such authority and there is no other source of authority for her actions. Each
of the conveyances, including the trust deed, was therefore void. The trial court's
decision was correct and should be affirmed.

9. The Bank continues to assert apparent authority also. Apparent authority
exists only based upon the acts and statements of the principal to the person
relying on the authority. Workers' Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp.. 2009
UT 18, If 10, 210 P.3d 277. "It is the principal who must cause third parties to
believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority." City Elec. v. Dean
Evans Chrysler Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983). In the present case, the
Bank can point to no action of Blaine upon which they relied which clothed Shirley
with any authority whatsoever. Accordingly, any claim of apparent authority must
fail.
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D.

The Trust Did Not Participate in the Loans and It Did Not Grant
Any Power-Reserved or Granted-to Shirley to Act

In an effort to vindicate its position, the Bank argues that either powers
reserved to the settlors or granted to the trustees authorized Shirley's actions. In
light of Bank One's care to avoid dealing with the Trust, this argument is ironic.
Bank One did not extend credit to the trust and avoided doing business with the
trust at all. The title company first prepared a deed to convey the home from the
trust to Blaine and Shirley individually. The trust was neither a co-borrower nor a
grantor of security in the Bank One loan. To pretend otherwise is to ignore the
undisputed facts.10

10. The Bank cites Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406 (2000)(now renumbered as
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-816) for the proposition that the terms of the Trust were
not made public. This statute provides that terms of a trust are disclosed by deed
when the deed provides the names of the trustees, their addresses and the name
and date of the trust. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-816(3). App. F, transferring the
home into the Trust complies with the each of these requirements, excepting the
date of the trust.
Moreover, this statute applies only to one who is a "purchaser of value who
take[s] the property without notice of the terms of the trust." Utah Code Ann. §
75-7-816(2). Neither Shirley nor Bank One qualify. No evidence exists that Bank
One was a purchaser for value without notice. To the contrary, the commitment
for title insurance, admitted as trial exhibit 72 suggests otherwise. App. M.
The Commitment for Title Insurance, App. M, issued 26 July 2000,
expressly provided that the home was vested in the name of the Trust. Schedule
C provided that "[tjhe following requirements must be met and completed to the
satisfaction of the [title company] before its policy of title insurance will be issued:
. . . a copy of Hanney Family Trust, as set out as Number 4, Schedule A, hereof."
Exhibit 72. Title insurance was issued in this case.
In light of Shirley's fraudulent act in conveying title from the trust to the her
and Blaine individual and her subsequent conduct, the commitment for title
insurance bodes ill for the Bank. Either (1) the Bank (through its agent, the title
company) had actual knowledge of the trust's terms, and thus Utah Code Ann. §
75-7-816 has no application; or (2) the Bank opted not to deal with the trust at all
and the statute had no application.
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Whether speaking of powers reserved to the settlors or powers granted to
the trustees, the Hanney Family Trust clearly required both Shirley and Blaine to
act. The Bank looks to section 4.2 of the trust, referring to "Reserved Powers" to
attempt to vindicate their position. App. E. Section 4.2 has the following
introductory phrase: "[w]e each reserve to ourselves the following powers." jd.
The reservation is not to an individual settlor, but "to ourselves"-as a group.
Other portions of Article 4 support this view. For example, only joint
decisions of Blaine and Shirley are given binding effect on the trustees, jd- at §
4.5. Or, to indicate an exercise of reserved trust powers, section 4.7 provides that
"[u]nless otherwise specifically provided herein, the powers we have reserved
shall be exercisable by instruments in writing signed by us." jd. at § 4.7. Each of
these sections-both applicable to section 4.2-require action by Blaine and
Shirley. Under the plain language of the trust, when the settlors exercise a
reserved power, they are required to do so jointly and in writing. It is undisputed
that no such document exists here.
Turning to granted powers, Shirley had no authority to act as a trustee
alone, id. at § 11.2. The Trust expressly calls for action by a majority of the
Trustees, jd. Utah law is clear that co-trustees who are unable to act
unanimously must act by majority decision. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-703.
Nevertheless, the Bank claims that Shirley was entitled to act alone. The plain
language of the Trust persistently speaks of trustees acting jointly.
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To support its untenable argument, the Bank seizes upon the word "sole" in
section 11.1. Without considering the actual context, structure, or plain meaning,
the Bank contends that this word modifies not the word "discretion" but the word
Trustees. The actual context evinces an opposite intent. "The Trustees [plural
noun] are authorized [plural verb] to examine the following powers . . . in their
[plural modifier] sole and absolute discretion." Id. at § 11.1. Suggesting that this
sentence authorizes one trustee to act alone simply ignores the plain meaning of
these words and the Trust as a whole.
The Restatement supports the view that the trustees were required to act
i

jointly: "If there are two or more trustees, the powers conferred upon them can
properly be exercised only by all the trustees, unless it is otherwise provided by
the terms of the trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 194. Shirley had

{

authority only in conjunction with her co-trustee, not alone. The Trust does not
submit to the Bank's hermeneutic gyrations.
When pressed to articulate Shirley's source of authority, the Bank is forced
to return to the general power of attorney. The Bank must either be able to justify
Shirley's actions based upon the power of attorney with regard to both the trust
and her execution of the trust deed or lose this matter. The power of attorney
must therefore grant authority to Shirley with respect to both trust matters and to

^

gratuitously transfer the home. As demonstrated above, the general durable
power of attorney does not provide for such authority.
<
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"A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is vested
in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of
beneficiaries." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates,
Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2
(1959)). Once the home was transferred into the Hanney Family Trust, its
trustees had "exclusive control of the trust property, subject to the limitations
imposed by law and the trust instrument, and once the settlor has created the
trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has only such ability to
deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Davis v.
Young. 2008 UT App 246, U 18, 190 P.3d 23, citing Flake v. Flake. 2003 UT 17, If
12, 71 P.3d 589. The Trustees were thus under a duty to convey the home upon
request by the settlors, but it was "the trustees"-plura!-who were required to act,
not a trustee alone.
In this case, the Bank is forced to argue that a thief, Shirley, conveyed
good and valid title to its predecessor-in-interest. A fraudster obtains no title to
the subject of his fraud by virtue of her fraudulent activities: "Where one has
stolen or embezzled the money or property of another, he obtains no title
whatsoever." Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints v.
Jollev. 467 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1970). See, also Western Sur. Co. v. Redding.
626 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1981); Witherspoon v. Yeck. 551 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Utah
1976); In re Two Bose Speakers, 835 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992);
Alamo Rent-A-Car. inc. v. Mendenhall. 937 P.2d 69, 73-74 (Nev. 1997). See,
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also, 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales, § 409 (2009) ("[a] thief does not divest an owner of
title. One who purchases stolen property from a thief, no matter how innocently,
acquires no title in the property; title remains in the owner.").
A breach of the duty of loyalty, by a self-dealing trustee, makes a tainted
transaction voidable. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802(2). Indeed, at common law,
such a transaction was simply void. Schock. 732 A.2d at 225. Statutorily, both
Utah's Uniform Trust Code and Utah's enactment of the Uniform Durable Powers
of Attorney Act provide that self-interested dealing by the fiduciary makes a
transaction voidable. Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-504 ("any loan . . . which is
i

affected by a substantial conflict of interest, is voidable.") & 75-7-802 ("a sale,
encumbrance, or other transaction . .. which is affected by a conflict of interest..
. is voidable."). While these statutes may not be dispositive, they are persuasive

(

authority.
As a trustee, Shirley had no authority to act unilaterally. Her only rights,
either as a grantor of the trustee or as a trustee, were to act in conjunction with
Blaine. The trust language is plain in its requirement of joint action. The trial
court was correct to reject the Bank's arguments regarding the trust. The
judgment should be affirmed.
<

E.

The Bank's Ratification Claim Is Unavailing

Before the trial court, Bank One argued that estoppel, waiver and
<

ratification applied to vindicate the trust deed. Evidently conceding that waiver
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and estoppel have no application, Bank One appears to have abandoned these
claims on appeal-at least they have not included such matters in their brief.
Instead, Bank One concentrates on the doctrine of ratification.
The Bank finally asserts that Blaine, in some fashion, ratified the loans in
question. The undisputed evidence is that Blaine had no knowledge of the loans
in question until February 2003. The parties immediately filed bankruptcy and,
within several months, adversary proceedings were pending in the bankruptcy
court. There was never a point in time at which ratification was made.
The Bank recognizes that ratification is "mixed question of law and fact."
App. Brief, 43. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusions are accorded at least a
measure of deference and its factual findings are subject to a duty to marshal. In
this case, the Bank does not satisfy its marshaling burden. It recites the trial
court's findings, but fails to present the evidence. Marshaling requires more:
"appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court,
and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to their case.
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the
record in support of their position." Chen. 2004 UT 82, ^ 78. Summarizing the
trial court's findings does not constitute any type of marshaling. The trial court's
findings are thus presumed supported by the record.
Neither does the Bank fare better with the law. The Bank cites snippets of
case law, not all. The Utah Supreme Court held that "ratification requires the
principal to have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify."
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Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). Additionally, where an
original contract was required to be in writing-such as a conveyance of real
property-the ratification must be written as well. jd. at 79.
Here, the Bank's argument fails on three counts. First, there is no
evidence-and the Bank points to none-that Blaine ever had any intent to ratify
any of Shirley's wrongful acts. Indeed, trial exhibit 67, attached as App. N, is
Blaine's letter repudiating the trust deed in question. R. at 1384, vol. II at 17980.*** In addition to never having any intent to ratify, prior to his repudiation,
Blaine never had full knowledge of all the facts. Zion's First Nat'l. Bank v. Clark
Clinic. Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988)(ratification requires full
knowledge of all material facts). It is undisputed that Blaine learned of Shirley's
(

betrayal in February 2003. Prior to then, he did not have full knowledge, and
could not have ratified anything. Finally, ratification, in this case, would require a
written ratification. No such writing exists.
A good illustration of the principle of ratification isOckev v. Lehmer. 2008
UT 37,189 P.3d 51. In Ockev, the plaintiff was the beneficiary of a trust
agreement. The trust terminated when he turned 28, but the property contained in
the trust was not conveyed to him at that point. Several years later, Ockey
executed a document directing his trustee to convey the property to another

-

entity. Ockey received a proportional interest in the new entity. Ockev, If 27. As a
result of this transaction, Ockey received several million dollars of income.
Quoting Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) the Supreme Court
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<

noted that one "'may not be willfully ignorant, nor may he purposely shut his eyes
to means of information within his possession and control and thereby escape
ratification.'" Ockev, U 31, quoting Bradshaw v. McBride, 659 P.2d at 78.
Contrasting Ockev with the facts of this case demonstrates that no ratification has
occurred.
In Ockev, the plaintiff actually signed an express direction to his trustee to
undertake the action of which he subsequently complained. Ockey accepted and
retained millions of dollars in benefits after giving his trustee these directions. In
the present case, Blaine never signed anything in the nature of a ratification.
Blaine immediately began to take actions, in the nature of repudiation, which
included a written repudiation of the trust deed, filing of a bankruptcy, adversary
proceedings, objections to Shirley's discharge in bankruptcy, entering into
separate agreements with the bankruptcy trustee to preserve the present claim,
and divorcing Shirley.
The Bank also contends that Blaine had constructive knowledge of these
matters by virtue of the fact that they were publicly recorded. One is under no
duty to continuously monitor the county recorder's office to ascertain whether
one's property has been wrongly conveyed to a third party. Christianson v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins.. Co.. 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983). There is no
evidence that Blaine learned of Shirley's actions prior to February 2003.
The facts do not support a ratification. The Bank also asserts that to allow
its claims to fail would result in an unjust enrichment. Indeed, "[t]he mere fact that
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a third person benefits from a contract between two others does not make such
third person liable in quasi contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. There must
be some misleading act, request for services or the like to support such an
action." Southern Title Guaranty Co.. Inc. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), quoting Knight v. Post. 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). See also, Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings. Inc. v. Adams. 564 P.2d
773, 774 (Utah 1977). Here, there is no misleading act, request for service or the
like by Blaine. Blaine had no interaction with the Bank or its predecessor and
requested nothing from them. There is no indication that Blaine received any
i

benefit from this transaction, and the trial court so found. App. C, Findings, If 66.
Rather than marshaling evidence on this point, the Bank resorts to speculation.
For example, the Bank argues that "Blaine personally benefitted from

{

Hanney & Hanney's debts being paid from the proceeds of the loan, particularly
those debts such as payroll for which he may have been personally liable." App.
Brief, 46. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support the claim that Blaine had
personal liability for any Hanney & Hanney debt or obligation. Nor does the Bank
point to any. Even the tax deductions do not help the Bank; there is nothing
which unjustly enriched any Defendant at the Bank's expense with respect to the
tax returns. There was a mortgage tax deduction because mortgage interest was
paid to Bank One. This is not an unjust enrichment at the Bank's expense, but an
acknowledgment that the Bank, in fact, was paid interest income on this loan.
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Ratification simply did not occur here. When fully informed, Blaine
repudiated the trust deed. Blaine received no benefit from the loan and retained
no benefit after being informed of the material facts. The trial court's rejection of
ratification was correct and should be affirmed.

II.

Hanney's Cross Appeal
The Bank's action had but a single point: its desire for judicial foreclosure.

At trial, the Bank's evidence was mortally deficient. After written closing
arguments and briefing, the Bank sought to cure this failure by moving to reopen
the evidence. The Bank provided no explanation for its failure, nor did it disclose
the nature of the evidence it sought to present. The trial court abused its
discretion in granting this motion. However, the trial court's ultimate ruling made
reopening moot. In the event that a remand is considered by this court, it is
appropriate to consider and reverse the trial court's order reopening the evidence,
and affirming the judgment on this alternate basis.
The evidence presented at trial was-and remains even after
reopening-insufficient to grant a judicial foreclosure. A decision to reopen a trial
is a matter of discretion, granting a motion to reopen must serve the interest of
fairness and substantial justice and be predicated upon a review of the totality of
the circumstances. Lewis v. Porter. 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976).11 "[Cjourts

11. In Lewis, a defendant chose to absent himself from trial; trial nevertheless
proceeded with his attorney and both sides presented evidence. 556 P.2d at 497.
When the defendant lost, he sought to reopen the evidence, claiming flaws in the
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should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings." United States v. Blakenship.
775 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1985).
Generally, "once both parties have rested and the court has ruled on the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's case it is simply too late to inject a new issue into the
case." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church. 642 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah
1982). "Counsel is entitled to control the presentation of evidence, and should
there be a failure to present evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally viewed

i

as a waiver of the claim." Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah
i

1998). Reopening the evidence can turn on the complexity of the evidence.
Compare, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction. 1999
UT 87 1HI22-24, 977 P.2d 518 (holding no abuse of discretion to allow reopening

<

when trial court observed that "there are some glaring misunderstandings in the
presentation of the evidence") with Tanoaro v. Marrero. 373 P2d 390, 391 (Utah
1962)(holding no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow reopening of case
claiming satisfaction of promissory note by new note).12
<

evidence. id. When his motion to reopen was denied, the Utah Supreme Court
had little difficulty in concluding that no abuse of discretion occurred, given
defendant's "ample opportunity" to present his side of the case, id12. Tangaro's facts are illustrative. Plaintiff lent defendant's wife money. 373
P.2d at 391. Plaintiff and defendant consolidated various debts of defendants into
a single note and extinguished the first note. Plaintiff nevertheless brought suit
on the extinguished note. id. The consolidated loan named defendant's spouse
as an obligor, but not defendant. When plaintiff lost his claim against defendant,
he sought to reopen the evidence to present "additional evidence on the renewal
note" presumably that defendant was an intended obligor, id. This motion was
denied, and the Utah Supreme Court held that "[njothing is cited, however, to
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The Third Circuit has distilled several salient elements to consider when
faced with a motion to reopen the evidence: prejudice, timing, and the character
of the proposed evidence are all important factors to consider. United States v.
Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Kithcart.
218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000). A review of the totality of the circumstances in
this case reveals that the Bank simply is not entitled to the exercise of judicial
discretion; the Bank had a full and fair opportunity to present its case. Having
failed to present sufficient evidence, the Bank should be held to its proof.
One factor is "whether the party opposing the reopening would be
prejudiced if reopening is permitted." United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220
(3rd Cir. 2000). See also, Lewis, 556 P.2d at 497. Unfair prejudice in this case
exists. The Bank has never revealed any bank employee, witness, or document
who would present the amount due under the trust deed. Even as late as the
final pretrial order, the Bank never disclosed such a witness or exhibit. App. A.
By allowing the evidence to be reopened, the trial court simply ignored the final
pretrial order which required disclosure.
In the present case, the Bank did not seek a reopening to present a few
ignored excluded exhibits like Whipple. Neither did the Bank's motion come
during the actual trial. Instead, the Bank waited until all the evidence had been
submitted and arguments have been made to correct a fundamental flaw in its

show any particular in which the trial court abused its discretion." jd.
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case, like Tanqaro. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its
discretion.
In addition, "to properly exercise its discretion the district court must
evaluate that explanation and determine if it is both reasonable, and adequate to
explain why the government initially failed to introduce evidence that may have
been essential to meeting its burden of proof." Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 220. Here,
there was no explanation from the Bank to inform the trial court's exercise of

i

discretion. Absent an explanation, reopening should have been denied.
The omitted evidence is the sine qua non of any judicial foreclosure in the
i

State of Utah: the amount and interest rate on under the foreclosed trust deed.
When the trial ended, its record included no evidence—not even a Bank One
business record—showing any such amount. A judgment of mortgage foreclosure

{

"shall include" "the amount due, with costs and disbursements." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-901(2). See also, Diener v. Diener. 2004 UT App 314, fl 12, 98 P.3d
1178 (use of "shall" indicates a mandatory condition, eliminating judicial
discretion). The amount due must be proven by evidence and reduced to
judgment following judicial determination. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901(2);
Associated Indus. Dev.. Inc. v. Jewkes. 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1984)(awarded
judgment must be based "on evidence in the record."); Jensen v. Lichtenstein.
145 P. 1036, 1038 (Utah 1914). In the present case, the Bank utterly failed to
adduce evidence to support its judicial foreclosure claim.
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The Bank did not present any evidence to establish the amount due and
owing under the note. Instead, the Bank merely presented: (1) that the original
principle balance of the trust deed was $247,000.00, App. J, Bank One Trust
Deed; (2) Shirley made monthly payments in undisclosed amounts from
sometime in the fall of 2000 (no specific month was established) until November
2002. There is, therefore, no way of knowing from the present state of the
evidence what amount is owing under the trust deed.
The Bank's evidentiary failure is more than mere arithmetic. To calculate
the amount due and owing under an interest bearing note, one needs to know at
least four specific points of data:
(1) the interest rate;
(2) the date interest begins to accrue;
(3) the principal amount on which interest accrues; and
(4) the amount and dates of payments.
The Bank presented only
(1) the principal amount upon origination; and
(2) the fact that payments of unknown amounts were made from the time
the loan originated until November 2002. This information is simply inadequate to
allow any calculation.
The amount owing under the mortgage is required so that a deficiency
judgment may be established. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-902. A deficiency amount
is established by deducting the sheriffs sale proceeds from the amount
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established by the judgment as due. id. Of course, excess proceeds (that is,
sales amounts in excess of the amount due) belong to the debtor or any junior
lienholder, not the creditor. Mickelson v. Anderson. 19 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Utah
1932). Here, Blaine's bankruptcy precludes a deficiency judgment, but it does not
preclude the possibility of excess proceeds. If, at sheriff's sale, for example, the
property sold for $400,000, but only $350,000 were owing to the Bank, Blaine
would be entitled to this difference.

,

In addition to creating a situation in which no excess or deficiency amount
can be calculated (and the concomitant risk that the Bank will obtain a windfall),
the failure to establish an amount owing also may prejudice Defendant's
redemption rights. "Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosures of
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in cases of sales under

(

executions generally." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-906(1). Redemption, in turn, is
controlled by Utah R. Civ. P. 69C. To redeem, a redemptioner must pay the sales
price from the sheriff's sale within 180 days after the sale, together with a
surcharge of 6%, plus other amounts which may be owing on the property. Utah
4

R. Civ. P. 69C(d) and (e).
The redemption price is linked to the sales price, not to the amount due
under the mortgage. See, e.g., Wasatch Oil & Gas. L.L.C. v. Reott. 2007 UT App
223, ffl| 12, 22-24, 163 P.3d 713. However, since foreclosing judgment creditor
may credit bid the amount owed under the judgment at the sheriff's sale, failing to
establish the amount due creates an absurdity. Because no amount owing has
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been determined, the Bank cannot may any credit bid: there is no "credit" to bid.
Without determining the amount owing to the Bank, any amount bid by the Bank
or any other person at the sheriff's sale would be, by definition, an excess bid and
belong to Defendant, not the Bank. Failing to establish an amount due is
tantamount to establishing the invalidity of the mortgage.
Alternatively, allowing the foreclosing creditor to unilaterally determine what
is owed unfairly allows the Bank to determine the redemption price. By setting its
"credit" bid high, the Bank may make redemption economically unfeasible. Such
unfettered discretion is inconsistent with the language and intent of the mortgage
foreclosure statute. Brockbank v. Brockbank. 2001 UT App 251, U 12, 32 P.3d
990 ("To allow a foreclosing creditor to control the right of redemption is
inconsistent with the purpose of the right to provide a check on bids that are well
below market value."). See also, Wasatch. 2007 UT App 223, fl 23-24. Viewed
from any perspective, the requirement of establishing the amount owing is a
substantial protection required by the statute.
Finally, the Bank's requested reiief on appeal-outright reversal and entry of
a judgment in its favor-is problematic. Because no amount has ever been
determined by the trial court, an outright reversal would be inappropriate. Even
after three days of trial, memoranda and argument on the motion to reopen, an
order allowing reopener, and an appeal, the Bank still cannot state-from the
evidence-the amount (principle and interest) that it claims to be owed. Absent
that evidence, remand would be meaningless. The Bank chose to rest its case
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with the facts in a particular posture. The fact-the undisputed fact-that it chose
to put no evidence of the amount of indebtedness or accruing interest before the
trial court is fatal. The trial court's decision to reopen should be reversed and the
trial court's judgment affirmed on this alternate basis.

Conclusion
The Bank opened trial with a trenchant declaration: "It is not only for what
we do that we are held responsible, but also for what we do not do." R. at 1385,
vol. I, 4. The Bank brought suit to obtain a judicial foreclosure. The Bank
presented the case that it saw fit and failed to present the critical evidence.
Reopening after the flaw was forcefully demonstrate was unfair. The trial court's
decision on this point should be reversed and the judgment affirmed on this
alternative basis.
The Bank's failure does not stop at the reopener motion, however. In this
appeal, the Bank challenges factual findings, but did not marshal the evidence.
Instead, the Bank merely reargued its case. The findings should therefore be
affirmed. Neither, however, does the Bank prevail substantively.
The general durable power of attorney did not grant Shirley any authority to
act for the trust or to make any gift. Her actions were contrary to the legal trust
reposed in her. At the very least, Shirley's actions were voidable and timely
challenged. At common law, Shirley's actions were void. Either way, her actions
are not valid and the trust deed cannot be sustained on any of them.
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Finally, the undisputed fact is that the Bank relied on a forged special
power of attorney prepared by its agent, Inwest Title. That reliance is fatal, as the
trial court found. The trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence and its legal conclusions are correct. Its judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, this / 3 day of September 2010.

irad C. Smith, Attorney for Blaine Hanney
and Hanney Family Trust
Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing brief to:
Laura S. Scott
Matthew D. Cook
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this /* day of September 2010.
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HANNEY,BLAINE J

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

JOINT FINAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER
Case No. 050700241
Judge Rodney S. Page

vs.
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual; et al.,
Defendants.

The parties hereby submit the following Joint Final Pre-Trial Order:
I.

PARTIES
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Franklin Credit Management Corporation

("Franklin") is the assignee of Bank One, NA ("Bank One"). Defendants Blaine J. Hanney
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("Blaine Hanney") and Shirley A. Hanney ("Shirley Hanney") are residents of Davis County,
Utah. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were formerly husband and wife but are now
divorced. Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff The Hanney Family Trust ("Hanney Family
Trust") is a revocable trust which was created by Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney in February
1995. Blaine Hanney and the Hanney Family Trust are collectively referred to as "the Hanney
Defendants." Defendant American General Financial Services, Inc. ("American General") is a
Utah corporation.

II.

GENERAL STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN'S CLAIMS, AMERICAN
GENERAL'S CLAIMS AND HANNEY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES
A.

GENERAL STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN'S CLAIMS
1.

Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were married for over thirty years and

were co-owners of Hanney and Hanney Construction, Inc. ("Hanney and Hanney"), which was a
"S" corporation. During their marriage, Blaine Hanney gave Shirley Hanney complete authority
to handle all of their financial affairs. Having given her complete authority, Blaine Hanney did
not concern himself with how Shirley Hanney was handling those financial affairs. He never
reviewed the statements for their joint checking or savings account. He never reviewed the
books of Hanney and Hanney. He never even reviewed their joint federal income tax returns
before or after filing. Instead, he simply told his wife to "go ahead and sign [them]."
2.

The Hanneys were married in 1973. Approximately five years later,

Blaine Hanney's parents divided their property into eight parcels so that each of their children
could have one parcel. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney paid his parents small monthly
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payments for several years to pay for their undeveloped lot. On November 2, 1982, Blaine
Hanneys' parents recorded a Warranty Deed conveying the undeveloped lot to Blaine Hanney.
The Hanneys then built a house on the Property using money that they had saved for
approximately five years. Blaine Hanney did most of the labor and they paid cash for the
materials. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney always considered themselves joint owners of the
Property. Indeed, in Shirley Hanney is identified as the "joint tenant with rights of survivorship"
of the Property in two Deeds Granting Easements recorded in 1979.
3.

In 1995, for estate planning purposes, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney

executed a Revocable Trust Agreement of the Hanney Family Trust ("Trust Agreement") on
February 22, 1995. Under the form Trust Agreement, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were
appointed Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. They were also the beneficiaries. Also on
February 22, 1995, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney, as grantors, conveyed the Property to
Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney, as Trustees for the Hanney Family Trust, pursuant to a
Special Warranty Deed. The Trust Agreement also recites that all of the Hanneys' checking and
savings accounts were transferred to the Hanney Family Trust. Although these assets were
ostensibly conveyed to the Hanney Family Trust, the Hanneys retained full dominion and control
over their assets, including the Property. Indeed, the Hanney Family Trust did not file separate
income tax returns or have separate checking or savings accounts.
4.

As Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust, Shirley Hanney reserved to

herself the right to "dispose of any property by . . . mortgage" or "borrow money [or] pledge all
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of part of the Trust Property" in her "sole and absolute discretion." Also in February 1995, ""'

^w

Blaine Hanney executed a General Durable Power of Attorney appointing Shirley Hanney as his
"true and lawful attorney" with "full power to do and perform all and every act that [he] may
legally do . . . in relation to all of [his] property, real or personal..."
5.

Beginning in 1998, Shirley Hanney obtained several loans for Hanney &

Hanney which were secured by deeds of trust on the Property. These loans were used to pay off
creditors of Hanney & Hanney and to repay funds that Shirley Hanney had "borrowed" from

,

Hanney Development, L.P., a limited partnership of Blaine Hanney and his mother and siblings.
6.

On June 9, 1998, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney executed a Home
i

Equity Line Deed of Trust in the amount of $50,000 in favor of Key Bank National Association
("First Key Bank Trust Deed"). On January 19, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Home Equity
Line Deed of Trust in the amount of $80,000 in favor of Key Bank ("Second Key Bank Trust

J

Deed"). Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Second Key Bank Trust Deed "by
POA Shirley A. Hanney." Some of the proceeds of this loan were used to pay off the First Key
Bank Trust Deed and, consequently, a Deed of Reconveyance for the First Key Bank Trust Deed

\

was recorded on March 31, 1999.
7.

On April 16, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Modification of Key Equity

Options Agreement that increased the credit line from $80,000 to $120,000. Shirley Hanney
signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Modification "by POA Shirley A. Hanney." On February
28, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed an Open End Deed of Trust in the amount of $163,200 in
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(

favor of American General Finance ("AG Trust Deed"), which was recorded on February 29,
2000. Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the AG Trust Deed "by POA Shirley A.
Hanney."
8.

On August 24, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed a Deed of Trust in favor of

Bank One NA ("Bank One Trust Deed") to secure a loan in the amount of $247,000 ("Bank One
Loan"). Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Bank One Trust Deed "by Shirley
A. Hanney as attorney in fact." The proceeds from the Bank One Loan were used to pay off the
loans from Key Bank ($69,997.00) and the AG Trust Deed ($167,087.00). The balance of the
proceeds of the Bank One Loan was paid jointly to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney pursuant
to check in the amount of $1,875.88. The beneficial interest under the Bank One Trust Deed was
subsequently assigned to Franklin.
9.

The proceeds from the Key Bank Loan and AG Loan were used for

Hanney and Hanney Construction. They were also used to repay funds that Shirley Hanney had
withdrawn from the bank accounts of Hanney Development, L.P. ("Hanney Development"),
which is a limited partnership owned by Blaine Hanney, his mother, and his siblings. Although
Shirley Hanney was not a partner in Hanney Development, she assumed numerous duties and
responsibilities in it.
10.

On April 17, 2002, American General executed a Subordination

Agreement subordinating the AG Trust Deed to the Bank One Trust Deed.
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11.

From 1998 through 2003, the Hanneys deducted the interest on these

loans, including the Bank One Loan, on their federal income tax returns. In 1998, the Hanneys
deducted "home mortgage interest" in the amount of $2,192.00. In 1999, the Hanneys deducted
"home mortgage interest" in the amount of $7,756.00. In 2000, the Hanneys deducted "home
mortgage interest" in the amount of $17,152.00.

In 2001, the Hanneys deducted "home

mortgage interest" in the amount of $29,622.00. Finally, in 2002, the Hanneys deducted "home
mortgage interest" in the amount of $25,852.00.
12.

In March 2003, the Hanneys filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy ("Bankruptcy

Action"). They listed Bank One Loan as a "joint debt" on their bankruptcy schedules. When
Bank One sought leave from the automatic stay to foreclose the Bank One Trust Deed, however,

*

Blaine Hanney asserted for the first time that he had no knowledge of the Bank One Loan and
that Shirley Hanney forged his name on the Bank One Trust Deed. Consequently, the Chapter 7
Trustee filed an Adversary Proceeding seeking to invalidate the Bank One Trust Deed on Blaine
Hanney's one-half interest in the Property. The Trustee did not challenge the validity of the
Bank One Trust Deed on Shirley Hanney's one-half interest in the Property. After discovery and

\

the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment, the Trustee agreed to abandon his interest in
Property and allow this action to proceed against Blaine Hanney, Shirley Hanney and the
Hanney Family Trust in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, Utah.
13.

Blaine Hanney did not revoke the General Durable Power of Attorney

until October 19, 2006, over six years after the Bank One Trust Deed was executed and recorded.
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Shirley Hanney Had Actual Authority to Execute the Bank One Trust Deed
14.

As Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust, Shirley Hanney had actual

authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed and encumber the Property, including Blaine
Hanney's interest in the Property. The Trust Agreement does not impose any limitations on the
powers of Shirley Hanney to borrow against the Property. Nor is any such limitation imposed by
Utah law.

Shirley Hanney also had actual authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed

pursuant to the General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney in February 1995.
Shirley Hanney Had Apparent and/or Implied Authority to Execute the Bank One Trust Deed
15.

By giving Shirley Hanney complete authority to handle all of their

financial affairs, by executing the Trust Agreement and the General Power of Attorney, and by
allowing Shirley Hanney to execute his name on other important legal documents such as federal
income tax returns, Blaine Hanney gave Shirley Hanney apparent or implied authority to execute
the Bank One Trust Deed on his behalf, particularly because borrowing money is often a
collateral act which is a natural and ordinary incident of handling the financial affairs of a family
and a business.
Bank One Trust Deed Valid Under Doctrines of Equitable Subrogation and Equitable Lien
16.

The Bank One Trust Deed is a valid and enforceable lien on the Property

under the doctrines of equitable subrogation because it "stands in the place" of the Key Bank
Trust Deeds and the AG Trust Deed, which were paid off from the proceeds of the Bank One
Loan.
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17.

Alternatively, under the doctrine of equitable liens, the Bank One Trust

Deed is a valid lien on the Property to the extent that the proceeds from the Bank One Loan were
used for the benefit of Blaine Hanney and/or the Hanney Family Trust.
Bank One Trust Deed Valid Under Doctrines of Equitable Estoppel, Waiver, Ratification &
Unjust Enrichment
18.

Blaine Hanney and the Hanney Family Trust are equitably estopped from

challenging the validity of the Bank One Trust Deed. Blaine Hanney was obviously aware that
Shirley Hanney had obtained mortgages on the Property because he deducted "home mortgage
interest" on his federal income tax returns beginning in 1998. He was also obviously aware that
the amount of the mortgages had increased from 1998 to 2003 because the amount of "home
mortgage interest" that he deducted on his federal income tax returns increased from $2,192.00
in 1998 to $29,622.00 in 2002. Moreover, Blaine Hanney never challenged the validity of the
Bank One Trust Deed until the Trustee objected to Bank One's Motion and, in fact, he included
the Bank One Loan on his bankruptcy schedule as a "joint debt." Finally, Shirley Hanney is a
Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust and her knowledge and representations are imputed to the
Hanney Family Trust.
19.

Similarly, the Hanney Defendants' claims are also barred by waiver

because Blaine Hanney accepted the benefits of the Bank One Loan without objecting to the
validity of the Bank One Loan or the Bank One Trust Deed.

. •• i •
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20.

Blaine Hanney, individually and as Trustee of the Hanney Family Trust,

ratified the Bank One Trust Deed by accepting the benefits of the Bank One Loan with
knowledge of all material facts surrounding the execution of the Bank One Trust Deed.
21.

Under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, Blaine Hanney or the

Hanney Family Trust is obligated to repay the Bank One Loan because the proceeds were used
for his benefit, including the paying off of the Key Bank Loan and the AG Loan, the funding of
fund Hanney & Hanney, and the repayment of funds that Shirley Hanney improperly withdrew
from Hanney Development. The Hanney Family Trust cannot avoid liability simply because one
of its Trustees, Blaine Hanney, chose to not concern himself with any of the financial affairs of
the family, the Hanney Family Trust or Hanney and Hanney.
The Bank One Trust Deed is Valid Lien on Shirley Hanney's Interest in Property
22.

Shirley Hanney executed the Bank One Trust Deed and received the

benefits of the Bank One Loan. Consequently, the Bank One Trust Deed is a valid lien on
Shirley Hanney's interest in the Property, regardless of whether that interest derives from her
joint ownership of the Property or her beneficial interest under the Hanney Family Trust. Shirley
Hanney has an "individual" interest in the Property because martial assets were used to purchase
the undeveloped lot and build the house on the Property. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney
always considered the Property to be jointly owned. In his 2004 Examination and deposition,
Blaine Hanney repeatedly referred to "our" Property. In 1979, two Deeds of Easements related
to the Property were signed by Shirley Hanney and specifically refer to her as a "joint tenant
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with rights of survivorship."

Shirley Hanney signed the Special Warranty Deed, which

conveyed the Property to the Hanney Family Trust, as a "grantor." All of the documents for the
Hanney Family Trust refer to "our" Property. Finally, the schedules filed by the Hanneys under
penalty of perjury and with the advice of legal counsel in the bankruptcy action refer to the
Property as jointly owned by Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney.
23.

Shirley Hanney is also a beneficiary of the Hanney Family Trust. A s a

beneficiary, Shirley Hanney was entitled to encumber her interest in the Property. Although the
Trust Agreement includes a "spendthrift clause," the Hanney Family Trust is not a valid
spendthrift trust with respect to Blaine Hanney or Shirley Hanney because they are the "settlors"
of the Hanney Family Trust and they retained complete dominion and control over the assets of
the Trust, including the Property.
B.

GENERAL STATEMENT OF AMERICAN GENERAL'S CLAIMS.

American General's claims track the claims of Franklin very closely. For that reason, in
the interest of brevity, many of Franklin's claims are simply incorporated by reference below.
Where American General's claims differ from Franklin's claims, those differences are noted.
1.

American General incorporates by reference paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and

7 of the General Statement of Franklin's Claims ("Franklin's Claims") above.
2.

American General incorporates by reference paragraph 8 of Franklin's

Claims, and adds that the proceeds from the Bank One Loan did not pay in full the debt secured
by the AG Trust Deed.
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3.

American General incorporates by reference paragraph 9 of Franklin's

4.

American General incorporates by reference paragraph 10 of Franklin's

Claims.

Claims. Under the Subordination Agreement American General subordinated to the principal
amount, but not to interest, on the Bank One Loan.
5.

American General incorporates by reference paragraph 11 of Franklin's

6.

American General incorporates by reference paragraph 12 of Franklin's

Claims.

Claims. In addition, the Hanneys listed their debt to American General as a "joint debt" on their
bankruptcy schedules.
7.

American General incorporates by reference paragraph 13 of Franklin's

8.

American General incorporates by reference paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,

Claims.

19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of Franklin's Claims. The assertions in these paragraphs concerning the
Bank One Trust Deed and the Bank One Loan apply equally to the AG Trust Deed and the AG
loan secured by the AG Trust Deed.
C.

HANNEY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO FRANKLIN'S CLAIMS.

Defendant Blaine Hanney and Defendant Hanney Family Trust are represented by Brad
C. Smith of the law firm of Stevenson & Smith, P.C. Defendant Shirley Hanney has proceeded
in this matter pro se.
General Response
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In August 2000, Bank One, N.A. loaned money to Shirley A. Hanney in exchange for a
Trust Deed on property then vested in the Hanney Family Trust. Bank One's trust deed was not
signed by Blaine J. Hanney, and Bank One, or its agents, refused to accept any valid power of
attorney signed by Blaine J. Hanney. Instead, Bank One (or its agents) required a Special Power
of Attorney for Blaine Hanney, which Shirley Hanney forged to obtain the loan. Additionally,
Shirley Hanney forged a quit claim deed to transfer the property in question from the Trust to her
own name to complete the transaction. Bank One's Trust Deed was not authorized by Blaine
Hanney whether actually, apparently, or impliedly. Likewise, the February 2000 Trust Deed
granted in favor of American General Finance, was also predicated upon a forged special power
of attorney and forged quit claim deed. Shirley Hanney had no actual, apparent, or implied

*

authority to execute the deed.
The Trust and Its Property
Prior to any of the transactions at issue in this case, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney

I

owned a house and real property located at 3037 East 3050 North, Layton, Utah 84040.
Immediately prior to each of the transactions at issue in this case, title to the house was vested in
the Trust. Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney were jointly the trustees of the trust, which was
established on February 22, 1995 by the execution of the trust agreement. Blaine Hanney,
Shirley Hanney, and Blaine's two children from a prior marriage were the beneficiaries of the

^

trust. The trust granted broad authority to the trustees, including the power to sell, convey,
pledge or hypothecate the assets of the trust. However, the trustees were required to act by
(

majority vote; a single trustee was without authority to act alone or unilaterally.
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As to real property, only the house at issue in this case has ever been conveyed to the
trust. The real property (prior to the construction of the house) was received by Blaine Hanney
from his parents. During the course of Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney's marriage, the house
was built, although title to the property was never vested in Shirley Hanney. Shirley Hanney's
name appears in the chain of title for the property only when the trust was created and the house
was conveyed to her and Blaine, as trustees.

When the transactions in question were

consummated, by way of a forged quit claim deed, Shirley Hanney caused title to transfer from
the trust to herself. Upon completion of each transaction, she carefully reconveyed title to the
trust.
The Powers of Attorney and Their Use by Shirley Hanney
As part of the execution of the trust agreement in February 1995, Blaine Hanney
executed a general durable power of attorney in favor of Shirley Hanney. This power of attorney
was the only power of attorney executed by Blaine Hanney in favor of Shirley Hanney. As to
the two transaction in question in this case, neither transaction relied upon the general durable
power of attorney. In fact, the lenders in question (or their agents) expressly rejected the use of
the general durable power of attorney and required a special power of attorney. The two special
powers of attorney relied upon in this action were each forged by Shirley Hanney.
More specifically, on February 2, 2000, Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature
on a Special Power of Attorney. This special power of attorney was presented to the title
company to close the transaction. In furtherance of this fraudulent transaction, on February 25,
2000, Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature on a Quit Claim Deed purporting to
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transfer the property from the Hanney Family Trust to Blaine and Shirley Hanney in their
individual capacities. On February 28, 2000, pursuant to the afore-mentioned forged special
power of attorney, Shirley Hanney executed an Open-Ended Deed of Trust in favor of American
General. On the same day, February 28, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed a Quit Claim Deed
purporting to transfer the property from Blaine and Shirley Hanney individually, back to the
Hanney Family Trust.
Blaine Hanney did not authorize the execution of the February 2000 special power of
attorney, the quit claim deeds, or the deed of trust in favor of American General, nor was he
advised of their existence until 2003.

Blaine Hanney did not receive any funds from the

American General Trust Deed.
As to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, in August 2000, Shirley Hanney arranged new
financing on the property through Bank One, Plaintiffs assignor. Following a similar fraudulent
pattern, on August 22, 2000, Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature on a Warranty
Deed, purporting to transfer the property from the Hanney Family Trust to Blaine and Shirley
Hanney individually. The Title Company informed Shirley Hanney the 1995 General Durable
Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney was not acceptable. To further the transaction,
Shirley Hanney forged Blaine Hanney's signature on a special power of attorney on August 18,
2000. Pursuant to this newly created and forged special power of attorney, Shirley Hanney
executed a Deed of Trust in favor of Bank One on August 24, 2000. On the same date, Shirley
Hanney executed a Quit Claim Deed, transferring the property from Blaine and Shirley Hanney
individually, back to the Hanney Family Trust.
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Blaine Hanney did not authorize the execution of the August 2000 special power of
attorney, the warranty deed, quit claim deed, or the deed of trust in favor of Bank One, nor was
he advised of their existence until 2003. Blaine Hanney did not receive any funds from the Bank
One Trust Deed, nor did he endorse any check made payable to him as proceeds therefrom.
Other Matters
It is true that for tax years 1999-2002, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney filed joint tax
returns. During those years, Blaine was working full time out of state. Shirley Hanney had the
tax returns prepared and signed Blaine's names to the tax returns. The tax returns used the
interest paid on the two mortgages in question as a tax deduction. After Shirley Hanney's fraud
came to light, Blaine Hanney sought and was granted innocent spouse relief by the IRS for taxes
assessed by Shirley's activities.
Shirley Hanney's fraud was not limited to the above-referenced transaction.

It

encompassed a scheme to cheat Blaine Hanney's family out of hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Ultimately, Shirley Hanney was charged with communications fraud, pleaded guilty and served
several years in prison.
Shirley Hanney Has Never Had An Individual Interest in the Property
Plaintiff claims that its trust deed is a valid lien on Shirley Hanney's interest in the
property. To the contrary, Shirley Hanney never had an individual interest in the Property. The
undisputed facts establish that the Property was transferred to Blaine individually by his parents,
with the reservation of a life estate. Subsequently, Blaine transferred the property to the Hanney
Family Trust and Blaine's mother, Mabel Hanney, deeded her remaining life estate to the Hanney
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Family Trust. No valid deed has ever created an individual interest in the property in Shirley
Hanney. Shirley Hanney's interest in the property is limited to her role as Trustee for the Hanney
Family Trust. Shirley Hanney has no individual interest in the property to which Plaintiffs lien
can attach.
Shirley Hanney Did Not Have A uthority to Unilaterally Encumber Trust Property
Under the Hanney Family Trust Agreement, a Majority of Trustees Were Required to
Encumber Trust Property.

Plaintiff incorrectly asserts in its memorandum that

M

[t]he Trust

Agreement does not impose any limitations on the powers of Shirley hanney to borrow against
the Property."

The Hanney Family Trust Agreement does not allow a single trustee to

unilaterally encumber trust property. While the Trust Agreement would allow the trustees to
execute Trust Deeds such as those at issue in this case, it imposes a clear limitation on the
powers of the trustees in paragraph 11.2, which states:
In the event the Trustees do not agree on any matter, and except as otherwise provided by
the powers which we have elsewhere specifically reserved to ourselves or others, the decision of
a majority of the Trustees shall govern and be binding on the Trustees and the Trust. If there is
an even number of Trustees, another Trustee may be added pursuant to paragraph 13.2, below.
(Exhibit C, Trust Agreement.) Under the Trust Agreement, a majority of trustees was required in
order to exercise the enumerated powers reserved to the trustees.

Shirley Hanney did not

constitute a majority of the trustees. Indeed, because there were two trustees, unanimity was
required, and absent the consent and express authorization of Blaine Hanney, Shirley Hanney's
attempts to encumber Trust property were of no legal effect, nor were her actions binding on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Trust under the plain language governing the Trust.

Moreover, trust property can only be

encumbered in accordance with the provision of the trust agreement. See, e.g., Banks v. Means,
2002UT6549, 52P.3dll90.
In addition, under Utah law in place at the time, Blaine Hanney could not delegate his
trustee's powers via power of attorney. To the contrary, Utah Code Ann.

§ 75-7-403 (2000)

stated, "(1) The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire
administration of the trust to a co-trustee or another." In addition to the trust containing no
provision allowing delegation of authority to a co-trustee, state statute specifically prohibited
such action with regards to a trustee's powers. Accordingly, Blaine Hanney's active participation
and consent was required to encumber trust property.
The 1995 General Durable Power ofAttorney Did Not Grant Shirley Hanney Actual Authority
to Encumber Trust Property.
In Kline v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court wrote,
"A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, authorizes
another to act as agent. ... [T]he instrument creating this authority must be strictly construed."
(Citations omitted.)(Italics added.)

Moreover, "[a] court cannot imply authority of the

attorney-in-fact that the power of attorney does not express."

3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §28.

(2006). While Plaintiff cites Kline for this same principal in its memorandum, Plaintiff asks this
Court to do just the opposite, namely to loosely construe the power of attorney to imply authority
in Shirley Hanney which was not granted nor contemplated.
The 1995 General Durable Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney does not give
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Shirley Hanney any authority to take any actions in regard to any property belonging to the
Hanney Family Trust. Instead, Blaine Hanney delegated authority to his then wife to "do and
perform all and every act that I may legally do through an attorney, in relation to all of my
property, real or personal..."

(Italics added.)

While the power of attorney can be strictly

construed to have allowed Shirley Hanney to dispose of property belonging to Blaine Hanney
individually, it cannot even be loosely construed to imply any authority over or relationship to
property belonging to the Hanney Family Trust.
At all times relevant hereto, the Property was titled to the Hanney Family Trust. Blaine
Hanney did not own the Property individually. The Property was legally titled to the Hanney
Family Trust. The Property was not his property. Furthermore, the Trust Agreement makes no
provision for any trustee to delegate their authority to act by means of a power of attorney. The
Trustees were expected to act of their own stead, and the Trust provided a mechanism for
protecting Trust property in the event that the Trustees were to resign or be unable to act.
(Exhibit A, at ^|13.2.) The Trust Agreement and the Power of Attorney can not be construed to
have any relationship one with the other.

Instead, the Power of Attorney must be strictly

construed to apply only to property belonging to Blaine Hanney individually.
Even assuming arguendo that the Power of Attorney could be construed to relate to
unidentified property belonging to the Hanney Family Trust, neither Plaintiff, nor American
General can claim to have relied on the Power of Attorney, as both refused to accept or rely upon
the Power of Attorney at the time the deeds in question were executed. To the contrary, Shirley
Hanney's sworn affidavit reflects that on both occasions, she was advised by title company
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agents that neither Bank One nor American General would accept the 1995 Power of Attorney as
a legitimate basis for executing the deeds in question on Blaine Hanney's behalf. On both
occasions, Bank One and American General required Shirley to create Special Powers of
Attorney, which the undisputed facts establish are forgeries having no legal effect.

Having

refused to accept the 1995 Power of Attorney at the time the deeds in question were executed,
Plaintiff and American General are not in a position to claim to have relied on the powers of
attorney now.
Shirley Hanney Did Not Have Apparent or Implied Authority to Encumber Trust Property.
Apparent or implied authority, as noted in Plaintiffs memorandum, always flows from
specific acts of the principal. Plaintiff asserts that Shirley Hanney had apparent or implied
authority to encumber Trust property because of the 1995 Power of Attorney, and because
Shirley Hanney illegally signed Blaine Hanney's name on the couple's joint tax returns. As
previously set forth, the 1995 Power of Attorney, which must be strictly construed, makes no
reference to property belonging to the Hanney Family Trust.

Blaine Hanney has taken no

specific act in executing that document, which would imply authority or establish that Shirley
Hanney had apparent authority to encumber the Property. With regards to Shirley Hanney's
custom of filing tax returns without her husband's input, there was no action by Blaine Hanney to
make it appear that Shirley Hanney had authority to dispose of his property. There is simply no
relationship between the two.

Likewise, there is no evidence that Bank One or American

General had any knowledge in this regard. Indeed, had the IRS known at the time that Shirley
Hanney had forged Blaine Hanney's signature on tax returns, it certainly would not have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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accepted the returns. Shirley Hanney's acts in that regard cannot create implied authority in
herself to take unrelated action disposing of Hanney Family Trust property.
III.

GENERAL STATEMENT OF HANNEY DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS
AND CROSS-CLAIMS AND RESPONSES OF FRANKLIN AND AMERICAN
GENERAL
A.

GENERAL STATEMENT OF BLAINE HANNEY'S AND HIS TRUST'S
CLAIM

The trust deeds asserted in this action are wrongful liens under Utah's wrongful lien
statute. They were not authorized by court order or statute. They were not authorized by the

i

trust or Blaine Hanney. Their removal has been demanded in writing, but they have not been
released.

For largely the same factual reasons stated hereinbefore, the two trust deeds are
i

wrongful liens.
Both the American General Trust Deed and the Bank One Trust Deed were deeds
obtained without the signature of Blaine Hanney, a trustee of the Hanney Family Trust whose
consent was required in order to encumber the Property. Shirley Hanney executed both deeds
relying on separately forged powers of attorney. Likewise, as previously discussed, Blaine
Hanney's 1995 general durable power of attorney, made no mention to property of the Hanney
Family Trust, and was insufficient to grant authority to Shirley Hanney to act in Blaine's stead
with regards to trust property. Both the American General Trust Deed and the Bank One Trust
I

Deed fall squarely within the definition of a "wrongful lien" within the statute. Under these
circumstances, both the American General Trust Deed and the Bank One Trust Deed, along with
Shirley Hanney's other wrongfully filed deeds, should be declared void ab initio and the Hanney
Family Trust should be awarded its costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this action.
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B.

FRANKLIN'S AND AMERICAN GENERAL'S RESPONSE TO HANNEY
DEFENDANTS' WRONGFUL LIEN COUNTERCLAIM

The Hanney Family Trust has asserted a Counterclaim against Franklin and a CrossClaim against American General for wrongful lien. The Bank One Trust Deed and AG Trust
Deed are not wrongful liens because they were signed by Shirley Hanney as Blaine Hanney's
attorney-in-fact pursuant to the 1995 General Power of Attorney, which was not revoked until
October 19, 2006, over six years after the Bank One Trust Deed and AG Trust Deed were
executed and recorded. Accordingly, the Bank One Trust Deed and AG Trust Deed are not
wrongful liens, because they were "signed by" an owner of the Property (Shirley Hanney) as
well as "authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the Property" (the 1995
General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney).
IV.

JOINT STATEMENT OF INCONTROVERTED FACTS
1.

The house and real property that is the subject of this action is located at 3037

East 3050 North, Layton, Utah 84040 ("Property").
2.

On February 22, 1995, Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney executed the

Revocable Trust Agreement of the Hanney Family Trust ("Trust Agreement"). Blaine Hanney
and Shirley Hanney were appointed Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. They were also
beneficiaries of the Hanney Family Trust.
3.

Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney executed a Special Warranty Deed conveying

the Property to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney, as Trustees for the Hanney Family Trust.
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4.

The Special Warranty Deed was executed on February 22, 1995 and recorded on

April 10, 1995.
5.

On February 22, 1995, Blaine Hanney executed a General Durable Power of

Attorney ("General Power of Attorney").
6.

The General Power of Attorney appoints Shirley Hanney as Blaine Hanney's

"true and lawful attorney in fact." The General Power of Attorney gives Shirley Hanney:
[F]ull power to do and perform all and every act that I may legally
do through an attorney, in relation to all of my property, real or
personal, where situate, to carry out the purposes for which this
power is granted, specifically including the power to make
deposits, sign checks, endorse items, and withdraw funds from
checking, savings, or other accounts, with full power of
substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming that
which Shirley Hanney or my agent's substitute shall lawfully do or
cause to be done by my agent or my agent's substitute lawfully
designated by virtue of the power herein conferred upon my agent.

'

(

\

7.

The General Durable Power of Attorney was terminated in writing on October 19,

8.

On June 9, 1998, a Home Equity Line Deed of Trust was executed in the amount

2006.
(

of $50,000 in favor of Key Bank National Association ("First Key Bank Trust Deed"), which
was recorded on June 16, 1998.
9.

On January 19, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Home Equity Line Deed of

Trust in the amount of $80,000 in favor of Key Bank ("Second Key Bank Trust Deed"), which
I
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was recorded on January 20, 1999. Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Second
Key Bank Trust Deed "by POA Shirley A. Hanney."
10.

Some of the proceeds of this loan were used to pay off the First Key Bank Trust

11.

A Deed of Reconveyance for the First Key Bank Trust Deed was recorded on

Deed.

March 31,1999.
12.

On April 16, 1999, Shirley Hanney executed a Modification of Key Equity

Options Agreement that increased the credit line from $80,000 to $120,000. Shirley Hanney
signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Modification "by POA Shirley A. Hanney."
13.

On February 28, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed an Open End Deed of Trust in

the amount of $163,200 in favor of American General Finance ("AG Trust Deed"), which was
recorded on February 29, 2000. Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the AG Trust
Deed "by POA Shirley A. Hanney."
14.

Also on February 29, 2000, a Power of Attorney - Special (Specific Property

Only), which purports to be executed by Blaine Hanney, was recorded for the Property.
15.

On August 24, 2000, Shirley Hanney executed a Deed of Trust in favor of Bank

One NA ("Bank One Trust Deed") to secure a loan in the amount of $247,000 ("Bank One
Loan"). Shirley Hanney signed Blaine Hanney's name on the Bank One Trust Deed "by Shirley
A. Hanney as attorney in fact." The Bank One Trust Deed was recorded on August 29, 2000.
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16.

Also on August 29, 2000, a Power of Attorney - Special - Durable (Specific

Property Only), which purports to be executed by Blaine Hanney, was recorded on the Property.
17.

The proceeds from the Bank One Loan were used to pay off the loan from Key

Bank ($69,997.00) and to pay American General ($167,087.00). A check in the amount of
$1,875.88, which represented the balance of the proceeds of the Bank One Loan, was issued in
the name of Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney.
18.

Hanney & Hanney was formed in September 1994 and "expired" on January 21,

'

2004. It was an "S" corporation and Shirley Hanney owned 60% and Blaine Hanney owned
40%.

19.

Hanney Development, L.P. ("Hanney Development") was formed on April 27,

1993. The general and limited partners of Hanney Development are Blaine Hanney and his
mother and siblings.
20.

<

The proceeds from the Key Bank Loan and AG Loan were used for Hanney and

Hanney Construction.
21.

u

The beneficial interest in the Bank One Trust Deed was subsequently assigned to

Plaintiff
•

22.

•

•

i

The 1998 federal income tax return for Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney was

filedxon or about September 23, 1999. The tax return shows a,deduction for "home mortgage
interest" in the amount of $2,192.00.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
08439.117/4823-5874-2019.3
24

(

": 2 3 . ' '! 'be 10QQ federa 1 b »c vnie ta: : reti lrn for Blaine I la iiney and Shirley Hanney was
filed oi .»' iDou; Oeton-r \<\ 2000
interest w ;-)e amoun: .r
24.

N

The tax return shows a deduction for "home mortgage

"'. ' • ) .

I he 2000 federal income ta;? :, i etui n for Blaine I lanney and Shirk y 1 Iaiine\ was

filed on or about September !s: ''OJ

lm tax return shows a deduction for "home mortgage

interest" in the amount of $ i . ' - • >
25.

The amended

•

-eueru income

•.

..• = •

.. .

;•

• ir-^y

Hanney was filed on or about September 19, 2003. '\hi amended lax return show- a deduction
for "home mortgage interest" in the amount of $29,622.00.
I he 2002 federal income tax return. *.- r ,w^ Finney am M.I:* f; -.a:ii:^ v, : -

26.

also filed on or about September 19, 2003. T h e tax returns shows a deduction for "home
mortgage interest" in the amount of $25,852.00.
?n.
Mi '•-:

-

Rlainc Hanney and Shirley Hanney nice
U'

t!

neiu. v. . »r ^ napter

bankruptcy on

"!i.t:ikruptcy Action"). On their schedules, they listed the Bank One Trust

Deed i:-; the amount of $247,000 as a secured claim.
28
<^ -1"11" • —

\ m e r i c a n General has stipulated that, pursuant to nu s...K>rdiru;:k>n Agreement
'

•

"^'

v

-

.^rii i 6 . ^ 0 0 - , the Bank One 1 rust Deed is in

senior lien priority posi.ti.on to the American General Trust Deed

American General claims that

the subordination applies c >nly tc the principal amount :)f the Ban k. One I oan , a rid ri :»! ti i,e
interest.
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29,

On August 22, 2006, the Trustee in the Bankruptcy Action abandoned the

Property.
V.

CONTROVERTED FACTS/ISSUES
1.

As Trustee of The Hanney Family Trust, did Shirley Hanney have actual,

apparent or implied authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed and/or the AG Trust Deed and
encumber the Property, including Blaine Hanney's interest in the Property?
2.

As Blaine Hanney's attorney-in-fact pursuant to the POA, did Shirley

i

Hanney have actual, apparent or implied authority to execute the Bank One Trust Deed and /or
the AG Trust Deed and encumber the Property, including Blaine Hanney's interest in the
Property?
3.

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, is the Bank One Trust Deed a

valid lien on the Property because it "stands in the place" of the Key Bank Trust Deeds and the

i

AGTrustDeed?
4.

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, is the AG Trust Deed a valid
.

lien on the Property because it "stands in the place" of the Key Bank Trust Deeds?
5.

Under the doctrine of equitable liens, is the Bank One Trust Deed a valid

lien on the Property to the extent that the proceeds from the Bank One Loan were used for the
benefit of Blaine Hanney and/or the Hanney Family Trust?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
26may contain errors.

08439.117/4823-5874-2019.3

.

•

'

-

•

<

•.. 6. '

1'ndei Ihi: docttntv* ot equit;*1^'

II.MH. I«.

|he \< i I rusl Deed ,i \;ili<i hen on

the Proper;} u rne extent that the proceeds from the AL- iA ai- were used for the benefit of Blaine
Hanney ana a: ,, i.aniiC} :\,::../ •'n.-.
'. •

7.

I Jndei the equitable doctrine of unji ist en richment. is Blaine I lanney 01: the

Hanney Family Trust obligated to repa) the AG Loan because the proceeds were used for his
benefit?
' 8. • I Inder the equitable doctrh le of unjust enrichment, is Blaine I Ianne> 01 the
Hanney Family Trust obligated to repay the Bank One Loan because the proceeds were used for
his benefit?
9. - • Are Blaine Hanney anc UJL- Hanney i an.:.; , /ust equitably estopped from
challenging the validity of the Bank One Trust Deed and/or the AG Trust Deed?
iu.

Did Blaine Hanney and/or the Hannev :-aniily I rust waive their righi i-_

challenge the validity of the Bani ou^ \ rus, Deco and or inc Z\-^ i•.»*;
..

:>I^I;K

lianne} arm j , ;:;. :;an:ie;- .•anil:1 . "us; ram

"ML

\rdUi -'

Trust Deed and/or the AG Trust Deed?
Did Shirley Hanney have an interest n-, liu Propem. either from her joint
ownersiiiD o: in. property or her beneficial interest uncle: -i^ : ,am;e\ : an,,:/* ; :L ;;
Is ttic \ d 1 rust Deed a \alui hen on Sliirie) lianne) :, inleie.sl in the
Property?
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14.

Is Bank One Trust Deed a valid lien on Shirley Hanney's interest in the

15.

Under the Subordination Agreement, did American General subordinate

Property?

the AG Trust Deed to the entire amount of the Bank One Trust Deed, including interest, or just
the principal of the Bank One Trust Deed?
16.

Which power of attorneys were used to consummate the transactions in

question: the general durable power of attorney or the two forged special powers of attorney?
VL

WITNESSES
A.

FRANKLIN WILL CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES
1.

Shirley A. Hanney

2.

Blaine J. Hanney

3.

Franklin will designate any additional will call witnesses no later than

January 30, 2009, the deadline previously established by the Court.
B.

FRANKLIN MAY CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES
1.

Henry Vantienderen

2.

ErikK. Iverson

3.

Any other witness identified and/or called by Defendants.

4.

Any other witness that becomes necessary for impeachment or rebuttal,
<

regardless of whether such witness has been previously identified or disclosed to Defendants.
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• -'5. ' ' Franklin, v • ill identify ai i\ additional may call w itnesses no later than
January 30, 2009, the deadline previously established by the Court.
C.

HANNEY DEFENDANTS WILL CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES
1.

D.

\ll ^ itnesses olhet\A ISC identified

2.

Blaine Hanney

3.

Shirley I lanney

'

.

'

,

.

•

HANNEY DEFENDANTS MAY CALL THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES
1.

Erik K Iverson

2.

Allison Hodges

3.

Other idenuiuc \\ii:ies^e.v identified ir. achanee v: . :- Janu?*™ ?;;
T

4.

-•

.

. • '.

K" neeueu u> respond or rebut any witness identified by any

party in advance of the 31: januar. 2009 deadline.
E.

- * '

- V , .

;L,..L_ , %•

l i l t MM LOWING WITNESSES

American Genera; wih designate an\ will eali witnesses no later than January 30, 2009,

F.

AMERICAN GENLR A.L MAY CAM. THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES

American General w ill desigj iaic any rna\ ian witnesses no later than Jam iary 30,, 2009,
the deadline previously established by the Court.

"
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VII.

EXHIBITS
A,

EXHIBITS FRANKLIN EXPECTS TO OFFER AT TRIAL
Chain of Title Documents

Document No.
STGC000818-820
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000821-824
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000825 - 826
I (Produced by Inwest)
STGC000510-513
STGC000827 - 828
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000404-405

Date
03/15/1979

Description
Deed Granting Easement

03/15/1979

Deed Granting Easement

11/03/1982

Warranty Deed

01/14/1999
01/14/1999

Affidavit of Death
Quit Claim Deed

02/22/1995

Special Warranty Deed

Hanney Family Trust Documents
Date
02/22/1995

Document No.
STGC000072 - 73
STGC0000395 - 396
STGC000402 - 403

02/22/1995

STGC000322
STGC000399
STGC000389
STGC000397
STGC000394& STGC000398
STGC000392 - 393
STGC000383-388

02/16/1995
02/22/1995
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
02/22/1995

STGC000373 - 380
STGC000353 - 358
STGC000359 - 364

N/A
N/A
N/A

Description
General Durable Power of Attorney - Blaine
Hanney
General Durable Power of Attorney - Shirley
Hanney
John H. Geilmann Letter
Client Instruction List
Summary of Last Will
Summary of Last Will
Summary of Revocable Hanney Family Trust
Abstract of Hanney Family Trust Agreement
Review Procedures and Future Planning For
Estate Plan of Blaine and Shirley Hanney
Personal Data and Estate Inventory
The Last Will of Shirley Hanney
The Last Will of Blaine Hanney

1

Franklin does not anticipate offering all of the exhibits listed on the table. Counsel for the parties have agreed to
meet to discuss and further refine the exhibits that will be offered at trial. Because of conflicting schedules,
however, counsel were unable to meet prior to filing this Pre-Trial Order. Consequently, for sake of inclusiveness,
all of the potential exhibits have been included in the table.
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STGC000381-382
STGC000400-401
STGC000327 - 328

N/A
N/A
02/22/1995

STGC000323 - 324

02/22"l<->°5

STGC000404 - 405
STGC000331-352
STGC000815-817

02/22/1995
02/22/1995
10/18/2006

Special Power of Attorney: Blaine Hanney
Special Power of Attorney: Shirley Hanney
Blaine Hanney Directive to Physicians and
Medical Services
Shirley Hanney Directive to Physicians and
Medical Services
Special Warranty Deed
Hanney Family Revocable Trust Agreement
Revocation of General Durable Power of
Attorney
•"fits

Description
Letter from Key Bank re Subpoena
Key Bank Home Equity Line Deed of Trust
(June 9, 1998)
Deed of Reconveyance
Key Bank Home Equity Line Deed of Trust
(January 19, 1999)
Modification of Key Equity Options
Agreement and Deed of Trust

Date
12/12/2007

Document No.
STGC000829
STGC000081-85
i STGC000509
STGC000087 - 92

02/23/1999
01/19/1999

STGC000507 - 508

04/K''!°o9

STGC000503 - 504

04/23/2002

Deed of Reconveyance

American General Loan Documents
Document No.
STGC000621-625
STGC000505 - 506
STGC000489 - 498
AGF0043
AGF0314
AGF0315
AGF0332
AGF0338-339
AGF0343-366
STGC000830
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000831-833

Date
02/2000

Description
American General Loan Documents

02/02/2000
02/28/2000
03/03/2000
01/25/2000
02/22/1995
02/22/1995
N/A

Power of Attorney - Special
Shirley Hanney Letter
Check to Key Bank
Fax to American General
General Durable Power of Attorney
Revocable Trust Agreement
Schedule C - Title Commitment

1 02/25/2000

Quit Claim Deed

1

1
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(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000834-835
(Produced by Inwest)

02/29/2000

Power of Attorney - Special (Recorded)

Bank One Loan Documents
Document No.
STGC000250-251
STGC000252
STGC000695 - 698
STGC000784 - 796
STGC000780-781
STGC000797 - 800
STGC000683 - 684
STGC000668 669
STGC000661
STGC000838-840
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000806
STGC000648 - 649
AGF0105-106
STGC000769
STGC000585 - 597
STGC000774
STGC000775
STGC000841 - 844
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000845
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000846 - 848
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000849-851
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000852
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000853
(Produced by Inwest)
STGC000836 - 837
| (Produced by Inwest)

Date
08/24/2000
08/28/2000
11/18/2002
08/09/2000
08/03/2000
08/24/2000
08/24/2000
08/28/2000
08/22/2000
08/22/2000

Description
Settlement Statement
Promissory Note
Bank One Deed of Trust
Loan Documents
Truth-In-Lending Statement
Loan Documents
Disbursement Request
Disclosure Statement
Warranty Deed
Warranty Deed (Recorded)

08/24/2000
08/18/2000
00/00/2001
02/05/2003
01/10/2005
02/10/2003
02/20/2003
08/24/2000

Quit Claim Deed
Power of Attorney - Special - Durable
Allstate Insurance Policy
Letter from Blaine Hanney
Letter from Brad Smith & Affidavit of
Shirley Hanney
Notice of Default
Letter from Bank One
Loan Application

00/00/1998

Recording Checklist

02/20/2002

Letter from Inwest and Related Documents

08/29/2000

Checks

08/09/2000

Pay-Off Inquiry

11/03/2006

Letter from Inwest Title
Power of Authority - Special - Durable
[(Recorded)

08/18/2000
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08/29/2000

STGC000298 - 300

Checks

STI Holdings/ Notice of Interest
Date
02/25/2003
05/25/2005

Document No.
STGC000609
AGF0007- 008

Description
Notice of Interest
Notice of Trustee's Intent To Dismiss
Adversary Claim Against STI Holdings and
Opportunity For Objection

lllamt lhiiuuit ami Mifiit't I'm Return* and Hank liecnnh
Document No.
STGC000483 - 488
STGC000406-413
STGC000414-420
STGC000421-429
STGC000430 - 440
STGC000441-451

j

STGC000453-469
STGC000470 - 482
F000024
F000026
F000027
F000029
F000039 - F000040
1 (Produced by Blaine Hanney)

Date
09/14/2005
00/00/1995
00/00/1996
00/00/1997
00/00/1999
00/00/1999
00/00/1999
00/00/2000
00/00/1999
07/31/1978
02/10/2000
03/10/2000
04/10/2000
09/10/2000

Description
Hanney 2000 Income Tax Return
Hanney 1995 Income Tax Return
Hanney 1996 Income Tax Return
Hanney 1997 Income Tax Return
Hanney 1999 Amended Tax Return
Hanney 1999 Income Tax Return
Hannev 1999 Amended Tax Return
Hanney 2000 Income Tax Return
Hanney 1999 Income Tax Return
First National Bank Authorization Letter
First National Bank Checking Account
Records

First National Bank Checking Account
Records - 1995 through 2002
IRS Innocent Spouse Documents

1 (Produced by Blaine Hanney)

flaunts S llannry "
' onstructwu !hn nmenis
Document No.
STGC000925 - 940
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC000941 -977
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)

Date
2002

Description
2002 Income Tax Return for Hanney &
Hanney

01/31/2000

Hanney & Hanney Checking Account
Statements
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STGC000978-1030
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC001031 -1046
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC001087-1149
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC001051-1063
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC001064-1075
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC001077-1086
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC001047-1050
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC000001-002
(Produced by Blaine Hanney)

01/31/1998

Hanney & Hanney Money Market Account
Statements

2001

2001 Income Tax Return for Hanney &
Hanney

1998

Various Hanney & Hanney Financial
Documents for 1998

1998

1998 Income Tax Return

1997

1997 Income Tax Return

1996

1996 Income Tax Return

1997

Various Hanney & Hanney Financial
Documents for 1997

10/03/2005

Business Entity Search for Hanney & Hanney
First Security Bank Statements for Hanney &
Hanney
Barnes Banking - Unpaid Checks and Credit
Line Advances

1 (Produced by Blaine Hanney)

Barnes Banking Statements
(

Document No.
B000663 - 664; B000676;
B000679 - 680; B000700 703;B000708-713;
B000728;B000730-735;
B000740-743;B000749751;B000764-765;B000772
-773;B000775-783;
B000785;B000795-797;
B000799
B000804 - 807
1 (Produced by Barnes Banking)

Date

Description
Barnes Banking Checking Account
Statements for Hanney & Hanney
'

•

•

^^
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STGC000881-916
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC000917-924
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)

00/00/2000

N/A

Barnes Banking Checking Account
Statements for Hanney & Hanney with
Handwritten Notes
Hanney & Hanney Payables

Miscellaneous Documents Re Hanney Partnership
Document No.
B000618-630
B000634-635
STGC000003 004

Date
03/02/1993
06/25/1997
10/03/2005

N/A
STGC000854-861
(Produced by Henry Van
Tienderen)
STGC000862-88(>
N/A
(Produced by lien:y Van
Tienderen)
B00001-004;B000422-423;
(Produced by Barnes Banking)
B00012;B000343;B000324;
B000321;B000316
1 (Produced by Barnes Banking)

Description
Certificate and Agreement of Limited
Partnership of Hanney Development
Partnership Borrowing Authorization
Business Entity Search for Hanney
Development
Various Documents with Handwritten Notes
re Hanney Partnership
Hanney & Hanney Reconciliations - Van
Tienderen
Signature Cards for Hanney Development
Accounts with Barnes Banking
Hanney Development Checks

Barnes Banking Litigation Documents
Document No.
V000001-005;V000023;
V000038;V000040;
V000044; V000062-064;
V000128-132;V000139

Date
01/21/1998

Description
Various Documents Produced by Barnes
Banking (Various Documents Regarding
Hanney & Hanney Construction Produced by
Henry Van Tienderen)

Bankruptcy '' Document No.
STGC000244 - 246

Date
05/22/2003

STGC000128-134

12/15/2003

Description
Trustee's Response to Bank One's Motion
for Relief from Automatic Stay
Objection to Discharge of Shirley Hanney

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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03/17/2006

Settlement Agreement between Trustee and
Blaine Hanney
Schedule D of the Hanneys' Bankruptcy
Schedules
Bankruptcy Schedules

N/A

STGC000615
STGC000524 - 572

03/19/2003

Shirley Hanney Answers and Affidavits
Document No.
STG000094-103

Date
04/08/2004

STGC000594-602

01/26/2005
01/12/2005

Description
Handwritten "Answer" of Shirley Hanney
(Bankruptcy Action)
Affidavit of Shirley Ann Hanney
Affidavit of Shirley Hanney
(Barnes Banking)
Handwritten Answer of Shirley Hanney (First
Franklin)
Handwritten Letter of Shirley Hanney to
Clerk of Court
(Bankruptcy Action)
Handwritten "Answer" of Shirley Hanney
(First Franklin)
Affidavit of Shirley Hanney
(First Franklin)
Handwritten Answer of Shirley Hanney
(Barnes Banking)

05/00/2005
03/28/2005

12/01/2004
01/03/2007
10/09/2006

Depositions from Barnes Banking Action and Bankruptcy Action
Description
Date
12/08/2005 Deposition of Henry Van
Tienderen (Barnes Banking)
01/23/2006 Deposition of Henry Van
Tienderen Vol. II (Barnes
Banking)
01/11/2006 Deposition of Blaine J. Hanney
(Barnes Banking)
01/24/2006 Deposition of Blaine Hanney
Vol. II (Barnes Banking)
01/13/2006 Deposition of Shirley A. Hanney
(Barnes Banking)

Document No.
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Stipulated

03/03/2004 2004 Examination of Blaine
Hanney (Bankruptcy Action)
12/22/2003 2004 Examination of Blaine
Hanney (Bankruptcy Action)
09/22/2005 Deposition of Eric Iverson
(Bankruptcy Action)
09/07/2005 Deposition of Blaine Hanney
(Bankruptcy Action)
09/07/2005 Exhibit Schedule (Bankruptcy
Action)
09/01/2005 Deposition of Shirley Hanney
(Bankruptcy Action)
09/01/2005 Exhibit Schedule
(Bankruptcy Action)

B.

EXHIBITS FRANKLIN MAY OFFER AT TRIAL
1.

Any exnim: uscvi r\ : ^iendants at: W,L •/- lucnunec r>\ .^enaanb- a- a

exhibit the> expect to use or may use at trial.
2.

Any other document produced by am pun . o- xmrc narty in the course of

this litigation and not identified as an exhibit herein, but rmH* insula: as sucn document becomes
necessary for ii npeachment oi rebi lttal
3

^ny

otj:ier

document that becomes necessary for impeachment or rebuttal

regardless of whether such document has been previously identified or disclosed.
C.

EXHIBITS HANNEY DEFENDA> I N L X P E C T TO Of U' r

- JLAL

1.

All documents identified by Plaintiff or any other Deienaan;;:: the pretrial

2.

Ml il("[n'>siiioii transcript; ironi the Unimex ban;-- *>:

order.
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^ • riding or the

matter of Hanney Development v. Barnes Banking Company.
3.

-

All documents executed by Shirley Hanney at or in connection with the

closing of the two loan transaction at issue in this case.
4.

All affidavits of Shirley Hanney from this case, the Hanney bankruptcy

proceeding or the matter of Hanney Development v. Barnes Banking Company.
5.

Warranty Deed from Chris S. Hanney and Mabel J. Hanney to Blain J.

Hanney, dated 20 January 1979.
6.

Quit Claim Deed from Mabel J. Hanney to Blaine J. Hanney and Shirley

Ann Hanney, Trustees, dated 13 January 1999.
7.

Forged Special Power of Attorney dated 2 February 2000, recorded 29

February 2000.
8.

Forged Quit Claim Deed dated 25 February 2000, recorded 29 February

9.

Forged Quit Claim Deed dated 28 February 2000, recorded 30 March

10.

Forged Special Power of Attorney dated 18 August 2000, recorded 29

11.

Forged Warranty Deed dated 22 August 2000, recorded 29 August 2000.

12.

Forged Quit Claim Deed dated 24 August 2000, recorded 29 August 2000.

2000.

2000.

August 2000.
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D. • . I ' M I I H I II'S AIMEKK ** < - ' ^ N L I U I E X P E C T S 1 <' > I >l VFM A I I Kl \I
' 1.

American General Revolving Line of Credit Agreement and Disclosure

Statement in the am* >unt < >f $163,200, cta.1 ed I <ebr uar> 28, 2,000.
2.

.

On-p-l rt- ! >e r o! '!rusi irom Blaine J. and Shirley Ann Hanney to

American General daiec; rcDrtuir> Jh. _.KK recorded rehr:ur\ ._>- _:*-'"H3.

Subordination Agreement executed by American General in favor of Bank

One, dated April 17,2002.
.;

E,

EXHIT
1.

Vllil.

-

. • . •'
••; - f

^

•">

.•-•••.•.-'•.''

< v :**-

^

•

• •. — -

.-.'.
,:

A m c\ninus listed by me uiiur parlies.

POSSIBILITY OI S E T T L E M E N T
Ihc possibility of settlement is considered poor,
• ^ •-- : ihis jiig^diiN oi January

3)()LL

BYTHECOI JRT:

>_. •

t
^

v^-

Honorable j^pdne) S. Page
Second Judicial D'sHc* ' our:. t ;u\i> L ountv
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

LAURA S. SCOTT
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff

BRAD C. SMITH
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Hanney Defendants

GEORGE W. PRATT
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH, P.C.
Attorneys for American General
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

LAURA S. SCOTT
PARSONS BEHLE & lATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff

BRAD C. SMITH
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Hanney Defendants

GEORGES. PRATT
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH, P.C.
Attorneys for American General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this l\j)

day of January, 2009,1 caused to be mailed, first class,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JOINT FINAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER
to:
Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
George W. Pratt

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

/\

MPQMU
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HANNEY,BLA!NE J

SECOND
2 1 § Z M T COURT-

SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAr

COUNTY OF DAVIS., FARMINGTON DEPARTMEN"

Memorandum! Decision

FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation.
Plaintiff,
vs.
BLAINE J. HANNE r , ai i individual;
SHIRLEY A HANNEY, an individual;
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF
UTAH INC., a Utah corporation; STI
HOLDINGS, INC.. a Nevada corporation;
and THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a
revocable trust,

Case No. 050700241

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

This mattei having come before the court for trial and the court having heard the
witnesses and received tne evidei ice ai id com isel \ iavii ig subi r lifted the writtei i ciosii ig
arguments and the court having reviewed the same and having disposed of the
plaintiff's Mor***- " Reopen nnc nemo fuhv advised r t r 'r premises "uses a? Tohows
L\

-.'

Trust Dee: or tn~ IOI neid D^; plaintiffs predecessor !: merest Bank One
Tne lot was deeded to defendant Blane u .an r -- w*
signed by his Dai ents, tviabL- at id Ct n is He . life estate to the grantors

_,.-: t

ZJB\'\

. n .-

:*\ a Vva^anty Deed

.

^ ~:

v .;ei

ved a

:" was recorded with the Davis County Recorder in 1982. It

was deeaed to Blaine at the same time that othei iots his parents had developed were
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-2deeded to his siblings. After the lot was deeded, Blaine and Shirley proceeded to build
a home on the lot. Blaine did most of the work on the home and it was completed lien
free. The Hanneys thought that they may have paid some for the lot but could not
remember.
Blaine and Shirley were married in 1973. After the marriage Blaine worked in
construction and spent the last 33 years working for Interwest Construction until his
retirement a few years ago. Shirley worked at various jobs but spent 20 years working
at Cover Club Foods until it was sold in 1994. Over the years they put their money in a
joint account out of which family expenses were paid. Shirley was primarily responsible
for keeping track of the family finances , paying the bills , seeing the taxes were taken
care of and for the financial management for the family. She signed checks in Blaine's
name and tax returns when he was out of town. In 1991 Blaine's construction job begin
to take him out of town most of the time and he would only come home once or twice a
month. Shirley took on even more responsibility for family finances and he became
less and less involved, relying on Shirley's representation and to how things were going.
He trusted her completely.
Over the years Blaine's family had been involved in the development and sale of
land owned by his parents. [ the lot in question was one developed by his family ]. They
did business as Hanney Development. In April of 1993 the family decided to create a
Limited Partnership to carry on the business. They organized Hanney Development a
Limited Partnership. Blaine, his mother Mable, and his sister Fay Shumway were
designated as the General Partners with his other five siblings as Limited Partners. The
Business Accounts and checking was maintained at Barnes Bank. Shirley, even
though not a part of the limited partnership, had full control of the finances of the
company she had authority on all the accounts at Barnes Bank and did all the
bookkeeping for the company. She was the one who paid all the bills deposited all the
funds and kept the books of the company . She would deal directly with the accountant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

o-

in preparing taxes and prepared financial reports for the members of the partnership.
She often signed Blaine's name on checks, other business documents and the tax
returns and would deliver documents to the other general partners to sign. Everyone
relied on her to take care of the financial part of the business. They relied on her reports
as to the financial condition of the Partnership.
In 1992, about the same time as the limited partnership was created, Blaine's
Parents suggested that Blaine and Shirley create a Family Trust. Blaine and Shirley
met with a representative of an Attorney by the name of John Geilmann to discuss a
trust. They decided to create the Hanney Family Revocable Trust. The document was
drawn up by Mr. Geiimann's office and the representative came to their home and went
over it with them. They understood that the trust would become effective if something
happened to either one of them, but would have no effect as long as they were both
still alive. The Trust named Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees. It provided
in paragraph 11.1 that the trustees in their sole and absolute discretion could exercise
the powers listed [ emphases added ]. Paragraph 11.2 provided that if they could not
agree on a matter then a decision of a majority would govern. It further provided that if
their was an equal number of trustees another could be added to break the deadlock as
provided in paragraph 13.2 of the Trust. They signed the Trust on February 22, 1995.
On that same day Blaine Hanney, as grantor, signed a Special Warranty Deed
conveying the lot here in question to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees of
the HANNEY Family Trust. Shirley Hanney was not listed as a grantor but also signed
the deed. It was recorded on April 10, 1995. The Hanneys also signed a General
Power of Attorney to each other in conjunction with signing the Trust; however, it was
never recorded.
The Hanneys never transferred any other property 1o the trust as they were
instructed. Their bank accounts, stocks , insurance policies and other property
remained as it was before the Trust was created. They treated their property just as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4they had before the Trust was created. They testified that they understood the trust
would only take effect after one of them died and that the General Power of Attorney
could only be used in the event one of them was disabled.
In 1994, after Shirley had left Clover Club, it was her desire to start a
construction company, so on September 9, 1994, Hanney and Hanney Construction
inc. Was organized. Shirley had 60% of the stock and Blaine 40%. Shirley was listed
as Director, President, Secretary / Treasurer and Registered Agent of the Company.
Blaine was listed as Director and Vice President. A business account was set up a
Barnes Bank. The Hanneys agreed that they would use $45,000 that they had In
savings at America First to buy equipment for the company, but that it would be repaid.
It was agreed that construction would be financed by construction loans. It was during
this time that Biaine was out of town most of the time and in keeping with the
Incorporation agreement, Shirley was almost entirely in charge of running the business.
She kept all of the records, managed the finances, paid the bills. She provided all the
information to the accountant and saw that tax returns were prepared and did
everything else to run the business. She signed Blaine's name when she needed to
when he was out of town even including tax returns,. If he asked to look at bank
records or tax returns she would generally tell him they were at the accountants or
make some other excuse
She did not have a contractors license. In order to be able to build she teamed
up with a contractor by the name of Bernie Slack to build homes and used his license.
They would build homes together and share costs after the home was finished they
would split any profits. Mr. Slack eventually signed with her so that she could get her
license. At one point she, through Hanney and Hanney construction, entered into a
partnership with her brother Ted in a concrete business.
At first Shirley only used money that they had agreed on from savings at America
First and construction loans: however. At some point she opened up a line of credit with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

First Security Bank which she paid off each year. Blaine was not on that and had no
knowledge of it.
The business got to a point that she could not meet her obligations this came to
a head when she incurred a $160,000 concrete bill and had no money to meet it. At
this point she begin taking money from Hanney Development accounts at Barnes Bank
to meet her Hanney Construction obligations. Neither Blaine nor any fo the members of
Hanney Development had any knowledge of this. Shirley manipulated the books and
records so that it was not apparent from the records.
In 1998 Shirley went to Key Bank to get a home equity line of credit to pay the
bills of Hanney Construction so she would not have to take any further money from the
Hanney Development accounts..On June 9, 1998 she obtained a $50,000 Home Equity
Line of Credit and signed a Trust Deed on the lot in question. She signed her name and
Blaine's name individually and as trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. The documents
never referred to any Power of Attorney. Blaine did not sign it nor was he aware of it.
The notary could remember Shirley but could not remember anything else about the
signing.
On January 19, 1999, the Line of Credit was increase to $80,000. Shirley again
signed her name and Blaine's name to the documents and this time referenced a
Power Of Attorney, but there was no signature for the trust. Again the evidence was
that Blaine did not sign nor was he aware of it.
Again on April 16, 1999, the Line of Credit at Key Bank was increased to
$120,000. The documents carried the signature of Blaine and Shirley individually and
as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. Again it referenced the Power of Attorney.
Again the testimony was that Shirley signed all the names and that Biaine was not
aware of it.

~"

In February of 2000, Shirley contacted American General Finance to refinance
the Key Bank Line of Credit. She met with their representatives and in conjunction with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6acquiring the loan signed a Quit Claim Deed on February 25, 2000 transferring the lot in
question from Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust
to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney. It bore the signature of Blaine Hanney and
Shirley Hanney. There was no reference to any Power Of Attorney. It was recorded at
the request of Interwest Title on February 29, 2000 at 12:28p.m. as document No.
1577645. The evidence was that Blaine never signed the document nor was ever aware
of it.
This was the first document in the chain of title that purported to transfer any
interest to Shirley in her own right. There had been documents in form of easements
that included Shirley's signature or referred to her as a joint tenant, but it was unclear
form a legal standpoint and title perspective what interest they represented other than
to recognize her possible inchoate interest as a spouse.
On February 28y2000 , Shirley Hanney signed an Open Ended Trust Deed on
the lot to secure a $163,000 Loan from American General. The document bore the
signature of Blaine and Shirley and referenced that Blaine's name was signed by
Shirley under a Power of Attorney. This document was recorded by Interwest Title on
February 29, 2000 at 12:29 p.m. as document No. 1577647 Again the evidence was
that Blaine did not sign the document nor was he aware of it.
American General required that Shirley have a Special Power of Attorney
specific to the lot in question in order to sign for Blaine. Interwest Title prepared the
Special Power of Attorney for Blaine's signature. The document was executed on
February 2, 2000 and bore Blaine's signature. Interestingly enough it was notarized by
Eric Iverson a person who notarized numerous documents in these matters .prepared
by interwest Title. The document was recorded by Interwest Title on February.29,2000
at 12;29 p.m. as document No. 1577646.. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not
sign this document nor was he aware of it.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7On March 30, 2000, another Quit Claim Deed was recorded by Interwest Title.
This deed bore the signatures of Blaine and Shirley and conveyed the property from the
Hanneys back to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. Shirley
signed both names and referenced the Special Power of Attorney. Again the evidence
was that Blaine was not aware of it.
The monies received from American General were applied to pay off a part of
the Key Bank Loan and obligations that Shirley had incurred through Hanney
Construction.
In August 2000, Shirley refinanced the American General Loan.
On August 29, 2000, a Warranty Deed conveying the lot from Blaine Hanney and
Shirley Hanney as Trustees to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as joint tenants was
recorded by Interwest Title. It bore the signatures of Blaine and Shirley Hanney as
trustees but made no reference to a Power of Attorney. It was signed on August
22,2000. It was again notarized by Mr. Iverson. It was recorded at 4:15 p.m. as
document No. 1610660. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not sign the document
nor was he aware of it.
On August 24, 2000, another Trust Deed was signed to secure a loan for
$247,000 from Bank One plaintiff's predecessor in interest. It bore the signature of
Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and referenced a Power of
Attorney. It was recorded at the request of Interwest Title on August 29, 2000 at 4:20
p.m. as document 1610662. Again the evidence was that Biaine had no Knowledge of
this.
in this matter Bank One also required a Special Power of Attorney as to specific
property. Again the Special Power of Attorney was provided by Shirley. It was dated
August 18, 2000 and bore Blaine's signature. It was notarized by Mr. Iversion. It was
recorded at the request of interwest Title on August 29, 2000 at 4:19 p.m. as document
No. 1610661, just prior to the Trust Deed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Again on August 29, 2000 another Quit Claim Deed was recorded at the request
of Interwest Title. The deed was signed on August 24, 2000 and bore the signature of
Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and referenced the Power of
Attorney. It conveyed the lot from the Hanneys back to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees
of the Hanney Family Trust. It was recorded at 4:20 p.m. as document No. 1610663
Again Blaine was never aware of this document.
The proceeds from this loan were used to pay off the amounts owing to Key
Bank and other obligations owing by Hanney Construction.
Plaintiff, who's burden it was, never presented any evidence as to the identity of
the handwriting in question nor was there any testimony from anyone from the financial
institutions or the title companies or notaries that Blaine had personally appeared
before them or that they know him or had met him.
Testimony was that Shirley Hanney as book keeper of Hanney Development and
as President, Secretary/treasurer, Director and Registered Agent of Hanney
Construction, controlled all the records kept and controlled all of the records of these
two companies. That she falsified the records and tax returns and withheld information
from Blaine Hanney so that he had no idea what was going on.
There was no evidence that any of the monies received by Shirley Hanney went
to improve the lot in question or to provide for family expenses or property.
From the foregoing findings of fact the court concludes as follows:
In the first instance it is important to note that the plaintiff as assignee of
Bank One stands in the shoes of Bank One.
The court concludes that Shirley Hanney never held title to the' lot in question
either as a joint tenant or a tenant in common. That her only interest was an inchoate
interest as a spouse of Blaine Hanney.
The court further concludes that any powers that were granted to Blaine Hanney
and Shirley Hanney as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust had to be exercised jointly.
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-9Further the General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney at the time of the
creation of the Family Trust, as an estate planning tool, was insufficient to grant Shirley
the authority to use it as she did here. That is further evidenced by the fact that
plaintiffs predecessor in interest would not allow her to proceed without a Special
Power of Attorney as to specific property.
The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove that Blaine Hanney signed
the Special Power of Attorney or that he had knowledge of or authorized Shirley
Hanney to act in his behalf.
The court therefore concludes that the Trust Deed granted to Bank One on the
lot in question is void.
As to the claim of the plaintiff for unjust enrichment, the law requires that in order
to recover under that theory, the plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff conferred a benefit
on Mr Hanney, that he was aware of that benefit and that Mr Hanney retained the
benefit under circumstances such as to make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit..
In this matter the court sees no benefit to Mr. Hanney. He never received any of
the moneys loaned by the plaintiff nor were they used to improve the lot in question or
provide anything for the family. The monies all went to pay obligations of Shirley
Hanney. There is nothing to show that he received any benefit from Hanney
Construction of any significant nature. In fact if anything , Mr Hanney was damaged by
the manner Bank One and interwest Title handled the loan in question.
The most credible evidence shows that Mr. Hanney had no Knowledge of the
loan by Bank One to Ms. Hanney and never signed any of the documents or powers of
attorney it was claimed he signed in conjunction with the loan.
The court further finds that this case is a good example of the lax procedures
followed by lending institutions and lock-step title companies in their haste to close
loans.
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-10The court denies plaintiff's claims for Waiver, Estoppel and Ratifications based on
the arguments set forth in defendants closing arguments and the facts of this case.
The court therefore enters judgment in favor of the Defendant for no qause of
action and declares the Trust Deed held by the plaintiff on the lot in question to be void.
.Costs to the defendant.
Defendant is to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the courts
ruling and submit a copy to the plaintiff at least five days before it is submitted to the
court for signature.
Dated this c^T^day of January, A P. 2010

BY THE COURT:

Rodney S.^age
District Court Judge
Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to
Laura Scott
201 So. Main Street, Suite 1800
Slat Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Brad C. Smith
3986 Wash. Bt;vd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

' '

"

postage prepaid this 2b day of January, AD, 2070
Alyson Brown
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801)394-4573
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954
Attorney for Defendants Hanney
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 050700241

vs.
Judge Rodney S. Page
BLAINE J. HANNEY, et al.
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on April 2009 before
the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Plaintiff was not present in court, but was
represented by Laura Scott of the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer.
Defendant Blaine Hanney was present in court, individually and as trustee of the
Hanney Family Trust, and was represented by Brad C. Smith of the law firm of
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. The court, having heard the evidence of the parties,
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reviewed the trial exhibits, reviewed the parties written closing arguments, and
disposed of the Plaintiffs post-trial motion to reopen the evidence, hereby makes
the following findings of fact:
Findings of Fact
Introductory and Background Facts
1.

This case revolves around the title to a certain Lot ["Lot"] and the validity of
a certain Trust Deed on the Lot held by Plaintiffs predecessor in interest,
Bank One.

2.

The Lot is located in Davis County, Utah, and is described in the attached
Exhibit A.

3.

The Lot was deeded to defendant Blaine Hanney ["Blaine"] individually by a
Warranty Deed signed by his parents, Mabel and Chris Hanney dated
January 20, 1978.

4.

The 1978 Warranty Deed reserved a life estate to Chris and Mabel
Hanney. It was recorded with the Davis County Recorder in 1982.

5.

The Lot was deeded to Blaine at the same time that other lots his parents
had developed were deeded to his siblings.

6.

After the Lot was deeded, Blaine and his then-wife, Shirley Hanney
["Shirley"] proceeded to build a home on the Lot.
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1

7.

Blaine did most of the work on the home and it was completed lien free.
Blaine and Shirley thought that they may have paid some for the Lot but
could not remember.

8.

Blaine and Shirley were married in 1973.

9.

After the marriage Blaine worked in construction and spent the last 33
years working for Inwest Construction until his retirement a few years ago.

10.

Shirley worked at various jobs but spent 20 years working at Clover Club
Foods until 1994.

Immediate and Extended Family Financial Matters
11.

Over the years they put their money in a joint account out of which family
expenses were paid.

12.

Shirley was primarily responsible for keeping track of the family finances,
paying the bills, seeing the taxes were taken care of and for the financial
management for the family. She signed checks in Blaine's name and tax
returns when he was out of town.

13.

In 1991 Blaine's construction job begin to take him out of town most of the
time and he would only come home once or twice a month. Shirley took on
even more responsibility for family finances and he became less and less
involved, relying on Shirley's representation and to how things were going.
He trusted her completely.
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14.

Over the years Blaine's family had been involved in the development and
sale of the land owned by his parents.

15.

Blaine's family conducted business as Hanney Development, Ltd, a Utah
limited partnership.

16.

'

In April of 1993 the family decided to create a Limited Partnership to carry
on the business and organized Hanney Development a Limited
Partnership.

17.

Blaine, his mother Mabel Hanney, and his sister Faye Shumway were
designated as the General Partners with his other five siblings as Limited

<

Partners.
18.

The partnership's banking accounts and checking were maintained at
Barnes Bank.

19.

Shirley, even though not a part of the limited partnership, had full control of
the finances of the company. She had authority on all accounts at Barnes

<

Bank and did all the bookkeeping for the company. She paid the bills,
deposited the funds, and kept the books of the company. She dealt directly
i
with the accountant in preparing taxes and prepared financial reports for
the members of the partnership. She often signed Blaine's name on
checks, other business documents and the tax returns and would deliver

{

documents to the other general partners to sign. Everyone relied on her to

I
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take care of the financial part of the business. They relied on her reports
as to the financial condition of the Partnership.

Establishment of Hanney Family Trust
20.

In 1992, about the same time as the limited partnership was created,
Blaine's Parents suggested that Blaine and Shirley create a Family Trust.

21.

Blaine and Shirley met with a representative of an Attorney by the name c
John Geilmann to discuss a trust. They decided to create the Hanney
Family Revocable Trust.

22.

The trust document was drafted by Mr. Geilmann's office and a
representative came to their home and went over it with them.

23.

They understood that the trust would become effective if something
happened to either one of them, but would have no effect as long as they
were both still alive.

24.

The Trust named Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees.

25.

The Trust provided in paragraph 11.1 that the trustees in their sole and
absolute discretion could exercise the powers listed.

26.

Paragraph 11.2 provided that if they could not agree on a matter then a
decision of a majority would govern.

FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. V. HANNEY, ET AL.

CASE NO. 050700241
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5 of 17

27.

It further provided that if there was an equal number of trustees another
could be added to break the deadlock as provided in paragraph 13.2 of the
Trust.

28.

Blaine and Shirley signed the Trust on February 22, 1995.

29.

On that same day Blaine Hanney, as grantor, signed a Special Warranty
Deed conveying the Lot here in question to Blaine Hanney and Shirley
Hanney as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust.

30.

Although Shirley Hanney was not listed as a grantor, she also signed the
deed.

31.

This deed was recorded on April 10, 1995.

32.

Blaine and Shirley also signed a General Power of Attorney to each other
in conjunction with signing the Trust. Neither of the General Powers of
Attorney were recorded.

33.

The Hanneys never transferred any other property to the trust as they were
instructed. Their bank accounts, stocks, insurance policies and other
property remained as before the Trust was created. They treated their
property just as they had before the Trust was created. They testified that
they understood the trust would only take effect after one of them died and
that the General Power of Attorney could only be used in the event one of
them was disabled.
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Formation of Hanney and Hanney Construction
34.

In 1994, after Shirley had left Clover Club, it was her intent to start a
construction company. On September 9, 1994, Hanney and Hanney
Construction, Inc., was formed. Shirley had 60% of the stock and Blaine
40%. Shirley was listed as Director, President, Secretary/Treasurer and
Registered Agent of the Company. Blaine was listed as Director and Vice
President.

35.

A business account was set up a Barnes Bank for Hanney and Hanney
Construction, Inc.

36.

Blaine and Shirley agreed that they would use $45,000 that they had in
savings at America First to buy equipment for the company, but that it
would be repaid.

37.

It was also agreed that construction would be financed by constructions
loans.

38.

It was during this time that Blaine was out of town most of the time and in
keeping with the Incorporation agreement, Shirley was almost entirely in
charge of running the business. She kept all of the records, managed the
finances, paid the bills. She provided all the information to the accountant
and saw that tax returns were prepared and did everything else to run the
business. She signed Blaine's name when she needed to when he was out
of town even including tax returns. If he asked to look at bank records or

FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP. V. HANNEY, ET AL.

CASE No. 050700241
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7 of 17

tax returns she would generally tell him they were at the accountants or
make some other excuse.
39.

Shirley did not have a contractor's license. In order to be able to build she
teamed up with a contractor by the name of Bernie Stark to build homes

{

and operate under his license. They would build homes together, share
costs, and after the home was finished, they would split any profits. Mr.
Stark eventually signed with her so that she could get her license.
40.

At one point she, through Hanney and Hanney Construction, entered into a
(

partnership with her brother Ted in a concrete business.

Shirley's Embezzlement of Funds
41.

In the conduct of the construction business, Shirley initially used only
money that they had agreed on from savings at America First and
construction loans. However, at some point she opened up a line of credit

(

with First Security Bank which she paid off each year. Blaine was not on
that and had no knowledge of it.
42.

The business got to a point that she could not meet her obligations. This
came to a head when she incurred a $160,000 concrete bill and had no
money to meet it. At this point she beginlaking money from Hanney

^

Development accounts at Barnes Bank to meet her Hanney and Hanney

8 of 17
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Construction obligations. Neither Blaine nor any of the partners of Hanney
Development had any knowledge of this.
43.

Shirley manipulated the books and records of Hanney Development so that
it was not apparent from the records that she had taken money from
Hanney Development.

Key Bank's 1998 Line of Credit
44.

In 1998 Shirley went to Key Bank to get a home equity line of credit to pay
the bills of Hanney Construction so she would not have to take any further
money from the Hanney Development accounts.

45.

On June 9, 1998 she obtained a $50,000 Home Equity Line of Credit and
signed a Trust Deed on the Lot. She signed her name and Blaine's name
individually and as trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. The documents
never referred to any Power of Attorney. Blaine did not sign it nor was he
aware of it.

46.

The notary could remember Shirley but could not remember anything else
about the signing.

47.

On January 19, 1999, the Home Equity Line of Credit was increased
$80,000. Shirley again signed her name and Blaine's name to the
documents and this time referenced a Power of Attorney, but there was no
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signature for the trust. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not sign nor
was he aware of it.
48.

On April 16, 1999, the Line of Credit at Key Bank was increased to
$120,000. The documents carried the signature of Blaine and Shirley

{

individually and as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. Again it
referenced the Power of Attorney. Again the testimony was that Shirley
signed all the names and that Blaine was not aware of it.
American General's 2000 Loan
49.

{

In February of 2000, Shirley contacted American General Finance to
refinance the Key Bank Line of Credit. She met with representatives and in
conjunction with acquiring the loan signed a Quit Claim Deed on February
25, 2000. The Quit Claim Deed transferred the Lot from Blaine Hanney
and Shirley Hanney Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust to Blaine Hanney
and Shirley Hanney. It bore the signature of Blaine Hanney and Shirley

(

Hanney. There was no reference to any Power of Attorney.
50.

The Quit Claim Deed was recorded at the request of Inwest Title on
February 29, 2000 at 12:28 p.m. as document No. 1577645. The evidence
was that Blaine never signed the document nor was ever aware of it. This
Quit Claim Deed was the first document in the chain of title that purported

<

to transfer any interest to Shirley in her own right.

i
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51.

There had been prior documents in form of easements that included
Shirley's signature or referred to her as a joint tenant, but it was unclear
from a legal standpoint and title perspective, what interest they
represented, other then recognizing Shirley's possible inchoate interest as
a spouse.

52.

On February 28, 2000, Shirley Hanney signed an Open Ended Trust Deed
on the Lot to secure a $163,000 Loan from American General. The
document bore the signature of Blaine and Shirley and referenced that
Blaine's name was signed by Shirley under a Power of Attorney. This
document was recorded by Inwest Title on February 29, 2000 at 12:29 p.m.
as document No. 1577647. Again the evidence was that Blaine did not
sign the document nor was he aware of it.

53.

American General required that Shirley have a Special Power of Attorney
specific to the Lot in order to sign for Blaine.

54.

Inwest Title prepared a Special Power of Attorney for Blaine's signature.

55.

The document was executed on February 2, 2000 and bore Blaine's
signature. Interestingly enough it was notarized by Eric Iverson a person
who notarized numerous documents in these matters prepared by Inwest.
The document was recorded by Inwest Title on February 29, 2000 at 12:29
p.m. as document No. 1577646. Again the evidence was that Blaine did
not sign this document nor was he aware of it.
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56.

On March 30, 2000, another Quit Claim Deed was recorded by Inwest Title.
This deed bore the signatures of Blaine and Shirley and conveyed the
property from the Hanneys back to Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of the
Hanney Family Trust. Shirley signed both names and referenced the
Special Power of Attorney. Agian the evidence was that Blaine was not
aware of it.

57.

The monies received from American General were applied to pay off a part
of the Key Bank Loan and obligations that Shirley had incurred through
Hanney Construction.

Bank One's 2000 Loan
58.

In August 2000, Shirley refinanced the American General Loan.

59.

On August 29, 2000, a Warranty Deed conveying the Lot from Blaine
Hanney and Shirley Hanney as Trustees to Blaine Hanney and Shirley
Hanney as joint tenants was recorded but made no reference to a Power of
Attorney. It was signed on August 22, 2000. It was again notarized by Mr.
Iverson. It was recorded at 4:15 p.m. as document No. 1610660. Again
the evidence was that Blaine did hot sign the document nor was he aware
of it.

60.

On August 24, 2000, another Trust Deed was signed to secure a loan for
$247,000 from Bank One, plaintiffs predecessor in interest. This Trust
Deed is the trust deed in question before the Court. It bore the signature of
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Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and referenced a
Power of Attorney. It was recorded at the request of Inwest Title on August
29, 2000 at 4:20 p.m. as document 1610662. Again the evidence was that
Blaine had no knowledge of this.
61.

In this matter Bank One also required a Special Power of Attorney as to
specific property. Again the Special Power of Attorney was provided by
Shirley. It was dated August 18, 2000 and purported to bear Blaine's
signature. It was notarized by Mr. Iverson. It was recorded at the request
of Inwest Title on August 29, 2000 at 4:19 p.m. as document No. 1610661,
just prior to the Trust Deed.

62.

Again on August 29, 2000 another Quit Claim Deed was recorded at the
request of Inwest Title. The deed was signed on August 24, 2000 and bore
the signature of Shirley Hanney and Blaine Hanney by Shirley Hanney and
referenced the Power of Attorney. It conveyed the Lot from the Hanneys
back to the Blaine and Shirley as Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust. It
was recorded at 4:20 p.m. as document No. 1610663. Again Blaine was
never aware of this document.

63.

The proceeds from this loan were used to pay off the amounts owning to
Key Bank and other obligations owing by Hanney Construction.

64.

Plaintiff, who bore the burden of proof at trial, presented no evidence as to
the identity of the handwriting in question nor was there any testimony from
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anyone from the financial institutions or the title companies or notaries that
Blaine had personally appeared before them or that they know him or had
met him. Blaine denied ever signing any of the documents relating to any
of the encumbrances or transfers of the Lot.
65.

*

The testimony was that Shirley Hanney, as book keeper of Hanney
Development and as President, Secretary/treasurer, Director and
i

Registered Agent of Hanney Construction, controlled all the records kept
and controlled all of the records of these two companies; she falsified the
records and tax returns and withheld information from Blaine Hanney so

<

that he had no idea what was going on.
66.

There was no evidence that any of the monies received by Shirley Hanney
went to improve the Lot or to provide for family expenses or property.

67.

In addition to the terms of the General Power of Attorney which did not
provide Shirley with authority to engage in the transactions in question, the

(

limits of here authority were further evidenced by the fact that plaintiffs
predecessor in interest would not allow her to proceed using the General
<

Power of Attorney, but required a Special Power of Attorney as to specific
property.
68.

The most credible evidence shows that Mr. Hanney had no knowledge of

^

the loan by Bank One to Ms. Hanney and never signed any of the

I
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documents or powers of attorney it was claimed he signed in conjunction
with the loan.

Conclusions of Law
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1.

Plaintiff is merely the assignee of Bank One and stands in the shoes of
Bank One.

2.

Shirley Hanney never held title to the Lot either as a joint tenant or a tenant
in common. Shirley's only interest was an inchoate interest as a spouse of
Blaine Hanney.

3.

Any powers that were granted to Blaine Hanney and Shirley Hanney as
Trustees of the Hanney Family Trust had to be exercised jointly.

4.

The General Power of Attorney executed by Blaine Hanney at the time of
the creation of the Family Trust, as an estate planning tool, was insufficient
to grant Shirley the authority to use it as she did here.

5.

Plaintiff has failed has failed to prove that Blaine Hanney signed the
Special Power of Attorney or that he had knowledge of or authorized
Shirley Hanney to act in his behalf.

6.

The court therefore concludes that the Trust Deed granted to Bank One on
the Lot is void. Judgment in Defendant's favor to that effect shall issue.
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7.

Plaintiff also claims a right to recovery under the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment. In order to recover under that theory, the plaintiff must
prove that the plaintiff conferred a benefit on Blaine, that he was aware of
that benefit and that he retained the benefit under circumstances such as

1

to make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit.
8.

The Court sees no benefit to Mr. Hanney. He never received any of the
moneys loaned by the plaintiff nor were they used to improve the Lot or
provide anything for the family. The monies all went to pay obligations of
Shirley Hanney. There is nothing to show that he received any benefit from

{

Hanney Construction of any significant nature. In fact if anything, Mr.
Hanney was damaged by the manner Bank One and Inwest Title handled
{

the loan in question.
9.

The court denies plaintiffs claims for Waiver, Estoppel, and Ratifications
based on the arguments set forth in defendants closing arguments and the

<

facts of this case.
10.

The court therefore enters judgment in favor of the Defendant for no cause
<

of action on Plaintiff s claim.
11.

The Trust Deed, Davis County Recorder's Entry No. 1610662, held by the
plaintiff on the Lot to be void.

12.

(

Costs are awarded to Defendant Blaine Hanney who shall file a
memorandum of costs in conformity to Utah R. Civ. P. 54.
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DATED this

35

day of February 2010.
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Approved as to form:

Laura Scott, Attorney for Plaintiff

Rule 7 Notice
Notice is hereby given that the foregoing document will be submitted to the
Court upon the expiration of eight days from the date of mailing, below.

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to the following:
Laura Scott
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
this _l!rday of February 2010.
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954

:C*OND~
'
i^STRICT COURT

K f

Mtu;

"&**%.
*** &1F0

I

FB

L

'•'•' LuiiS

dECfOJsj'h
'
^ S T R I C T CO H O T

Attorney for Defendants Hanney
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT BLAINE J. HANNEY
AND HANNEY FAMILY TRUST

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 050700241
vs.
BLAINE J. HANNEY, et al.

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on April 2009 before
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the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Plaintiff was not present in court, but was
represented by Laura Scott of the law firm of Parsons Behle and Latimer.
Defendant Blaine Hanney was present in court, individually and as trustee of the
Hanney Family Trust, and was represented by Brad C. Smith of the law firm of
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entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following
Judgment in favor of Defendant Blaine J. Hanney and the Hanney Family Trust:

1.

Plaintiffs Claims of No EffectThe Court hereby declares that Plaintiff
Bank One's claims against Defendant Blaine J. Hanney and the Hanney
Family Trust are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.

2.

Plaintiffs Trust Deed of No Further Effect The Court hereby declares
that that certain Deed of Trust, dated 24 August 2000, and recorded in the
office of the Davis County Recorder on 29 August 2000 as Entry No.
1610662, is of no further force or effect and does not constitute a lien or
claim upon the real property described in the attached Exhibit A.
DATED this A>

day of February 2010.

Rule 7 Notice
Notice is hereby given 1hat the foregoing document will be submitted to the
Court upon the expiration of eight days from the date of mailing, below.
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to the following:
Laura Scott
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
this ^zday of February 2010.
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WARRANTY

Lay ton

hereby CONVEY

DEED

, County of
and WARRANT

to

£

• ) •' ' ' "

, grantor

Chr?s S. Hanney and Mabel J . Hanney, husband ana wife
of

t Z-*

Foe f»»H $ .V> ;.v?.'r..;..

Dr. v i s

s

State of Utah,

B l a i n e J . Hanney,

, grantee
of

I-ay t o n

fnr the sum of

, County of

Davis

, f tate of Utah

Ten D o l l a r and othf>r good and v a l u a b l e

considerationsDOfabAftB,

&»*^^

m$$%%

:

H p a r t of S e c t i o n 1 , Townahip U N o r t h , Range 1 West, S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n ,
x r . p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s t Beginning a t a p o i n t S 8 9 * 5 8 ' 2 2 " K. 6 0 b . 6 0 f e e t , li. 0 ° 2 2 l 3 6 " E a s t
fli?.75 f e e t and N 88°08 f 55 , ? E. 1*6.02 f e e t from t h e S.W. C o m e r of
saJd S e c t i o n 1 , and running t h e n c e N. 0 o 2 2 f 3 6 " £* 66U.55 f e e t ; thence
N. 89°.?7 f li6 w E . 222*00 f e e t ; t h e n c e S 0 o 2 2 , 3 6 l West 658.52 f e e t ;
thence S 8 8 ° 0 8 , 5 5 " West 222-12 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g ,
c o n t a i n i n g 3 . 3 8 a c r e s , more or l e s s ,

Mii-.jcct to u a i u ^ e n t s , a g r e e m e n t s , r e s e r v a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s cf r e c o r d , and
T V.LTiiLK N:.7.-. AMD SUBJECT TO t h e rirrht. o f way and p r i v i l e g e s j s t a b l i s e d in
L/.:»ic;t "A" -Mracne.d h e r e t o and by r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t
h?reof.
i?y^&,c^v,iir^ jfii^ chu g r a n t o r s h e r e i n , and*eaah<*<>£'*~thMj'G! -lift. c s t a V
2&&&&pM3f\-i 4 - ; o r sc i o n ^ as t h - y both'^s^aM<--.*l'ifcvitjr*^

in 'and-'tc ''trl'CV*

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

WITNESS the hand

of said grantor* , this

20th

Signed «<
' thr presence of

day of

.'...;

January
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EXHIBIT "A''

a 25.0 foot .-ide right of v-.y, 12.50 feet on each side of and parallel to the follcvino
described cente.rli.ne, to ho used in common with the grantors, the grantees, and ether
parties owning adjacent property to said riqht of way, for ingress, egress, ror.r^ss,
cind all other purposes for which a road may be used: Beginning at a point on an existing highway at a point South 89°58,22,f East 271.98 feet and North 26°M7'52M East 9.8u
fe«-t and North ]6°39 , 50 n East 215.30 feet and Northerly 199.b0 feet along the- arc or ?.
34,257.Mb foot radius curve through a central angle of 0°20', and North 5°^9,38" West
303.32 feet and Northerly 199.63 feet along the arc of a 3^,307.^8 foot radius curve
through a central angle of 0°20' and South 85°25'21M East 20. bO feet frorr, the Southwest
corner of Section 1, Township n North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running
lutncc Southeasterly 250.0 feet, more or ltss, to a point Soi'th 8l*058'22" rast 271.98
feet and North 260M7I52,, East 9.ft**feet and North 1G°39'50" East ?lc.30 feet and
Nortnerly 199.30 fe^t along the arc of a 3M257.U8 foot radius curve through a central
angle of 0°20f and Korth 5°29!38" West 227.32 feat and North 88°oe'55" East UO.O 5L<V:
(Point A) fro.-n the Southwest corner of said Section 1; thence South ^°52,36t' East ^20,0
feet; thence along the arc of a M2.02 foot radius curve to the left 73.27 feet; thence
North 75°15' Eas~ 150.0 feet; thence along the arc of a 78.0U foot eadius curve to the
left. 131.05 feet; thence North 21° West 85.0 feet; thence along the arc of a 25l*«9l foot
radius curve to the right 98.83 feet; thence North 0°22'36" E-ist 72.0 feet, more-or IK'SS,
to a point of curvature; thence along the arc of a 70 foot radius curve to the r-'^ht
107.23 feet; thence North 8fi°08,55M East 98.0 feet (parallel to and 7.50 feet South of
a line extending South 88°08,55M West from a point South 8^058*22n East 1321.0 feet and
North 09221 36" Eas.t 6 5.8^.81 feet and West ^ 6 . MO feet froi.i the Southwest corner of said
Suction 1); thence Easterly 62.37 feet along the arc of a 518.0 fcot radius curve to the
left; thunce Easterly 62.32 feet along the arc of a M08.10 foot radius curve to the
right; thence East 191.98 fe*t to a point South 89°58f22" East 1321.0 feet and North 0°22f
36" East ''.58.81 feet and Vest 223.20 feet from the Southwest comer of said Section 1.
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REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT
OF THE

.S^Ks
•'•••v/-^r^4Pr

::^-t^^
vu?*3£s&£
WS@?I

HANNEY FAMILY TRUST

psslll

••,'•'• •••.:-..>~v,.T-i>>ml

We, BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, hereby make and enter i n t o : : ^ | | I ^

-JW

tbis Revocable Trust Agreement with BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY,Sil
WP^feS

and the survivor thereof and successors thereto, who are hereby appointed Trustees of th^iSltil

•-^tllill
-••-'•'.^v&ass?

HANNEY FAMILY TRUST and hereafter sometimes called "Trustees."
ARTICLE ONE

•• • v ^ - . i ^ S K

®&s

'•.•-.Y.:T'SV

Trust, Beneficiaries and Successor Trustees
1.1 - The Trust created by this Revocable Trust Agreement is hereby designated and
'"X$$&

named as the HANNEY FAMILY TRUST and shall be known for all purposes as such.

''^mzm

1.2 - The beneficiaries of this Trust are the Trustmakers, BLAINE J. HANNEY andj§}|
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, a n ^ o u T c M l ^ ^

.vtssaassfiaE

bmm&m

:
HANNEY and BRETT.^|
mmm

m

OVERTON HANNEY and any and all children adopted by us or born as our issue after the date - - Q
of this Trust Agreement, and all other beneficiaries described herein.

;v..;> 4

j:%

Ifiii
• ^.tr'^-SiM

1.3 - In the event of the resignation, inability or refusal to act and, in any event, upon

*ww$

the death or disqualification of both the Trustees named above, we hereby nominate and appoint

wm
MICHAEL DOYLE HANNEY as Successor Trustee of this Trust.

In the event of the p

•;•£**£$

•ii&*gg*&m

resignation, inability or refusal to act, and in any event, upon the death or disqualification of the:sl1i^SSL™

•m^m^m
..wp^t
--., .>, %fct.vfe£p3

HANNEY FAMILYDigitized
TRUST
AGREEMENT, Page 1 of Nineteen Pages
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STGC000332

W&N&

Successor Trustee named above, we hereby nominate and appoint BRETT OVERTON

t:M$mz$ji

HANNEY as a Successor Trustee.
ARTICLE TWO
? ~ t ••••z.

't-k-^

Schedule of Distributions
2.1 - This Revocable Trust Agreement provides for the distribution of our property to

mm
••zim&j

our beneficiaries in specific ways and amounts, and at certain times. The purpose of this Article .~,-{.^J^:

mm

is to specifically describe the ways, amounts and times of the distributions. This Article is - ^ S l ^ ^ p
•

modified by other specific Articles of this Trust Agreement.

^M&m.

.v^iSm

2.2 - All of the then balance of each of the Trust Shares held in the FAMILY TRUST
«

as provided in paragraph 9.2 below shall be distributed in a "Final Distribution" as soon as is
reasonably practicable after the death of the survivor of BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY
ANN HANNEY, if the beneficiary of such share is then Twenty-One (21) years of age or older, ; | | ^ ^
••--••••••••.•K^&L

or at such time thereafter as such beneficiary shall reach Twenty-One (21) years of age.

"iv^^^»
'"•' '•'•"•'vV"^^8^a„

ARTICLE THREE
Trust Property

•s^^^m
•j ••'•".•

•••S&S^^^

3.1 -f Wp^hereby assign, transfer and convey to the Trustees, or there is otherwise;^^^f
assigned, transferred and conveyed to the Trustees, the property described in Schedule "AM of '[:^^^^
this Agreement. Th^TrusteesJhereby accept such property, with all increments or additions
thereto, for the purposes and on the conditions hereafter set forth. All property subject to this • v | ^ ^
Agreement shall constitute the Trust Property and shall be held, managed and distributed as
.provided herein.
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ARTICLE FOUR
Reserved Powers

4.1 - We reserve the power for ourselves or any other person to increase the Trust
Property at any time by delivering to the Trustees any property, or by naming the Trustees as
beneficiaries of any Jife insurance policy or bequest by Last Will and Testament.
4.2-<

=(£

serve\to ourselves) thefollowingpowers:-

•---S^^^m
•".-.v.-:-; •-Ti^f^Rgg

• ~;^Mm%$

(a)
The right to withdraw property from this Trust in any amount and
at any time upon giving reasonable noticgJn writing to any one or more of the
Trustees. gucLaQMg^i^ e q u ^ 0Dty i£w&-ate not then serving as a Trustee of
this Trust, r
"
—

••• : • * - , * « 6 S L

j

••; rstrg^^ggSSi

'• . ^ S S ^
7-'&$#$£$Rffi
:'<iM&Wk
.'•••' ^..•:---r/v-VrrS
;:^^?pS

(b)
The right to amend, modify, or revoke all or any part of this Trust
Agreement in any respect.

•"-^fe^

' . • ••' .7} S'vi'^^g

4.3 - Upon revocation of this Trust, the entire Trust Property shall be distributed
outright to us or in accordance with our discretion and direction.
4.4 - Upon the death of the survivor of BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN
HANNEY this Trust shall become irrevocable.
4.5 - So long as either BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY is alive,
and whether or not we are Tiustees,(oS)decision shall prevail and be binding upon all of the . ^ 4 § |
Trustees as to all matters concerning the Trust Property without any liability on the part of the

v®^^

other Trustees for our decision. We may resign as Trustee at any time by filing a written

•••-•^sss

resignation with the other Trustees and shall thereupon be relieved of and discharged from all

SfllllP
•-•^wM
• rv'YoGjei^iW

future duties as Trustee. In the event of the death, resignation, or incompetence as defined in

:

^^

'• 'Si^^
paragraph 5.2 of either BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, all of the rights | g g ^ ' ^
'W^m
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT, Page 3 of Nineteen Pages
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'JW^^M

' I

and powers of the Trustees shall thereupon vest in and be thereafter exercised by the remaining | | ^
•A^mM

Trustees.

'&mM

• • v^^M^>

4.6 - The powers reserved herein shall not be exercised to substantially increase the
-

•

"

•

--^g|
•

>

* • '

*

•

-

'

•

'

>

«

"

"

'

•

<-^ys||

duties or liabilities of the Trustees without their written agreement, which agreement may

vfBllfl

:

."• -3^8
provide for their increased compensation.

•S#^

4.7 - Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, the powers we have reserved shall

^^g^^"

be exercisable by instruments in writing signed by us and delivered to the Trustees.
ARTICLE FIVE
Disposition of Trust Property During mv Lifetime
5.1 - During the lifetime of either of us, the Trustees shall pay to us all of the net ^ | | | ^
.r.--.:;.:v...ig^

income to the Trust in such installments as we may request. Such payments shall be made at '•Si^
least annually unless we direct to the contrary, in which event the Trustees shall follow our
directions.
5.2 - If at any time either or both BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN H A N N E Y l H ^ g

"' "iii^M
should become incompetent, or for any reason we are imable to act in our own behalf, t h e S l ^ ^ ^ ^
Trustees may pay or apply for the benefit of such Trustmaker all or any part of the income and if |f||||
principal of the Trust Property as the Trustees may from time to time deem necessary or
advisable for the support, comfort, medical and dental care, hospital and nursing expenses, and
all other monies needed for the benefit of such Trustmaker.

The Trustees shall add any^a-M

undistributed income to principal. The incompetency of BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY^g§|
ANN HANNEY may be established by the written opinion of two (2) independent, licensed
medical doctors.
. . . . . " ' .
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RETICLE SIX
•:•';^i.Si*^g> ^ . w ^ .

J:.

Payment of Taxes, Debts and Obligations
6.1-

^IHllI^

Upon the death of either BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY,

*i!ffl
•

the Trustees shall pay all taxes, debts and other obligations which shall be properly charged

-^:§§&$

MM$M
J

.•.- >^M

against the Trust Property or either Trustmaker's individual estate by reason of their death or

3S||^y

otherwise. If any personal representative, administrator or other person acting in a trust or -^^^?
fiduciary capacity shall have paid any estate, inheritance or succession tax upon or with ^specttlpf

" ^lif
to any or all of the Trust Property required to be included in the gross estate, the Trustees shaUjp^
reimburse such person for the amount of such taxes paid.

•£!8®s*
•'.•.••r^;»'s?»

Wm
#2£m,™
^ f ®

•^^mm

ARTICLE SEVEN
Division of Trust Property At Death

'^'SSISI

7.1 - Upon the death of First Spouse, as defined by Article Seven paragraph 7 . 3 3 p |
below, the Trustees shall proceed as follows:
(a) The Trustees shall make payments, or retain reserves for making such
payments, as directed by Article Six.
(b) In the event that there is in existence at the time of either of our
deaths, a written statement or list in either of our handwriting or signed by either
of us, disposing of all or part of our tangible personal property (other than
money, evidences of indebtedness, documents of title or securities, and property
used in trade or business) which is subject to the terms of this Trust and which
has not otherwise been specifically disposed of hereunder, each such item of
personal property shall be distributed to the person whose name is set forth on the
list as the intended beneficiary of that item as his or her sole and separate
property, as soon after my death as is reasonably practicable, The Trustees may
consider such distributions in determining the nature and extent of any
discretionary distributions authorized by this Trust Agreement; but no distribution
to any beneficiary made pursuant to this paragraph shall reduce or be considered
an advancement against any mandatory distribution to such beneficiary from the
assets of the FAMILY TRUST except as required by the list referred to herein.

&§m

iKiii^
vm^^m

m%m
•sssss&i

''8®tfflk
'•mm
^V^^fsfcV^TA'

^iflL
. : - .'.-^sVi-sv^
•:^%S£&

;:;^#E

»™

'^£&^$m
i'•*}&$$&$
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r^V^t&L

".•^p^a

rm^m;'

(c) Upon the death of First Spouse and if our estate is of such value that
any federal estate taxes thereon would be reduced by a marital deduction, the
Trustees shall divide the Trust Property into two separate Trusts known as the
MARITAL TRUST and the FAMILY TRUST. The assets of the two Trusts shall
be determined as stated below.

lit
'

•••••?-'<?&

• : • • " ' %
•;<••••$

(d)
The Trustees shall allocate to the FAMILY TRUST all of the Trust
Property not otherwise allocated, paid or reserved in this paragraph 7.1. Any
unused reserves shall be divided and allocated as required by this paragraph 7.1
when the Trustees determine that such reserves are no longer needed.

"wiSH

^m

7.2 - The MARITAL TRUST shall contain that portion of the Trust Property to be

,#3P

'determined as follows:

•^m~

•^§H

(a)
The Trustee shall, as of the date of the death of First Spouse,
allocate a fraction of the "qualified property11 to the MARITAL TRUST, which
shall not be reduced by any taxes payable by reason of such death. The
numerator of the fraction shall be the largest amount that, without causing or
increasing a state death tax based on the Federal credit for state death taxes, will
produce a marital deduction resulting in no or the minimum Federal estate tax
payable by reason of the death of First Spouse, after allowing for the unified
credit against federal estate tax and all available credits and deductions. When
calculating the minimum Federal estate tax payable by reason of the death of First
Spouse, any taxes which may become payable by reason of Second Spouse's
subsequent death shall be taken into account. The denominator of the fraction
shall be the value of the qualified property. The numerator and denominator shall
be based on values as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes. We
intend that the MARITAL TRUST qualify for the marital deduction, and any
provision of this instrument that is inconsistent with that intention shall not apply
to the MARITAL TRUST.

%$$*

-HI
-Sin
. v'^aa^
•'•.'•.'.J3&

•Sfl
Hfll
:y

Wm

KSM

sil

(b) "Qualified property" is that trust property, or the proceeds of any sale
or disposition thereof, which is not expended or disposed of pursuant to the
preceding provision of this Article and which is included in the gross estate for
Federal estate tax purposes and for which a marital deduction would be allowed,
by election or otherwise, if allocated to the MARITAL TRUST. We direct that
any election be made which is necessary to qualify the MARITAL TRUST for the
marital deduction.
(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, if Second Spouse survives
First spouse for less than 170 days, the numerator of the fraction shall not
exceed one-half of First Spouse's adjusted gross estate (meaning the gross estate
for Federal estate tax purposes less any deductions allowed under Sections 2053
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT, Page 6 of Nineteen Pages
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STGC0003^7

• /

and 2054 of the Internal Revenue Code or any amendments thereto) less the
amount of the marital deduction allowed to my estate for Federal estate tax
purposes for interests passing to Second Spouse other than under this Article.
:-.

••••:i-?T*?f!r\.U

v.-/.:-#*«W?;><

:.:j:^S^g
: :

7.3 -

-\ ^0M

The FAMILY TRUST shall contain the balance of the Trust Property remaining

mm
-1!

after deducting all amounts allocated to the MARITAL TRUST, and the items of personal

. --•.•rSV^Vrf
. •.•-Krf'.^i.j

property allocated by the list described in paragraph 7.1 (b). Subject to the personal property

:

^WM
r'-Sfcg&iS

list described in paragraph 7.1 (b), the Trustees shall have the sole discretion to select the
properties to be allocated to the MARITAL TRUST, provided that the properties shall be
selected in such a manner that the fair market value of the properties of each trust at the time
of the allocation shall be representative of that trust's proportionate share of the depreciation or \
appreciation of all property then available for allocation to the MARITAL TRUST which

• ''

'^XZ&fr^

-^^mmi

occurred between the date of death and the date of allocation. In no event shall there be
allocated to the MARITAL TRUST any properties for which the marital deduction would not
be allowed if they were included.
)£${&*&•

7.4 - Upon the death of the Second Spouse, then all of the Trust Property shall be held,
by the Trustees in the FAMILY TRUST.
7.5 - For purposes of this Trust Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)
When reference is made to a child, grandchild, descendant or issue,
or the plural thereof, such references shall include both those who are adopted
and those who are natural born.
(b)
When reference is made to the spouse of any of our descendants,
even if the spouse is named, such reference shall include only that spouse to
whom such descendant is legally married at the time described in such reference,
or was so married immediately prior to the death of such descendant. If such
spouse neither is nor was then so married, then such spouse shall receive nothing
under or through this Trust Agreement after the termination of said marriage.
The foregoing shall not be construed to create, transfer or grant to any person any

•^felw

"•••

'/AS§

r'^Mm
-••#11
••••vi^S
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•^®BBS$K
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^fi*^

beneficial interest in the Trust Property as a result of any second marriage oifvfelKi
other remarriage of ourselves or any of our descendants.
v. - ••^^.*H^4sfeg*

-!'=-"

(c)
When reference is made to First Spouse, such reference shall mean
the first of BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY who dies.
(d)
When reference is made to Second Spouse, such reference shall
mean the survivor of BLAINE J. HANNEY or SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY.
^ rs^MM
flli

ARTICLE EIGHT"
Disposition of Marital Trust
r

.j*

8.1-

After dividing the Trust Property as provided above, the MARITAL TRUSTS

any) shall be held, managed, distributed and transferred as follows:

'^•%0^

(a) During the lifetime of Second Spouse, the Trustees shall pay to
Second Spouse all of the income of the MARITAL TRUST at least quarterly, and
as much of the principal of the MARITAL TRUST as the Trustees determine
advisable for the support, comfort, and well-being of Second Spouse.

i^|S^|li

*wm

•^^•mk
(b) Upon written request, Second Spouse may at any time direct the
Trustees to pay out principal or income or both from the MARITAL TRUST to
'^$^M
Second Spouse, to our then living children or their living descendants, or to • • • . • ' • • r - - - ; ^ ^ v ^ ; ^ ^
'-••"•>-^&mm
anyone else, in amounts specified by Second Spouse.
•'/ "-"rv'-V:".'• Ki&ig

'tyj&jjf

:

-•^''^^WVM
'^^^^^^^^

(c) Upon the death of Second Spouse, the Trustees shall distribute the ; ; l i ^ ^ ^ ^
property of this MARITAL TRUST as Second Spouse may appoint and direct b y 4 ^ ^ ^
Last Will and Testament or by other written legal instrument specifically referring -;-W§$il~
to this power of appointment. In the absence of such an appointment as to all or # S | ^ ^ 1
any part :, of the MARITAJL TRUST property, the Trustees shall add r .to•^^^^ & S ( ^^ i
administer the same as property held in the FAMILY TRUST. Second SpoiisellSmw^
may exercise this general power of appointment in favor of Second Spouse's'W^^^§
estate, creditors, the creditors of the estate, or any other persons.
':''-::'-W^^m"
r
'0;'rd^m&M

> >

• • :•• - - ^ ^ ^ m m

SRTICLENINE

;

Disposition of Family Trust
9.1-

••••••^K>-*S:*±
'MWm
'"•'•. •;•••.•• l * » S i ? v v

•^S^S,
During the life of Second Spouse, the FAMILY TRUST shall be held, managed,' 1 ^!

distributed and transferred as follows:

^liJ^iM

^"Iffpf^
>
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(a) The Trustees shall pay to Second Spouse all of the net income of fiST"
FAMILY TRUST at least quarterly.
(b) The Trustees are authorized to pay to Second Spouse at any time any!
portion of principal as they deem necessary or advisable for Second Spouse's
maintenance in health, support in reasonable comfort, college, trade, business,
professional or other education, medical, dental, hospital and nursing expenses,
and expenses of invalidism. However, no such distribution of principal shall be
made to Second Spouse until the MARITAL TRUST shall have become
exhausted, unless it is impractical or un\yise to distribute from the MARITAL
TRUST. In addition, in any calendar year the Trustees shall pay over to Second
Mszmm
Spouse from the principal such amounts as Second Spouse shall request i n ' l ^ . ^ . ^
writing; provided, however, that the aggregate of such additional distributions;\|^^J|
shall not exceed the greater of (a) Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or (b)
five^^^^
percent (5%) of the value of the principal of the FAMILY TRUST determined onl§|§j""*
the last day of such calendar year. If Second Spouse should fail to exercise t h i s j | | ^ S
power before the end of any calendar year, it shall lapse as to that year and u n d e r | | ^ ^ g
no conditions nor circumstances shall it be treated as cumulative.
- ^'^t^i'&izryto
^ ^
MR
SNpgjs

(c) The Trustees are further authorized to pay to or for any of our living '8§§f
children any portion of the principal as the Trustees shall deem necessary or
advisable from time to time for the maintenance in health, support in reasonable
comfort, medical, dental, hospital and nursing expenses, expenses of invalidism,
expenses in connection with the donation of time and services for religious
purposes, and expenses for the trade, business, college, professional or other
fm
education of such child. The Trustees shall have the same authority and •mimm^M
discretion to make payments of principal to or for those of our grandchildren, one
or both of whose parents have died, become incapacitated or otherwise become Wi^^^d
^^.^
unable to adequately provide the basic support for such grandchildren. In - ^ ^ ^ ^
carrying out this provision, the Trustees shall take into consideration the basic | ^ ^ ^ ^
needs of Second Spouse and the essential needs of our children and grandchildren;||^^^^
i. and their ability to provide part or all of their essential needs • The decision o f ^ p j * ^ ^
the Trustees as to invasion of principal for these purposes shall be final, and o u r v ! ? ^ ^ | ^
children and grandchildren shall have no right or authority to have the decision v g ^ ^ ^
;
of the Trustees changed, amended or revoked in any way.
v S|^tf
...

-: '•':'-

'

:•<,•'•

if.r-Jt+V'ipjt

''¥l@ttq

9.2 - After both BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY have d i e d ; ' t w i l l

m%Wm
'•-V.:-x r y'> :-•. *V.*V«^'-"

rest, residue and remainder of the FAMILY TRUST shall be held, managed, distributedvand^i!
. transferred to or for the benefit of our children named in Article One, and all children adopted I f l
K by us or born as our issue after the date of this Trust Agreement, or their children as follows:
•H5K5S

i$W$HANNEY
•&

+'?%*•-•••:.

•• : - • • .
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(a)
Except as may otherwise be required by Article Two, the Trustees
shall divide the Trust Property into separate equal portions, and thereby provide
one portion for the benefit of each of our children then living, and one portion
for the benefit of the then living lawful descendants, by right of representation,
of each of our then deceased children. The portion or part thereof, hereafter
called "Trust Share/ which is allocated to each individual beneficiary shall
constitute and be administered as a separate trust. Except for the items described
in the personal property list described in paragraph 7.1 (b), the Trustees shall
have the sole discretion to select the properties to be allocated to each Trust
Share, provided that the properties shall be, selected in such a manner that the fair
market value of the properties of each Trust Share at the time of allocation shall
be representative of that Trust Share's proportionate share of the depreciation or
appreciation of all property then available for allocation which occurred after the,
deaths of both BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY and before,
the date of allocation. Separate books and records shall be kept for each Trust;
Share, but it shall not be necessary that physical division of the assets be made
as to each Trust Share. The income and principal of each Trust Share shall be
held, administered, and disposed of as provided below.
(b)
The Trustees shall distribute the income and principal of each Trust
Share to or for the beneficiary of such Share in such amounts as the Trustees in
their sole discretion deem necessary or advisable for the health, support,
education, and general welfare of each beneficiary and expenses in connection
with the donation of time and services for religious purposes. All income not so
distributed shall be accumulated and added to the principal of each Trust Share.

-^im.

™

.-.'• : ' ^ * ? ^ t $ $

5^tp|^p
••''••:-;- - :'i?*U&ij

^mmm

^mm
•

*

:

^®§$j

-;:.v.-:-.S^^®

:

A^M$m

(c)
When a beneficiary reached the age of Twenty-One (21) years the
"Final Distribution" as described in paragraph 2.2 above, or upon the death of
both BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY if such beneficiary,^|^B"
has already reached such age, the Trustee shall distribute to such beneficiary all||§§|
of the then balance of that beneficiary's Trust Share. This portion of t h e | ^ ^
FAMILY TRUST shall terminate completely as to any beneficiary who has l ^ ^ ^ p
received complete distribution of that beneficiary's Trust Share as provided in this ^ ^ ^ ^
paragraph 9.2:
Mmm

lipi

m

••V^/Jy^^A'^sIi

(d)
If any beneficiary of a Trust Share dies before the complete
distribution of that beneficiary's Share, the Trust Share of that beneficiary as then
constituted shall be distributed to any of our then living descendants or their
spouses in such proportions and subject to such terms, trust, and conditions as
such beneficiary may appoint (without violating any applicable rule against
perpetuities or accumulations) by specific reference to this power in a valid Last^
Will and Testament or other written legal instrument. This power of appointment
shall not be exercised in favor of the creditors of the deceased beneficiary, or the
beneficiary's estate or its creditors. .
•
•••
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(e)
Except as may otherwise be required by Article Two, if a n y i | ^ ^
beneficiary effectually exercised the foregoing testamentary power of
^
appointment, then that beneficiary's Trust Share as then constituted or the part
thereof not effectually appointed, shall be distributed in equal shares to the then
living descendants of such beneficiary, by right of representation.•••; If the
beneficiary leaves no living descendants, the Trust Share shall be distributed
equally to our then living descendants by right of representation. However, any
share otherwise distributable to one of our descendants for whom any property
is then being held in trust under this paragraph 9.2 shall be added to such trust
property. In addition, any share otherwise distributable to a minor for whom no
property is then being held in trust under this paragraph 9.2 shall immediately
vest in such minor, but the Trustees shall hold, use and expend so much of the
income and principal of such retained share as they shall deem necessary o r f f ^ ^ ^ q
advisable for the health, education, support, and general welfare of such m i n o r . - | ^ ^ ^
Any income not so expended shall be added to the: principal. The Trustees shallH
have with respect to each such retained share all of the powers, discretion andJ|
duties of management and distribution which they have with respect to the Trust,,.ify
r-TA.'^srfe.
Shares created herein generally.

- ^ v k» • ?-5» ~. *, : .

• -fJp*

^mmmm

ARTICLE TEN

5. -: > ;

Common Disaster
•^'^^ilffl^'^

m
10.1 - If we die in a common disaster or from illness or disease under circuinstancesjfg^
^^M^M
where it is not possible to determine with certainty which of us survived the other, it shall. P&m
.conclusively presumed that BLAINE J, HANNEY survived SHIRLEY ANN H A N N E Y . v ^ ^ ^ ^
s> 2:-,

ARTICLE ELEVEN

'^m$0&
''y^M^M*.^

Powers and Authority of Trustees

•

'^W^ir^i^^^^-

• - '•••.'•>i--£v;'&r—

11.1 - Without regard to any legal restrictions otherwise applicable to^ trustee^

}£>%.

X

%'

e authorized to exercise the following powers as well as any other powers co^eifed||
'••• .-yM}^fj

sole and absolute discretion.
(a) To retain, purchase or otherwise acquire any property, without
$81**
diversification as to kind or amount, whether or not such property was originally
a part of the Trust Property, or is authorized for investment by law, or is
unsecured, unproductive or of a wasting nature.
S •m^lM
,2

•$m
r
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(b) To dispose of any property at any time by sale, exchange, partition,
lease, mortgage, pledge, or option, at public or private sale, for such price and
on such terms and conditions as they may determine, whether for cash or other
consideration, or on credit with or without security.
(c) To hold any part of the Trust Property in cash or invested for any
period deemed advisable.
(d) To extend, modify or waive the terms of any bond and mortgage at
any time forming a part of the Trust Property; to foreclose any such mortgage or
take title to the property securing it by deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise;
to protect or redeem any such property from forfeiture for non-payment of taxes
or other liens; and generally to exercise as to such bond and mortgage or such
property all powers that an absolute owner might exercise.
(e) To exercise any option, right or privilege to convert or subscribe for
bonds, notes stocks, or other securities; to make such conversions or
subscriptions; to make payments therefor and to advance or borrow money for the
purpose of exercising any such option, right or privilege; and to hold as
investments such bonds, notes, stocks and other securities notwithstanding that
i they are not of a character authorized for investments by law or by other
'provisions of this Agreement.
(f) To vote any corporate stock held by them in person, through their
designees or by proxy, with or without power of substitution, and to execute
authority or proxies to one or more designees or nominees.
(g) To borrow money for any trust purpose and to pledge all or part of
the Trust Property to secure such borrowing without incurring any personal
liability therefor.
(h) To pay, extend renew, modify or compromise, upon such terms as
they may determine and upon such evidence as they may deem sufficient, any
obligation or claim, including taxes, either in favor of or against the Trust
Property.
(i) To hold or register any securities or other Trust Property in the name
of a nominee or in such form as to pass by delivery with or without indicating the
fiduciary character of such securities or other property.
(j)
To hold any separate parts or shares of the Trust Property wholly
or partly in undivided form for convenience or investment and administration.
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(k)
To buy, sell, and trade in securities of any nature, including short
sales, on margin, and for such purposes may maintain and operate accounts with
brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them with such
broker as security for loans and advances made to the Trustees.
G)
To make distributions or allocations in cash or in kind, including
in undivided interests, by prorata or non-prorata division or any combinations of
these ways in discretion of our trustees and on termination of the estate or trust,
to distribute property to a custodian for a minor beneficiary under the Gifts to
Minors Act of any state, or to use any other means of making distributions to a
minor under applicable law or terms of this trust.
11.2 - In the event the Trustees do not agree on any matter, and except as otherwise
provided by the powers which we have elsewhere specifically reserved to ourselves or others,
the decision of a majority of the Trustees shall govern and be binding on the Trustees and the
Trust. If there is an even number of Trustees, another Trustee may be added pursuant to
paragraph 13.2, below.
11.3 - Every Successor Trustee shall have the same title, rights, powers, duties and
discretion herein given the Trustees, without any act of conveyance or transfer. The Successor
Trustee shall only be responsible for the property delivered to them aind shall not be responsible
for transactions and occurrences regarding the trust prior to the time of their appointment.
11.4 - No person paying money or delivering any property to any Trustee shall be
required to see to its application.
11.5 - The guardian or conservator of the estate of a beneficiary under legal disability,
or the parents or surviving parent of a minor beneficiary for whose estate no guardian has been
appointed, may act for such beneficiary in making any appointment and giving any direction
under this Trust Agreement. The Trustees may make any payments hereunder directly to any
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such beneficiary or to the guardian, conservator, or parent of such beneficiary, or to any person
deemed suitable by the Trustees, or by direct payment of such beneficiary's expenses.
ARTICLE TWELVE
Qualification and Compensation of Trustees
12.1 - To the extent that any such requirement can legally be waived and except in
connection with a breach of trust, no Trustee shall ever be required to give any bond or qualify,
or be appointed by or account to any court, or obtain the order of approval of any court in the
exercise of any power or discretion hereunder.
12.2 - Notwithstanding paragraph 12.1, the spouse of any of our descendants shall not
be appointed or continue to serve as a Trustee after the filing, by any person and in any court,
of any petition for the separate maintenance or divorce of such spouse, except upon written
•

*

*

.

•

-

* - .

consent of those who are then the beneficiaries of at least two thirds of the current income of
the Trust Property. Upon the filing of any such petition, such spouse shall be immediately...
disqualified as a Trustee and a Successor Trustee shall be appointed as required by paragraph
13.2, below.
12.3 - The Trustees may, in their discretion, receive reasonable compensation for their
services, such compensation to be that which is normally charged by trust organizations for
similar services under similar circumstances.
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ARTICLE THIRTEEN
Resignation of Trustees
13.1 - Any of the Trustees may resign at any time by giving written notice specifying
the effective date of such resignation to the then existing beneficiaries of the current income of
the Trust Property.
13.2 - If all of the Trustees resign or are unable to act, a corporation authorized to
administer trusts under the laws of any state or of the United States, or an individual, may be
appointed as Successor Trustee by an instrument delivered to such successor and signed by those
who are beneficiaries, or their legal guardians, at the time of such appointment of at least twothirds of the current income of the Trust Property, and such beneficiaries may direct the
Successor Trustee to accept the accounts of any former Trustee, for which the Successor Trustee
shall have no responsibility.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN
Spendthrift Clause
14.1 - No interest of any beneficiary in the principal or income of any fund or trust
created herein shall be subject to pledge, assignment, sale or transfer in manner, or be liable for
or subject to the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements or torts of such beneficiary in any
manner to anticipate, charge or encumber any such interest.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
Provisions Relating to Vesting of Interests
15.1- All interestomder this Trust Agreement shall vest absolutely not later than twentyone (21) years after the date of death of the survivor of the group composed of ourselves, all
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persons named herein, and all members of classes specified in this Agreement who are living
on the date of its execution. Any assets then in the hands of the Trustees shall be forthwith
distributed to the persons to whom the Trustees could then distribute income as a result of any
provision of this Agreement in the proportion in which such income would be distributed among
them if the Trustees were, in fact, distributing all income of the Trust Property. For purposes
of this Article, any discretionary distributions of income among possible beneficiaries shall be
considered to be distributable among our living descendants in equal shares if they are all
members of a single generation, or by right of representation if they are members of more than

""•^jjl

one generation.
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ARTICLE SIXTEEN

M

No Reciprocal Trusts

Sfl
.^s^a
; :

16.1- Under no circumstances shall this Trust be considered a reciprocal Trust, nor shall
it be considered as having been given in consideration of any other trust which may be created -

- C^|

J||

^fl
Mi
V'A'IS

on a date identical with or reasonably close to the effective date of this Trust.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
Effective Date and Governing Law
17.1- This Trust shall take effect upon our execution of this Agreement, and it shall be
governed and construed in all respects according to the laws of the State of Utah. In no event

•

•

-•

" 4

m
Wr

and under no circumstances shall this instrument be construed as a testamentary document.
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ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
Unenforceability Provisions
18.1 - If any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining
provisions shall nevertheless be carried into effect
EXECUTED this g X day of 1A.

. 1995.

Q>JL~^ xj

2/1

:Sil

BLAINE J. HANNEY,
Trustmaker
'••:M
':•'•. ff^'S

..-J;.'ft ••it3

•mm
.<<£&£9

Z

SSHIRLEY A^N HANNEY,
Trustmaker

6

•%£^

•^Spl

:

«3Pf

SS
1

:>M^

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

: ss.
)

The foregoing Revocable Trust Agreement was subscribed and sworn to before me by
BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, whose signatures appears above on the
^ 2

day of

40N.,1995.

i
'iigM

DAVID ESHELTON
N0TJWPV8UC *S7ATEolUTAH
692 EAST 3060 NORTH
NORTH OGDENUT * U U

COMM> EXP* 1-3-98

5E?S

^slll
:^n
••iitep
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ACCEPTANCE OF TRUSTEES
We certify that we have read the foregoing Revocable Trust Agreement and understand

-'•4m

311
•"""jfJH*

the terms and conditions upon which the Trust Property is to be held, managed and disposed of

:

-?^§l
>!$m

by us as Trustees. We accept the Revocable Trust Agreement in all particulars and acknowledge

ifefefi
&9

receipt of the Trust Property described in the attached Schedule WA\

"KQ~^

J" v l

BLAINE J. HANNEY,
Trustee

tz^yL^

SHIRLEY
Trustee

N HANNEY,
S^SUw
••.• w ^ w t f & v r 1

iiiil
Prepared and
reviewed by:_
)HN H. GEILMANN
Attorney at Law
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801)627-3846

DATE
.•t:m&f
.;' • .f.vV-^VtjR">2*

-;^isi
^v^^SST

'•••:>-r.f-^2>Sr

-^M
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT, Page 18 of Nineteen Pages
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STGC000349

*m

m
M

> <M

J-

SCHEDULE

M W

A

Schedule of Trust Property
• SSJSMK

The property described below is subject to the terms of the REVOCABLE HANNEY
FAMILY TRUST AGREEMENT:

ciHf
iUff

1. Personal property described in an Assignment in Trust, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Schedule "A-l".

ittssi

^MM
:••: •:..,•£

&7.*i'x«!

^SH

2. Real property described in a Special Warranty Deed, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Schedule "A-2V

^wm
-.im

^?m

^~M~9s^kQ^-^
DATE

0"

BLAINE J. HANNEY
Trustmaker and Trustee

wit
siillil
'••vi-^^^ar

^~..r-^<Wi
••'•%•-^ 5*'^I-'.TS

: :.:^rH

DATE

SHIRLEY
H A N N E Y J
Trustmaker and Trustee
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SCHEDULE "A-l
ASSIGNMENT
For valuable consideration, we, BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY,
do assign, transfer and set over to BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY and
their Successor Trustees, to hold as Trustees for the HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, the
following described property:
1.
All personal and household effects ..of both Trustmakers, including antiques, art
objects, books, papers, clothing, household goods and supplies, furniture and furnishings,
jewelry, paintings, silverware, musical instruments, hobby collections, sporting equipment, tools
and vehicles, including but not limited to:
1992 TOYOTA
1992 TOYOTA

4TARN01P2NZ031298
4TARN81A7N2031517

2.
All our interest in all bank and savings accounts including time certificates of
deposit and shares in savings and loan associations and credit unions, including but not limited
to:
A.

Checking Accounts:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON #0113033506
BARNES BANK #02-0021001243

B.

Savings Accounts:
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION #12230-9
CLOVER CLUB EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Kaysville #3022-1
CLOVER CLUB EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Kaysville #2191-5

C.

Certificates of Deposit:

D.

Money Market Certificates:

E.

Savings Certificates:
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3. All our interest in all corporate and mutual fund shares, corporate funds, and U.S.
Government Savings Bonds, regardless of title or registration, including but not limited to:
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY #76 25 SHARES
HANNEY & HANNEY CONSTRUCTION, INC. #001 1800 SHARES
HANNEY & HANNEY CONSTRUCTION, INC. #002 1200 SHARES
HANNEY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP #LP006822

Si

4. All our interest in the HANNEY DEVELOPMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, NO.
LP006822.
5. All our interest in the following described real property located in Davis County,
State of Utah:

^mm

ALL OF LOT 27, WILDRIDGE ESTATES PHASE NO. 2. CONTAINS 0.27 ACRES.
(09:218:0027)

• a-^a
,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, BLAINEJ.
HANNEY
and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY,
EJ.HANNE
execute this assignment on the P- ^- day of
1995.

^Lfcu^j O"'
BLAINE J. HANNEY, Assignor
:.<^n

(^2W~
'SHIRLEY

MChtVLS^

HANNEY,'Ass^

r

•:••*»

6

STATE OF UTAH

"',. S8*&

: ss.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

The foregoing Assignment was subscribed and sworn to before u.c
HANNEY aand SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, whose signatures appear above c>
of - K > N . - ^ 1995.

,ii'.'.Ar.NC: J.
day

of 4\V

DAVID E.SHELTON
NOTARY PUBUC'STATEctVTAH]
692 EAST 3060 NORTH
NORTH OGDENUT 84414

COMM.
EXP.
1-3-98W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Howard
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SCHEDULE "A-2"
JICVFW

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEE:D

HAHHEY' BUIHE J.

••'••* "8LAINE J. HANNEY, Grantors of 3182 North Highway 89, City of Layton, County
of Davis, State of Utah, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS the below described tract of real
property to BLAINE J. HANNEY of 3182 North; Highway 89, City of Layton, County of
Davis, State of Utah, and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, of 3182 North Highway 89, City of •:•••;
Layton, County of Davis, State of Utah, and their Successor Trustees, as Trustees for the
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, Grantees for the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable
consideration.
Said tract of real property being situate in Davis County, State of Utah and more
particularly described as follows:
A PART OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, MORE
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89058'22" EAST 604.60 FEET, NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 649.75
FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE S.W. CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1, AND
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22,36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'46" EAST.222.00 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 0°22'36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH SP0V55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE
POINT OF BEGINNING. CONTAINING 338 ACRES; MORE OR LESS.
0?- 003•* oOfy
SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS, AGREEMENTS, RESERVATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD
AND TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT OF WAY AND PRIVILEGES ESTABLISHED DT
EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY REFERENCE MADE A PART THEREOF.
. c •>•->!

WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this 2-"X day of
Signed in the Presence of)

\3b^ ~ .. 1995.

- O ^ - g - ^ — ^ J " fif <ZL
BLAINE J. HANNEY

J
SHIRLEY

$w

. Hf,

HANNEY

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

ss.

On the c ^ day of 4-lW- •
1995 personally appeared before me BLAINE
J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY the signers of the within instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
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GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

:ss
)

Know all men by these presents, that I, BLAINE J. HANNEY, the undersigned, of 3182
North Highway 89, City of Layton, State of Utah, hereby make, constitute, and appoint
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY of 3182 North Highway 89, City of Layton, State of Utah, my true
and lawful attorney in fact for me and in my name, place and stead, giving unto said
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY full power to do and perform all and every act that I mayj,ggal|y
do through an attorney, in relation to all of my property, real or personal, wherever situate, to
carry out the purposes for which this power is granted, specifically including the power to
make deposits, sign checks, endorse items, and withdraw funds from checking, savings, on
other accounts, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming
that which SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY or my agent's substitute shall lawfully do or cause to
be done by my agent or my agent's substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the power herein
conferred upon my agent.

In the event that SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY fails to survive me, declines to serve or
for any reason fails to serve as my agent with this power of attorney, then I nominate and
appoint MICHAEL DOYLE HANNEY of Layton, Utah, to serve as my agent with the same
powers and discretions described above.
In the event that MICHAEL DOYLE HANNEY fails to survive me, declines to serve
BLAINE J. HANNEY POWER OF ATTORNEY, Page 1 of Two Pages

_
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or for any reason fails to serve as my agent with this power of attorney, then I nominate and
appoint BRETT OVERTON HANNEY of Layton, Utah, to serve as my agent with the same
powers and discretions described above.

This power shall terminate upon the physical destruction of this power of attorney by
the principal, BLAINE J. HANNEY.

This power shall not be affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal,
BLAINE J. HANNEY.

DATED this

2&L

day of

_, 1995.

IRiL^. ?r*hC
BLAINE J. HANNEY

Personally appeared before me BLAINE J. HANNEY, who acknowledged, sworn to,
subscribed and executed the foregoing power of attorney on the
" ^ - O — day of

-4-^Jr-

1995.

DAVID E. SHELTDN
AST30S0
NORTH
NORTH OG0ENUT844U
U^

COMM. EXP. 1.3.g8

BLAINE J. HANNEY POWER OF ATTORNEY, Page 2 of Two Pages
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WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
BLAINE J. HANNfcY
3037 EAST 3050 NORTH
LAYTON, UT 84040

E 16IG6&Q &268£ P
A52
SHERYL L, WHITE i DHVIS CHTY RECORDER
2000 AUG 29 4s 19 Prl FEE 14.00 DEP AC
REC'O FOR IHtJEST TITLE SERVICES IHC

SPAC^A^NE } H ! S UNE FOR RECORDERS USE ONLY.

WARRANTY DEED
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, AND THEIR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY
FAMILY TRUST
GRANTOR(S)
OF LAYTON, COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
HEREBY CONVEY AND WARRANT TO
BLAINE 4. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY r

AS

J0INT

TENANTS

GRANTEE(S)
OF LAYTON, COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION,
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED TRACT OF LAND IN DAVIS COUNTY,
STATEOFUT:
{09-003-0021)
See Attached Exhibit "A"

SUBJECTTO EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY OF RECORD. AND TAXES FOR THE YEAR
2000 AND THEREAFTER.
WITNESS, THE HAND(S) OF SAID GRANTOR(S), THIS /-Z

~^DAYOF

hUL>Q^7

l^JJ/U*^-

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF

J

ZOOD

f

fiOwiuu/'. dOUAAfcU;

BLAINE J. HANNEY, TRUSTEE

)Ala£<

T~^

&* HlMUtf*t+. J^-JMAAfof

'SHIRLEY A~N^ HANNEY, TRUST^c

STATE OF ( / T W - f l -

)
:SS
COUNTY OF t / J g f f £ / £ )

ON ft- , 7 ^ ,2000. PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE WIE^
THE SIGNER(S) OF THE WITHIN INSTRUMENT, WHO DULY ACKNOWLEDGE
THE SAME.

MM/ufc/^W

ERICKIVERSON

wtmpuBUQ'Simtfww

u -SH\terrsuc^r
#*irate# forth

OQDENUT 84403

COMM.EXR 03-23-2002

'•'ttANNBVFAMm/Tt^Wsr
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

STGC000838
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF UTAH
h. 1 6 I 1 5 6 6 Q

(ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH

B

)

On the 28th day of August, 2000, personally appeared before me SHIRMEY ANN HANNEY. AND THEIR
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, the signer ( ) of the foregoing instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that SHE executed the same

A

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires: n^ffi^
Residing at^ n J ^
w
"

U

[jfwftl
KorriW Fu&li&

(ifc^'Xm

(jlcwjl?)
•

^TTC^
—

AUU3CJJ HODGES

"^^'ssrBieJnwjHijw, •;

wmw,m-ft»jf
KOVEi2CEa 10. a r e
___ BTCTc 0 ? i m > |

j
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EXHIBIT "A"

F 1610660

B 2 6 S 6 P &5-4

A PART OF SECTION 1. TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, MORE PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 604.60 FEET. NORTH 0°22,36M EAST
649.75 FEET AND NORTH SS'WSS" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1,
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57*46" EAST 222.00 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 0°22'36" WEST 658.52 FEET. THENCE SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
D^'OOD
' OO £\ }
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER LINE. TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS. THE GRANTEES. AND
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY, FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, REGRESS
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING AT A POINT ON AN EXISTING
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89058'22" EAST 271 98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47,52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH
16°39'50" EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20\ AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY
199.63 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,307.46 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND
SOUTH 85°25*21" EAST 20.50 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH,
RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 250.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS.
TO A POINT SOUTH WSW22" EAST 271 98 FEET AND NORTH 26047'52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 16°39'50M
EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE
THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 227 32 FEET AND NORTH 88o08'55M EAST
40.0 FEET (POINT A) FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1, THENCE SOUTH 4°52'35H EAST
420.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 42.02 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 73.27 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 75°15' EAST 150.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 78.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT
131.05 FEET; THENCE NORTH 21° WEST 85.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 264.91 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE TO THE RIGHT 98.83 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0°22'36M EAST 72.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT OF
CURVATURE; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 70 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 107,23 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 98.0 FEET (PARALLEL TO AND 7.50 FEET SOUTH OF A LINE EXTENDING SOUTH 88°08'55M
WEST FROM A POINT SOUTH 89°58,22" EAST 1321.0 FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST
446.40 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1); THENCE EASTERLY 62.37 FEET ALONG
THE ARC OF A 518.0 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT; THENCE EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF
A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH WS$7T EAST 1321.0
FEET AND NORTH 0o22,36M EAST 658 81 FEET AND WEST 223 20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF
SAID SECTION 1.
SITUATE IN DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

STGC000840
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(SPECIFIC PROPERTY ONLY)
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KNOW ALL MEN BYTHESE PRESENTS, THAT
BIAINKLHANNEY

HAVE(S) MADE, CONSTITUTED AND APPOINTED. AND BYTHESE PRESENTS DO(ES) HEREBY MAKE.
CONSTITUTE AND APPOINT
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY
MY (OUR) TRUE AND LAWFUL ATTORNEY(lES) AND IN MY (OUR) NAME(S), PLACE(S) AND STEAD TO DO AND
PERFORM THE FOLLOWING ACT OR ACTS, WHICH ARE HEREBY HOTTED, HOWEVER, TO THE FOLLOWING
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY AND ANY IMPROVEMENTS AND FIXTURES LOCATED THEREON:
09-003-0021
See Attached E x h i b i t
to ask, demand, sue for, recover, cotlect. and receive all such sums of money, debts, and demands whatsoever as are now
or shall hereafter become due. owing, payable, or belonging to the undersigned; and have, use, and take all lawful ways
and means in the name of the undersigned, or otherwise, for the recovery thereof, by legal process, and to compromise and
agree for the same, and grant aqufttances or other sufficient discharges forthe same, for the undersigned, and tn the name
of the undersigned to make, seal, and deliver the same; to compromise any and all debts owing by the undersigned, and to
convey, transfer, and/or assign said property in satisfaction of any debt owing by me (either oi us): to bargain, contract,
agreefor,purchase, receive, and take said property, and accept the sefcen and possession thereof, and alt deeds, and
other assurances In the law therefor; and to lease, let, demise, bargain, sell, remise, release, convey, mortgage, convey in
trust, and hypothecate said property, upon such terms and conditions, and under such covenants as said Attorney shall
thinkfit;to exchange saU propertyforother real or personal property, and to execute and deliver the necessary instruments
of transfer or conveyance to consummate such e>change; to e>ecute and defiver subordination agreements subordinating
any lien, encumbrance or otherrightin said property to any other Hen, encumbrance, or otherrighttherein; also to bargain
and agreefor.buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, convey in trust or otherwise, and in any and every way and manner deal In
and with the improvements and fbiures located on said real property, including authority to utBke by eTigMty for VA
Guaranty; and, also, for the undersigned and in the name and as the act and deed of the undersigned, to sign, seal,
execute, deliver, and acknowledge such deeds, convenants, leases, indentures, agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust,
hypothecations, assignments, notes, receipts, evidences of debts, assumption agreements, settlement documents, releases
and satisfactions of mortgage, and such other instruments in writing, of whatever kind or nature, as may be reasonable,
advisable, necessary, or proper in the premises, but only with respect to said property.
GIVING AND GRANTING UNTO SAID ATTORNEY FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DO AND PERFORM ALL AND
EVERY ACT AND THING WHATSOEVER REQUISITE AND NECESSARY TO BE DONE IN AND ABOUT THE
PREMISES, AS FULLY TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES AS THE UNDERSIGNED MIGHT OR COULD DO IF
PERSONALLY PRESENT, THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY EXPRESSLY RATIFYING AND CONFIRMING ALL THAT SAID
ATTORNEY SHALL LAWFULLY DO OR CAUSE TO BE DONE BY VIRTUE OF THESE PRESENTS.
THIS POWER SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY SUBSEQUENT DISABILITY OR INCAPACITY OF THE PRINCIPAL
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND THIS 18th DAY OF August, 2000

A&k^r-

UTFWJ
STATE OFi&flW^
)
^ *SS
COUNTY O F \ ^ 6 e f L )

_ _y

C
J/CQyu,
^7WJAC

BLAIN0. HANNEY

ON THE •/% DAY OF August, 2000, PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, BLAllJS. HANNEY THE SIGNER OF
THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT WHO DULY ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME

EBlCKrVERSON
KmtPVBUQ'SimtfWH
4W»H*tt*SONBLVD
OeDENVr 84403

C0MM.EXR 03-23-2002
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EXHIBIT "A"
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A PART OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH. RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN. MORE PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°5&2T EAST 604.60 FEET*. NORTH 0°22*36" EAST
649.75 FEET AND NORTH SB'OS'SS" EAST 48 02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1.
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22,36" EAST 664 55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'46n EAST 222.00 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 0°22,36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER LINE. TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS. THE GRANTEES. AND
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY. FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, REGRESS
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING ATA POINT ON AN EXISTING
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89'58,22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26047'52M EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH
16o39'50n EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.257.48 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20', AND NORTH 5*29r38r WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY
199.63 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.307 46 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20* AND
SOUTH BS^S^r EAST 20.50 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH.
RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 250.0 FEET. MORE OR LESS.
TO A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47,52" EAST 9 84 FEET AND NORTH <\6r3V5T
EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE
THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND NORTH 5°29'38M WEST 227.32 FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST
40.0 FEET (POINT A) FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1; THENCE SOUTH 4*52'35M EAST
420.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 42.02 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 73.27 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 75015' EAST 150.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 78.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT
131.05 FEET; THENCE NORTH 21° WEST 85.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 264.91 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE TO THE RIGHT 98 83 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0°22,36M EAST 72.0 FEET. MORE OR LESS. TO A POINT OF
CURVATURE; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 70 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 10723 FEET; THENCE *
NORTH 88e08'55w EAST 98.0 FEET (PARALLEL TO AND 7 50 FEET SOUTH OF A LINE EXTENDING SOUTH 88*08'55"
WEST FROM A POINT SOUTH 89058,22" EAST 1321 0 FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36M EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST
446.40 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1); THENCE EASTERLY 62.37 FEET ALONG
THE ARC OF A 518.0 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT; THENCE EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF
A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH 89*58'22" EAST 1321.0
FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36"'EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 223.20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF
SAID SECTION 1.
SITUATE IN DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
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BAMCsONE
DEED OF TRUST, ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND RENTS,
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND FINANCING STATEMENT
THIS DEED OF TRUST, ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND RENTS, SECURITY AGREEMENT AND FINANCING
STATEMENT IS DATED AUGUST 2 4 , 2 0 0 0 , by B U I N E J HANNEY and SHIRLEY AflH HANNEY , whosa address
It 3 0 3 7 EAST 3 0 6 0 NORTH , t A Y T O N , UT 8 4 0 4 0 trafafrad to balow as -Trustor") for tha benaftt of Bank Ona,
N A . w h o H tddraaa It Horn* Loan Setvicaa, P.O. Box 7 1 0 0 9 7 , Columbus, OH 4 3 2 7 1 - 0 0 9 7 (referred to below
aometJme* as "Laodex" and t t x n a & r o t a* •Eernaficbry''} and Bank Onar NA (referred to bolow at Tru«te«" , ).
CONVEYANCE AND GRANT. For valuable cerieMereiiori, Trustor erewcabCy grants and conveys to Trustee In trust, with power of safe, for the
benefit ofLender <ae Bemfidary, e l of Trustor'sright,"tide, and interest In end to the following described reel property, together with ell tenant
security deposit*, utiftry tfepoeits end aH proceeds (including without limitation premium refund*) of each policy of insurance relating to any of
th«>npToverriem*/tne Personaf Property or tha Real Property; aft rente, Issues, profltt, revenues, royalties or other benefit* of the
Improvements; the Personal Property or the Reel Property; all easement*, rights of way, end eppurtsnsnccc; ell water, water rights and ditch
right* (including stock in utiHtie* wfth ditch or irrigation f.Jti»); arid e l other rights, royeftie*, end profits relating to the reel property, including
without Hmttation a* miner els, oH, gas, geothermel and eknfter matters, located in D A V I S C o u n t y , S t a t e of Utah (tha " R a t i

Proparty"):
PLEASE SEE ATTACHH)
Th« R«a! Proparty or Ha addraat It commonly knovvn at 3 0 3 7 EAST 3 0 6 0 NORTH, LAYTON, UT 84040. The Rest
Property tax Wertfffcetjon number is.090030021.
DCFtfMTIONS. The following worde shell have the following mannings when used in this Deed of Trust. Terms not otherwise defined in this
Deed of Truet ebell have the rTwar^s atttibutad to *uch twrns in the Uniform Commercial Code. Alt references to dollar emounts shell me en
amounts in law W money oltha Urwted.^Ute* of America.
' Guarantor. The word 'Guarantc*"-means end Irwrudes vwrd^oct Umhation, any and ail guarantors, sureties, and accommodation parties in
correction with to Indebtedness.
irnprovements., The w o ^ 'Improvement** means e ^ includae witr>out Rmrte^n en exielir^ and future improvements, fixtures, buildings,
structures, mobilehtwriea affixed oh the Reel Property, tellttiea, adcHtiorm, replecemerit* end other construction on the R««l Property.
Indebtedness. :Tha word •Indebtedness" means alli principal and interest payable under the Mote and any amounts expended or advanced
by Lender to discharge obligations,of T r u e ^ w ; e x p e n s « . m c o ^
by Trustee or Lerhder to enforce obligations of Trustor under this Deed of
Trust, te^ethy vritfi interest ori such amounts as provided In this Deed of Trust.
.»Uaaaa.^Tna;^^
rij^i,.M:and^lritaraat
of Grantor in and to ell leeses relating to the Reel Property, together with all
" modificatiorw.; extanelbrW and guwanoe* thereof, presently e>deting or rtereaher.arising.
Note. Th« wtn^ _"»Me" meam t M
truetor.to Lenda^/togetha

t h a principal a m o u n t of $ 2 4 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 from
end substitutiona

.(Peracnai Pi openyy the iworda "Personal ; Property * mean aK equipment, fixtures; end other articlea of personal property now or hereafter
owned by Truator, and now or hereafter attached or affixed to, or located on, the Reel Property; together with afl accessions, parts, and
7a^^
any of euch property; and together wjtti aB proceeds (including without limitation
../ad Insuranca p* oc*»ri» and refunds of promkjma) from any sale or other disposition of the Property.
:>

fre**r*y;^

.'/' j R a ^ Property, 17>ew

Real Property and the Personal Property.
property. Interests and rights described above in the "Conveyance and Grant" section.

, -M Reasis 4': Decwwewte.: The. words "Related}Docurnenta" mean arid .Include without Hmrtation tha Note and eN credit agreements, Joen
•"• %-ayjeament*^,'eovirownentti' agreements,guaranties, security agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, and all other instruments, agreements
.i&andoteuments, wlttther how.or hereafter existing, executed In.connection with the Note.
p f i R e ^ . TTie.Woc^

Income, issues, royalties, profits, and other benefits derived from

•"-• ' X*W ; P»e^^
?Tnaet*r; 'Tha w«nl."Tnartor" means any and e l pereone arid entitle* executing this Deed of Trust, Including without Kmrtetion etf Trustors
"
"" l,aiiov»;:;"-. Z:>;-:- •''"•
/?""<
V

TMW D S D OF TRUST>:WOU0WG THE ASSIOWIlttNT OF LEASES AMD RENTS AND THE SECURITY ffiTEREST W THE RENTS AND
. PSISONAL PROPERTY. IS OIVBi TO SECURE (1) PAYMENT OF THE WDEBTEDNESS AND (2) PERFORMANCE OF ANY AND ALL
OBLKIATIONS Of TIWSTOR L ^
THIS DEED OF TRUST IS GIVEN
AND ACCEPTS) ON THE FOLLOVnNQTQWS:
POSSESSION AND IULAJNTENANCE OF THE PROPERTY^ Trustor agrees that Trusted* possession and use of the Property shall be governed by
the foliowing provisions:
Posaaeelen and Use. Until the occurrence of an Event of Default, Trustor may (a) remain in possession and control of the Property, (b)
use, operate or manege the Property, and (c) collect any Rents from the Property. Tha following provisions relate to the use of the
Property or to other Imitations on the Property. Thla Instrument is • Trust Deed executed In conformity wfth the Utah Trust Deed Act,
UCA 57-1-19, etseq.
Duty to Maintain. Trustor shell maintain the Property in good condition end promptly perform all repairs, replacements, and maintenance
necessary to preearve its velue. Grentor shell els© observe and comply with all conditions and requirements (If any) necesaery to preserve
and extend aH rights, easements, licenses, permits (including, without fimrtation, zoning variations and any non-conforming uses and
structures), privileges, franchise* and concessions applicable to the Real Property or contracted for in connection with any present or luture
use of the Reel Property.
Hazardous Substance*. Trustor represents end warrents that the Property never has been, and never will be so long as this Deed of Trust
by the
Howard
Hunter Law
Library, storage,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
remains a lien onDigitized
the Property,
used
for theW.
generation,
manufacture,
treatment,
disposal,
release
or threatened release oi eny
hazardous waste or substance, as those
terms are defined inOCR,
the Comprehensive
Response, Compensetion and Liability Act
Machine-generated
may containEnvironmental
errors.
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upon the Property to make such inspections and tests as Lender may deem appropriate to determine compliance of the Property with this
section of the Deed of Trust. Trustor hereby (a) releases and waives any future claims against Lender for indemnity or contribution in Vie
event Trustor becomee liable for cleanup or other costs under eny such lews, and (b! agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Lender
against any and aO claims and losses resulting from a breach of this paragraph of tha Deed of Trust. This obligation to indemnify shall
aurvfvc the payment of the Indebtedness and the satisfaction ot this Deed of Trust.

.

Nuisance, Waste. Trustor shall not cause, conduct or permit any nuisance nor commit permit, or suffer any stripping of or waste on or to
the Property or any portion of the Property. Without firnrting the Generality of tha foregoing, Tructor wOJ not remove, or grant to any other
party tha right to remove, arty timber, mineraia fincfuoSng oil and gssj, eoiL gravel or rock products: without tha prior written cor*ent of
L ndef

*
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DUE OH SALE • CONSENT BY LENDER. Lander may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable itfl sums secured by thia Deed of Trust
Upon tho toto or transfer, without the Lender's prior written conaertt of ail or any part of tha Boa* Property, or any interact in the Real Property.
A "eafa ot tranafer" meena the conveyance of Real Property or any right titie or Interest therein; whether legal, beneficial ot equitable; whether
voluntary or invc^unterv; whether by outright sale, deed, instalment safe contract, land contract, contract for dead, lease-option contract, or by
•a*, assignment, or tranafer of any beneficial interest in or to any land truat holding trfJe to tht Real Property, or by any other method of
conveyance of Real Property interest. If any Trustor is a corporation (unless such Grantor's stock is pub6c*y traded), partnership or Umrted
SaWHy company, "sale or tranafer" atoo includes any change in ownership without tha prior written consent of Beneficiary of the voting stock.
partner ship interests or Brnftsd Eabittty company intareata, aa the caae may be. of Trustor:
TAXES ANO UBsS.
Grantor she* pay when due aft taxes, assessments, water charges and aawer service chargaa levied or assessed against tha
Property, or any part thereof, and ahaJI pay whan due a l claime for work done on or for services rendered or materiel furnished to tha
Property. Grantor ahsll maintain tha Property free and clear of all Kens, axcept for Bone of taxes and asseeamenta not due and except as
otherwise provided herein.
PROPERTY DAMAGE HSU RANCE.
Maintenance of Insurance. Trustor shad procure and maintain policies of tire insurance with standard extended coverage endorsements on
a replacement basis for tha ful" Insurable value covering aH Improvements on tha Real Property in an amount sufficient to avoid application
of any coinsurance clause, and with a standard mortgagee clause in favor of Lender. Trustor shsl also procure and maintain
cc*riprafiensfve public Kabahy^^ Insurance for injuries to persona ftncluxfing death) and property damage or loss of use, and such otUr
insurance aa may be required by Lender. Policies shall be written inform, amounts, coverages and basis reasonably acceptable to Lender
and issued by a company or companies reasonably acceptable to Lander. Trustor, upon request of Lender, will deliver to Lander from time
to time the policies or certificates of Insurance in form satis factory to Lender, including stipulations that coverages will not be cancelled cr
diminished without at least tan (10) days' prior written notice1*) Lender. Each insurance policy afro aha* include an endorsement providing
that coverage In favor of Lander wW not be impaired in any way by *riy act, orniasion or default of Trustor or any other person. Should the
Real Property at any time become located in an area designated by the Director of tha federal Emergency Management Agency as a special
flood hazard area. Trustor agreee to obtain and maintain Federal Rood Ineurance for the fuft unpaid principal balance of the loan, up to tbs
maximum potty limit* set under the National Rood Insurance Program, or aa otherwise rcqubjd by Lender, and to maintain auch insurance
for the term of the loan.
EXPBiprTURES f Y LENDER. If Trustor falls to comply with any provision of this Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding Is commenced
that would materiallyaffect Lander's interests in the Property, Larxier on Trustor's behalf may, but shall not be required to, tska any action that
Lender de«me appropriate. Any amount that Lender expends In ao doing will bear interest at the rate provided for in the Note from the data
incuffad or paid by Ufxler to tiSedete of rapayment by Trustor. All such expenses wi» be payable on demand and shall be secured by this
Imtrumant. Thia Deed of Truat also wfll secure payment of these amounts. Therightsprovidedforin thia paragraph ahaU be in eddrtionto any
other righttorany remedies to Which Lander may be emftled on account of the default. Any such action by Lender shell not be construed as
curing the default so as to bar Lander from any remedy that H otherwise would have had.
WARfyUfTYrDEPOISE Of TITUS.
TWe. Trustor warrants that: (a) Trustor holds good and marketable true of record to tha Real Property in fee simple, free and clear of alt
fterva and arv^urr^anew other
tt
in the legal description of the Real Property aet forth herein or attached hereto or in any
title Insurance policy^'trtJajrapb^
in favor of, and accepted.by. Lender in connection with thia Deed of Trust, and
|b) Trustor has the fuijright, power, sind authority to execute and deliver this Deed of Trust to Lender.
Defense of TWt. Subject to the exceptionm tha paragrsph above. Trustor warrants and will foraver dsfend the title to the Property against
the lawful claims of afl parsons.
No Other Uens. Grantor wHJ not wrthout the prior written consent of Lander, create, place, or permit to be created or placed, or. through
any act or failure to act, ac^fUieaca in the placing of, or eflow to remain, any deed of trust, voluntary or involuntary lien, whether statutory,
consfttirttofttl or c^^
ad veiorwn Uxas on the Reef Property which are not delinquent], security, imerest,
ericunSbfaTCe b ^
Property, or any part thereof, other than as permitted herein, regardless if Same era
^fSXpVeaary O T ^
DeetforTrustrs^iBrwuld-sny-of u>o-f©f09c^4>e<»ma
--•ttacheo* hereafto
fr^
wrthout the prior written consent of Lender, Grantor will cause the same to be
^promptlydiectorged and released. . .
DEFAULT.'IEachf:of uSe foHcrwing, at the option of Lender, eheif constitute an event of default ("Event of Default") under thia Deed of Trust:
1
.Defmta em<M
.=., .notw'ot hereaftar owkvj i© Lander. ^ ; ^

psyrneht when due ori'tM Indebtedness or sny other indebtedness DrtJbfceaTJon

. .• Other Defaults. 'Faflure'tocomply with-any oihar term* obegation, covenant or condrtidn contained in this Deed of Trust, the Note, in any of
the other ReUt^: Documents^
herefter arising between Beneficiary and Grantor.
:
r—De^a^to Th^Party, - ^
.* J : " oir ^ ' G u * * a m o r ^

olanyindebtedness.owing byJSrantor;
agreernant or undertaking.

"I;
aUns^uptcy':or-Inaorvsncy. ;If the Grantor:or.any Guarantor: (D becomes Irtaofvent, or makes a transfer in fraud of creditors, or makes an
^t;l;asa^gnfT>ent for :the benefit of oedrtors, or admits in wTitirvj rta inaWrty to pay its debt* as they become due; (9) generally ia not paying l u
'.r r;'••• 'debta as' aiich deott:becoma due;. (HJ has a rscerver, trustee or cuatocUan appointed ( j, or tike possession of, a* or rubstsrrbally. aflof the
ii: ^tsfaM
m i itfoce^riing brought by such party or ina proceexfing brought agairwt such party and
•: : -' a
possession ia r»t terminated within aixty (601 days after the affactrve data thereol or auch
:£- r party consents to or acquiesces at auch appoihtmant or possession; frv) fftes a petition for refief under the United States Bankruptcy Code
;<• or ariy other pr a sent or future federal or otste irtsofvancy. bankruptcy or similar taws (all of the forw^orng hereinafter cdttectivery cattad
•
-AppicAbia tankruptcy Law'Jbr aViy bvokjnta^ petition for relief te filed against such party under any Appficabia Bfar^kniptcY Law^ and
sur^ irwoiuntary petftkyii it rxK dismiased within sixty (60) days after tha fMng thereof, or an ordar for^ raWef rwrning w h party ia entered
under the^ any' Appficabla Bankruptcy Law, or any compoertJorv rea^aogernent, extension, rscrgancation or other relief of debtora howr or
hereafter axtsbng te'raqiiaitBd Of consantad to by auch party; fvj fafts to have cSscharged within a period of abcty |f30) days any
^ttachrr»er^^aequestrsh<xt^^ir^^
upon anyj>roperty of auch party; or (vt) fails to pay within thirty (30) days any final rnoney
ju^ment hoainax auch party.:^
. Uqusdanbfu Desiibi and Related Events. If Grantor or any Guarantor Is an entity, tha Bquidatkm, dissolution, merger or consolidation of any
such entity or, if any of siich parties is an individual, tha daath or leosf incapacity of any such individual.
Absjftdofwnant. Grantor abandons afl or a portion of the Property.
Action by Other UenhcWer. Tha hoWar of any Ben or aacurity interest on the Property (wrthout hereby implying the conaent of Beneficiary
to the existence or creation of any auch Sen or aacurity interest) declarea a defaurt thereunder or instrtutas foreclosure or other proceedings
for the enforcement of its remedies thereunder.
Destruction of Property. The Property la ao demolished, destroyed or damaged that, in the judgment of Beneficiary, it cannot be reetored or
rebuilt with available funds to a profitable condition within a reasonable period of time.
Condemnation. So much of the Property is taken in condemnation, or sold in lieu of condemnation, or the Property b so diminished in value
due to any injury or damage to tho Property, that tha remainder thereof cannot, in the judgment of Beneficiary, continue to be operatad
profitably for the purpose
for which
it was
being W.
usedHunter
immediately
prior to auch
taking, sale
or diminution.
Digitized
by the
Howard
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark
Law School, BYU.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES ON DEFAULT. Upon tha occurrence of any Event of Defaurt and at any time thereafter, Truatee or Lender, at fts
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Accelerato Indebtedness. Lender shall have the right at its option without notice to Trustor to declare the entire Indebtedness immediately
due and payable, including any prepayment penalty which Trustor would be required to pay.
Foreclosure. With respect to all or any pert of the Real Property, the Trustee shall have ihe right to foreclose by notice and sale, and
Lender shall have the right to foreclose by judicial foreclosure, in either case in accordance with and to the full extent provided by
applicable law.
Other Remedies. Trustee or Lender shall have any other right or remedy provided in this Deed of Trust or the Note or by law.
$eit of the Property. To the extent permitted by applicable taw. Trustor hereby waives any and all rights to have the Property marshalled.
In exercising its rights and remedies, the Trustee or Lender shall be free to sell ail or any pari of the Property together or separately, in one
sale or by separate sates. Lender shaft" be entitled to bid at any public sale on ail or any portion of the Property.
Attorneys' Fees; Expenses. If '^snder institutes any suit or action to enforce any of the terms of the Deed of Trust Lender shall be entroed
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees as attorneys' fa*s at thai and on any appeal. Whether or not any court action is involved, aH
reasonable expenses incurred by Lender which in Lender's oorrvon are necessary at any time for the protection of its interest or the
enforcement of its rights sha* become a pan of the Irxiebtedness payable on demand and shati bear interest at the rVote rats from the date
of expenditure unt3 repaid. Expenses covered by this paragraph include, without Dmrtewn, however subject to arry Bouts unoetappfcsbts
law, Lender's reasonable attorneys' fees whether or not there b a lawsuit including reasonable attorneys' fees for bankruptcy proceedings
(including efforts to'-mboSfcorv vacate any automatic stay or injunction), appeals and any anticipated r»st-judgment collection services, the
cost of searching records, obtaining tide reports (including foreclosure reports), surveyors' reports, enwomerttsl reports, appraisal fees,
thle insurance, e ^ f e e s for the Trustee, to the extent perrnitted by applicable law. Trustor also win pay any court costs, in addition tc all
other sums provided by law. .
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.
Appictbto Law. This Deed of Trust has been deftvered to Lender and accepted by Lender In the State of Utah. This Deed of Trust shaft* be
governed by and construed In accordance with the taws of the Stats of Utsfc.
Time to of the Esccnct. Tirneris of the essence m the performance of this Deed of Trust
Waivers and Cortsef<ts. Under shall not be deemfd to have waived any rights under this Deed of Trust for under the Related Documents)
unless such waiver (tin writing and signsd by Under. No delay or omission on the part of Under in exercising any right sha8 operate as a
waiver of such .right or any other right A waiver by any party of a provision of this Deed of Trust shall not constitute a waiver of or
prejudice the party's rigM otherwise to demand strict compliance wrth that provision or any other provision. No prior waiver by Under, nor
any course of docBng between Lender and Trustor, shelf constitute a waiver of any of Lender's rights or any of Trustor's obligations as to
any future transactions. Whenever consent by Lender is required in this Deed of Trust the granting of such consent by Lender in any
Instance shsH not constitute continuing consent to subsequent instances where such consent is required.
EACH TRUSTOR ACKNOWLHXiESHAVWO READ ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THfS DEED OF TRUST, AND EACH TRUSTOR AGRBES TO ITS
^TERMS'
TRUSTOR:

INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF

COUNTTOF

(MVi

MCWfY PUBUC
ALXSCW HOOGES
cn WEST mroct «wc so/o «
LAYTOK UT 840*1
ytf OTTiaiion LuAi>4
WOVEMBEB m a »

)se

P&Vfe

rare of irwi
On this day before me, the undersigned NotaryPublic, personally appeared BLAJNE J HANNEY POA BY SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY and SHIRLEY
ANN HANNEY, to me known to be-the individual* described in and who executad the Deed of Trust, and acknowledged that they signed the
Deed of Trust as their free and: voluntary act and deed, for the uses and pwposet therein mentioned.

of tyQIAbt
RttMngM.
Kottry PuMSc in and f o r * * Sttt* of

WhUh

_.2oJ2Q_

\Mfim , vtt*h
urn

My comniMion tuptrw

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used onry when obligations have been paid in tuff)

to:

1
.:>-;
•>

, Trustee
The undersigned it the legal owner vend holder of aO ino^btedness; secured by this Deed of Trust M sums secured by this Deed of Trust have
been tufy paid and satisfied. You are hereby directed, upon payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of this Deed of Trust or
pursuant to einy afpfoabk statute; to cancel the Note eecured fry this Deed of Trust (which is delivered to you togetherwith this Deed of Tajstt,
^end tojfecofwey, wrri>out warranty, to the p a ^
the estate now held by you under this Deed of
1

Trus^. Pleese mail the re

::Dete::-

Beneficiary: a

»r..
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben ClarkIts:
Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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EXHIBIT "A"
A PART OF SECTION 1. TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST. SALT LAKE MERIDIAN. MORE PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58-22- EAST 604.60 FEET, NORTH 0*22-36" EAST
649.75 FEET AND NORTH SS'WSS" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1,
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0*22'36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89*5746" EAST 222.00 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 0*22*36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 88*0ff55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
r 1610662 B 2686 P 66Q
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER UNE, TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS. THE GRANTEES. AND
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY. FOR INGRESS, EGRESS. REGRESS
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING AT A POINT ON AN EXISTING
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89#58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26*47:5r EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH
16*39"50* EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHeRLY 199.3*) FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34.25748 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF0*20\AND NORTH 5*29-38" WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY
199:63 FEET ALCING THE ARC OF A 34.307:46 F
SOUTH 85^521" EAST 2frW ^^
RANGE 1WEST; SALT^LAI« MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING TO
TO A POINT SOLTO 89*587T EAST 27^
EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY199:30 FEETAlONG THE ARC OF A34.257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE
THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGL^ OfeO^O" AND NORTH^5*29^8" WEST227:32 FEET AND NORTH SSWSS" EAST
40:0 FECT (FOINT A) FROM THE S ^ ^
420.0 FE^THENCEALONGYrHfe^^
CURVE TO THE LEFT73.27 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 7& IffEAST 1506 F^Et;;THENCE A t O N G T H E ^ & 6 F A 7 8 ^ f 0 0 T RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT
ISt.WFEE^^^
^URVETOTHE RIGHT EH3.83^ FEET; THENCEN6RTtiM236" EAST72.6 FEET^MORE OR LESS; TO A POINT OF
CtlRVATOREVtHENCE to
NORTH &8*08i55,l EAST 98.tf FEET (PARAlM:¥6 Allb^MFEET SOUTH OF A LlNEEXTENbiNG SOUTH88*bff55*
;
W^TFROM A POIhfr SOUTH;89*^
446M0;FJEET FROM THE SO^
•WE ARCOF A518 0 FOOT RADIUS CURVETO THE ^ F T ^ T H E N C E EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF
A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH 89f58'22" EAST 1321,0
FEET AND NORTH 0*22"36" EAST 658.81 F E ^ AND WEST 223.20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF
SAID SECTION 1.
SITUATE IN DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH.
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WHEN RECORDED MAH TO:
BtAWEJ.HANNEY
3037 EAST 305O NORTH
LAYTCN, UT64040

£ 1 6 1 0 6 & 3 * 2 A 8 A t 6>6> 1
W*TL U miJlt WVISCHTT K£C0»g

:38>Iu6 2t iiaipgra i2*oo J? *

tfCD

F<* D*OT TITU KWKCI

lie

SPACE ABOVE THfcUNE FOR ReCORDBTS USE ONLY^
RECORDED AT THE REQUEST OF »WEST TTOE SOlNrtCES, »KJ. ORDER # 2 5 ^
MA* TAX NOTICE TO; BAINE J. HANNEY
3C37 EAST 3050 NORTH. LAYTON UT B4040T

QUIT CLAIM DEED
BLAHE J, KANNSY AN0 $H*L£Y ANN HAHHCt

0RANT0R<8)
OP
LAYTON, COUNTY OF
DAVta. STATE OT
HEREBY GRANT, CONVEY AM FOREVER OUTT OAJM TO

UT,

*LA*fc X RAN8EY AND BHKLET ANN KANHCY, AW) THCJR WJCCHMORTmUBTttAFORTHCHANHCY
KAI«lYTRUrr
GRANTEEfS)
OF
LAYTON
CTTY, DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUAfiLE CONSIDERATION.
THE FOUCWNQ DESCRIBED TRACT OF LANDft*OAVtS COUNTY,
STATEOF
GM»-0«H

WITNESS, THE HAND<8) OF SAK) GRANTOR(8), THtS 24

DAY OF August

SZt

SJGNEDJN THE PRESENCE OF

STATE OF ITT

.2000,

)
:8S

COUNTY OF DAV?$)
ON THE 24 DAY C K A u p * , 2000. PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFOREME
BLAINE J. HANNOftnd SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY THE 8I0NER() OF THE m H I N INSTRUMENT. WHO DULY
ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT 0 HE ( ) EXECUTED THE SAME.

v\ Shirty <mntotoey» rttawf w

&]

NOTARY PUB'JG

fief

JNWU7 TITLE *eRVJC€8. INC.
<71 W. NCmTAOC PAPH W.VD H
UYTOM,V?MW«

me

AUJIMNQDQAI

ffi&SKtf
_U1*WNW

MMUMttMUNI
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$35,000.00

'

Date: October 25,2001

For value received, the undersigned Hanney & Hanney Construction (the "Borrower"), at
5506 S. Heath Ave, Kearns, Utah 84118, promises to pay to the order of Interwest
Construction, (the "Lender"), at 35 N. Redwood Road, N. Salt Lake, Utah 84054, (or at
such other place as the Lender may designate in writing) the sum of $35,000.00.
Unpaid principal after the Due Date shown below shall accrue interest at a rate of 12.00%
annually until paid.
The principal shall be payable in full on November 25, 2001 (the "Due Date").
The Borrower reserves the right to prepay this Note by making payment inftillof the
then remaining unpaid principal and accrued interest.
If any payment obligation under this Note is not paid when due, the Borrower promises to
pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, whether or not a lawsuit is
commenced as part of the collection process^
This Note is secured by a Geil Skid Loader: Sen # FER80-15Rider Riding Trowel: Ser.
# M-HPN24NTCSLWhitman Riding Trowel: Ser. #HA61065., dated October 25, 2001.
The Lender is not required to rely on the above security instrument and the assets secured
therein for the payment of this Note in the case of default, but may proceed directly
against the Borrower.
If any of the following events of default occur, this Note and any other obligations of the
Borrower to the Lender, shall become due immediately, without demand or notice:
1) the failure of the Borrower to pay the principal and any accrued interest in full on
or before the Due Date;
2) the death of the Borrower or Lender;
3) the filing of bankruptcy proceedings invoking the Borrower as a debtor;
4) the application for the appointment of a receiver for the Borrower;
5) the making of a general assignment for the benefit of the Borrowers creditors;
6) the insolvency of the Borrower,
7) a misrepresentation by the Borrower to the Lender for the purpose of obtaining or
extending credit.
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In addition, the Borrower shall be in default if there is a sale, transfer, assignment, or any
other disposition of any assets pledged as security for the payment of this Note, or if there
is a default in any security agreement which secures this Note.
If any one or more of the provisions of this Note are determined to be unenforceable, in
whole or in part, for any reason, the remaining provisions shall remain fully operative.
All payments of principal and interest on this Note shall be paid in the legal currency of
the United States. The Borrower waives presentment for payment, protest, and notice of
protest and nonpayment of this Note.
No renewal or extension of this Note, delay in enforcing any right of the Lender under
this Note, or assignment by Lender of this Note shall affect the liability or the obligations
of the Borrower. All rights of the Lender under this Note are cumulative and may be
exercised concurrently or consecutively at the Lender's option.
This Note shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
Signed this td> day of

vZvf

•—:

OchseZ-

tioi

, at jJoie4U ^ r / / Qkg

\

•

Borrower:
Hanney & Hanney Construction

^^jCUiA^^/

hirley Hannej^
Shirley
Hannev^

/4w^

77 )
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CURRENCY • | f

3037 E. 3050 N. STREET 771-8025
LAYTON, UT 84040

:

§

sifefe

fciw*??*'.^-^*^^-^.-1-

--• -l- :

Sii'9»wiir«*,&:-.a-,J r " •••-••?; '"• •
S.W^£v« , uL»fcr"-<$.V.i. .; : .*.V.r ;.-.. •

t^C0S1'?^N^&|yj|
USE OTHER SIDE F Q ^ ^ ^ ^ ] } ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
ADDITIONAL LISTING)/) PjCHECKSlf $ 3 M U & ©
"
BE SURE EACH ITEMliT w U i / i i < * ^ ?^QiRr^
JBttnoSA a 1 1

DEPOSIT TICKET

PROPERLY ENDORSED,

"'

frOTAL ITEMS

DATE

r n n?

CHECKS AND OTHER ITEMS ARE RECEIVED FOR DEPOSIT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OR ANY APPLICABLE COLLECTION AGREEMENT.
•; DEPOSITS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL.

Tdrj^tf'i

'" -- -

3H?s

's

K

a

srj

££%:£&&•&•••;£-•'&a&-.--'- •
if
N
'-*'

9P fll t_ I i i 8 '- «

TOTAL FROM w. E.(3
OTHER SIDE ^ ft 41

£ v ) j Barnes Banking Co.
849 West Hillfield R o a d • Layton. Utah 84041 • 546-BQ22

Serving Th» Community Since 1B91

• - • - • - -

q> §

i

i

OY

$YI7T>

WO

n

MffflBi
i." \ 2 i , 3 0 0 ? i i l i : 0 a

1 0 0 121*311'

.'• fo*0 0 3 L, U ? 5 0 0 /

Barnes Banking Co.
.Since 1891
Bountiful Branch
100 South 500 West - Bountiful, Utah 84010
(801)296-1010

Need Cash? Consider a Home Equity Loan!

304^ 10/26/01/

9*51:49

000350

DDA\Q£PC

0021001243

FDIC

?4?475.00

THIS IS YOUR RECEIPT - THANK YOU
AH items received are credited to your account subject to final payment.
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%x

^

^jwi/yc/

HATF-

t

R E C O R D I N G & BILLING C H E C K L I S T
Borrower:

&tM4^0

J^ HlUinUd-

£toAjfdtOQ

RECORD WHEN ? r NOW

AinsuUimn&tJr-

Seller:

lr2fe/«=e>

(Check the names above for Judgments, & tax liens before recording)
<^\'0!)^-tZ)<^
INITIALS
Before you record:
Did the Notary sign and stamp the document?
Write the file n u m b e r and tax serial # on the document.
Compare the legal description with the Commitment, (right county?)
Verify that Grantor, Trustor a n d / o r Buyers names on the document
exactly match Schedule A. .
Compare names on t h e grantor line with the acknowledgement.
Is there a return a d d r e s s on conveyances?
Check for j u d g m e n t s filed after the effective date
Check for federal tax Hens filed after the effective date.
.' Check for any recordings filed after the effective date.

»

A- i <•

Recording
I n s t r u mInfo
ent

•/yr\ toeo-0<> '
l l

r No.*
Juntry

Hl.ftt/toO-.
\\e\Q\p\P-LPOft e*u>
%7
T D t* ~ \ft1 Pfr te'L.
&0b c*i3 \ y ( m r ? ?
W P C/2--I

•VC^P

Time
..__

Jl-IIUL

..Hook

C^-2-

tta
i£Jl

i

£L£L
3J&&£~
njmL
LU&3
SUaSU. 1*21(24

q---lo

T»cc

a_

12-

Sk=.

tflfl 12___

Exceptions to Clear

1

1 Item //

Description

Clcnred By

1
— .

1

AdditionaTServices
Service

Comment

Fee "

i
Special Instructions:

^

r-TOTAL:

S3
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SCHEDULE A
Order Number: 25859

Commitment Number: 25859

1. Effective Date: JULY 26, 2000 @ 6:00 PM
2. Policy or Policies to be issued:
(a) A.L.T.A. Owner's
Proposed Insured

(b) A.LT.A. Mortgagee's
Proposed insured:
BANK ONE, NA, ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS
(c) Leasehold
Proposed Insured:

Amount of insurance
$
0.00

$

Premium Amount
$0.00
,

4&

243,000.00

Saoe-fltf

llut
$

ENDORSEMENTS 100 116 8.1

$
Endorsement Tota!:$
Premium Total:S
Additional Charges:$

55.00
806.00
0.00

TOTAL: S

861.00

OTHER ENDORSEMENTS:
OTHER SERVICES:

3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein is
FEE SIMPLE
4. Title to the estate or interest in said land is at the effective date hereof vested in:
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND SHIRLEY ANN HANEY, AND THEIR SUCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY
FAMILY TRUST
5. The land referred to in this commitment is described as follows:
See Attached Exhibit "A"

AS-tt^lte

PROPERTY KNOWN AS: 3037 EAST 3050 NORTH LAYTON, UT 84040
TO: TWENTIETH CENTURY MORTGAGE
ATTN: KASEY

f^- dm^

EWw^ J. Qoj/4
Authorized Counter Signature
INWEST TITLE SERVICES, INC.
471 W. HERITAGE PARK BLVD. #6, LAYTON, UT 84041

-aodb

^pxmm
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S T E W A R T TITLE*

EXHIBIT "A"
A PART OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, MORE PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 604.60 FEET, NORTH 0°22'36" EAST
649.75 FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 48.02 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1 AND
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 664.55 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'46" EAST 222 00 FEET THENCE
SOUTH 0°22'36" WEST 658.52 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST 222.12 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO A 25 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY 12.50 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF AND PARALLEL TO THE
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED CENTER LINE, TO BE USED IN COMMON WITH THE GRANTORS, THE GRANTEES, AND
OTHER PARTIES OWNING ADJACENT PROPERTY TO SAID RIGHT OF WAY, FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, REGRESS
AND ALL OTHER PURPOSES FOR WHICH A ROAD MAY BE USED: BEGINNING AT A POINT ON AN EXISTING
HIGHWAY AT A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47'52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH
16°39'50" EAST 215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS
CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20', AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 303.32 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.63
FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,307.46 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND SOUTH
85°25'21" EAST 20.50 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 1
WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 250.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO A
POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 271.98 FEET AND NORTH 26°47'52" EAST 9.84 FEET AND NORTH 16o39'50" EAST
215.30 FEET AND NORTHERLY 199.30 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 34,257.48 FOOT RADIUS CURVE THROUGH A
CENTRAL ANGLE OF 0°20' AND NORTH 5°29'38" WEST 227.32 FEET AND NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 40.0 FEET (POINT
A) FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1; THENCE SOUTH 4°52'35" EAST 420.0 FEET; THENCE
ALONG THE ARC OF A 42.02 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 73.27 FEET; THENCE NORTH 75°15' EAST 150.0
FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 78.04 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT 131.05 FEET; THENCE NORTH
21° WEST 85.0 FEET; THENCE ALONG THE ARC OF A 264.91 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 98.83 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 72.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO A POINT OF CURVATURE; THENCE ALONG THE
ARC OF A 70 FOOT RADIUS CURVE TO THE RIGHT 107.23 FEET; THENCE NORTH 88°08'55" EAST 98.0 FEET
(PARALLEL TO AND 7.50 FEET SOUTH OF A LINE EXTENDING SOUTH 88°08'55" WEST FROM A POINT SOUTH
irSS'ir
EAST 1321.0 FEET AND NORTH 0°22'36" EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 446.40 FEET FROM THE
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1); THENCE EASTERLY 62.37 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 518.0 FOOT
RADIUS CURVE TO THE LEFT; THENCE EASTERLY 62.32 FEET ALONG THE ARC OF A 408.10 RADIUS CURVE TO
THE RIGHT; THENCE EAST191.98 FEET TO A POINT SOUTH 89°58'22" EAST 1321.0 FEET AND NORTH O'lTZB"
EAST 658.81 FEET AND WEST 223.20 FEET FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1.
SITUATE IN DAVIS OCUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
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SCHEDULE B

O R D E R N U M B E R : 25859

C O M M I T M E N T N U M B E R : 25859

Showing matters which will be excepted in the Policy unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the company.
(SECTIONS)
1 Defects, Hens, encumbrances, adverse claims of other matters, if any, created first appearing in the public records or attaching subsequent to
the effective date hereof but prior to the date of the proposed insured acquires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage theron
covered by this commitment.
2. Taxes for the current year.
3. Any discrepancies, conflicts, or shortages in area or boundry lines, or any encrochments of any overlapping of improvements or other boundry
or location disputes (can be eliminated or amended in mortgagee's policy upon proper evidence being furnished).
4. Restrictive covenants affecting the property described in Schedule A.
5. Rights of claims of parties in possession, and not of record in the public records; liens for labor, services or material or claim to same which are
not of record in said records.
6. Any roadway or easement, similar or dissimilar, on, under, over or across said property, or any part thereof and not of record in said records.
7. Any adverse claim based upon the assertion that
a. Some portion of the land forms the bed or bank of a navigable river or lake, or lies below the mean high water mark thereof.
b. the boundry of the land has been affected by a change in the course or water level of a navigabie river or lake.
c. the land is subject to water rights, claims or title to water, and to any governmental regulation pertaining to wetlands.
(Section-2)
The following matters will be excepted in Schedule B of the policy to be issued:
TAXES FOR THE YEAR 2000 ACCRUING AS A LIEN, BUT NOT YET DUE AND
PAYABLE PRIOR TAX INFORMATION AS FOLLOWS:
YEAR:
1999
STATUS:
PAID
AMOUNT:
$1,126.22
SERIAL NO.:
09-003-0021

THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SPECIAL
ASSESSMENT DISTRICT(S) SHOWN BELOW, AND IS SUBJECT TO ALL CHARGES
AND/OR ASSESSMENTS LEVIED THEREBY:
DISTRICTS): DAVIS COUNTY
DISTRICT(S): WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
DISTRICT(S): NORTH DAVIS SEWER IMROVEMENT DISTRICT
DISTRICT(S): SPECIAL SERVICE AREA
DISTRICT(S): HOOPER WATER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
DISTRICT(S): MUTTON HOLLOW IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT

S T E W A R T TITLE®

C-1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
GUARANTY COMFAKY
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONTINUATION SHEET
SCHEDULE B

ORDER NUMBER: 25859

EASEMENT
DATED:
RECORDED:
ENTRY NO:
BOOK/PAGE:
VENDOR.
VENDEE:
PURPOSE:

COMMITMENT NUMBER: 25859

FEBRUARY 26, 1954
MARCH 12, 1954
135487
62/50
CHRIS S. HANNEY AND MABEL J. HANNEY
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO CONSTRUCT, RECONSTRUCT, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN AN
UNDERGROUND PIPELINE AND APPURTENANT STRUCTURES
WHICH LATTER MAY PROTRUDE ABOVE THE GROUND SURFACE
ON, OVER OR ACROSS THE PROPERTY; ALSO A PERPETUAL
EASEMENTS TO CONSTRUCT, RECONSTRUCT, OPERATE AND
MAINTAIN A ROAD FOR ACCESS TO, AND OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF SAID PIPELINE, ON, OVER, OR ACROSS THE
PROPERTY; ALSO A TEMPORARY EASEMENTS DURING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE UNDERGROUND PIPELINE AND
APPURTENANT STRUCTURES ABOVE-REFERRED TO, FOR
CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES ON, OVER OR ACROSS THE
PROPERTY.

4.

RIGHT OF WAY AND EASEMENT GRANT
DATED:
FEBRUARY 1, 1979
RECORDED:
MARCH 6, 1979
ENTRY NO:
524533
BOOK/PAGE:
755/982
GRANTOR:
CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL J. HANNEY
GRANTEE:
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
PURPOSE:
TO LAY MAINTAIN, OPERATE, REPAIR, INSPECT, PROTECT, REMOVE
AND REPLACE PIPELINES, VALVES, VALVE BOXES AND OTHER GAS
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES

5.

DEED GRANTING EASEMENT:
DATED:
MARCH 10,1979
RECORDED:
MARCH 15, 1979
ENTRY NO:
525339
BOOK/PAGE:
757/487
GRANTOR:
CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL HANNEY, DONALD SHUMWAY AND FAY
SHUMWAY, EMMA LOU EISENHOUR, BLAINE HANNEY AND SHIRLEY
HANNEY
GRANTEE:
BLAINE HANNEY AND SHIRLEY HANNEY AND MELVIN WEST AND
LINDA WEST
PURPOSE:
MAINTAINING A CERTAIN WELL AND CONVEYING THE WATER FROM
THAT WELL TO THE GRANTEE'S PROPERTY, IN. OVER, AND ACROSS
A STRIP OF LAND TWENTY (20) FEET IN WIDTH
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COMMITMENT NUMBER: 25859

6,

DEED GRANTING EASEMENT:
DATED:
MARCH 10, 1979
MARCH 15, 1979
RECORDED:
525340
ENTRY NO:
757/490
BOOK/PAGE:
CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL HANNEY, KEITH HANNEY AND CATHY
GRANTOR:
HANNEY, LAREN HANNEY, DEAN HANNEY, BLAINE HANNEY AMD
SHIRLEY HANNEY, MELVIN WEST AND LINDA WEST, DONALD
SHUMWAY AND FAY SHUMWAY, NOLA JEAN ROBINSON AND EMMA
LOU EISENHOUR
GRANTEE:
CHRIS HANNEY AND MABEL HANNEY, KEITH HANNEY AND CATHY
HANNEY, LAREN HANNEY, DEAN HANNEY, BLAINE HANNEY AND
SHIRLEY HANNEY, MELVIN WEST AND LINDA WEST, DONALD
SHUMWAY AND FAY SHUMWAY, NOLA JEAN ROBINSON AND EMMA
LOU EISENHOUR
ROADWAY FOR THE JOINT USE OF GRANTEES
PURPOSE:

7.

SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, RESTRICTIONS, RIGHTS OF WAY AND RESERVATIONS APPEARING OF
RECORD.

8.

TRUST DEED
DATED:
RECORDED:
ENTRY NO:
BOOK/PAGE:
AMOUNT:
EXECUTKrBY:
TRUSTEE:
^iEFICIARY:

JANUARY 1&-*S§9
JANU;
1479287

r

•A &

5432/665

X

S80.000.00
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY AND BLAINE J. HANNEY, AS TRUSTEES
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

y$ #

$

^

U

s
9.

MODIFICATION OF KEY EQUITY OPptDNS AGREEMENT AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND KEY EQUITY OPTIONS DEED
OF TRUST
/
DATED:
APRIL 16/1999
RECORDED:
MAY 1^1999
ENTRY NO:
1515563
BOOK/PAGE:
2501/441
PURPOSE:
/TO INCREASE LOAN AMOUNT FROM $80,000.00 TO $120,000.00

10. TRUST DEED
DATED:
RECORDED:
ENTRY NO:
BOOK/PAGE:
AMOUNT:
EXECUTED BY:
TRUSTEE:
BENEFICIARY:

FEBRUARY 28,2000
FEBRUARY 29, 2000
1577647
2620/256
$163,200.00
BLAINE J, and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY
INWESTTITLE SERVICES, INC.
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE, INC.
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SCHEDULE C
ORDER NUMBER: 25859

COMMITMENT NUMBER: 25859

The following requirements must be met and completed to the satisfaction of the Company before its policy of title
insurance wiJI be issued:
1. Show that restrictions or restrictive covenants have not been violated
2. Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the estate of interest, mortgage or lien to be issued.
3. Furnish proof of payment of all bills for labor and material furnished or to be furnished in connection with improvements erected or to be
erected.
4. Pay all general and special taxes now due and payable.
NOTICE TO APPLICANT: The land covered herein may be serviced by districts, service companies and/or muncipalities which
assess charges for water, sewer, electricity and other utilities, etc. Which are not covered by this report or insured under a Titie
insurance Policy.
Any matter in dispute between you and the Company may be subject to arbitration as an alternative to court action pursuant to
the Titie Insurance Rules of the American Arbitration Association, a copy of which is available on request from the Company.
Any decision reached by arbitration shall be binding upon both you and the Company. The arbitration award may include
attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may be entered as a judgement in any court of proper jurisdiction.
1.

PAYMENT OF ALL OUTSTANDING ASSESSMENTS, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND CHARGES BY REASON OF THE
LAND BEING INCLUDED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF ANY SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICT AS PROVIDED BY STATUTE.
THE PUBLIC RECORD DISCLOSES INCLUSION OF THE LAND WITHIN SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICTS THAT MAY LEW
SUCH ASSESSMENTS, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND CHARGES AS SET OUT AS EXCEPTION NO. 2, OF SCHEDULE B,
HEREOF.

2.

A COPY OF HANNEY FAMILY TRUST , AS SET OUT AS NO. 4, SCHEDULE A, HEREOF.

3.

RECONVEYANCE OF TRUST DEED SET OUT AS EXCEPTION NO. 8 AND 10, OF SCHEDULE B, HEREOF.

4.

TRUST DEED SECURING YOUR NOTE EXECUTED BY: BLAINE J. HANNEY and SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY, AND THEIR
SUCESSOR TRUSTEES FOR THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST

5.

THE FOLLOWING NAMES HAVE BEEN CHECKED FOR JUDGMENTS, FEDERAL AND STATE TAX LIENS,
NONE HAVE BEEN FOUND EXCEPT AS NOTED ON SCHEDULE B.
BLAINE J. HANNEY
SHIRLEY ANN HANNEY

• *
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February 5, 2003

Biyan W. Cannon, P,C.
8919 South Sandy Parkway
Building A, Suite 111
Sandy, Utah 84070

RE: Bank One Notice Of Default

Mr, Bryan W, Cannon:
I have received Notice of Default, I am notify you that I, Blaine J. Hanney, had no
knowledge of this loan made against my home, I never received any money from this loan, I
am writing this notice to inform you of the VALIDITY of this loan.
Please advise.

Thank you,

3"
Blaine J. Hanney
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